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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the impact of tax policy on firms' leverage ratios in a balanced 
panel of 129 medium-sized listed companies from II European countries from 1993 to 
2005. A general model of company leverage is applied within which King's tax ratios 
are used to capture tax policy changes, controlling for non-tax influences suggested by 
the theory of corporate finance. Various leverage measures are studied to check for the 
robustness of the estimated model. Total debt is then decomposed into long-term and 
short-term debt to examine the determinants of different components of debt. 
The estimation is initially performed within a traditional static framework. The 
model is estimated using panel data techniques, including the Hausman-Taylor 
(1981) instrumental variable estimator and the Arellano-Bover (1995) GMM 
estimator to control for endogeneity. The results suggest that tax policy as measured 
has a significant but small impact on firms' leverage ratios and the impact is 
stronger on short-term borrowings than on long-term ones. Non-debt tax shields are 
a substitute for debt in company activities. With regard to control variables, the 
empirical findings suggest that non-tax factors affect financing decisions in a way 
somewhat consistent with the pecking-order theory. There is evidence to support the 
argument for the differences between the determinants of long-term and short-terin 
financing decisions. 
Further research is done by adopting a dynamic adjustment model which allows firms 
to deviate from their optimal leverage due to random shocks and takes account of 
adjustment costs incurred when they work back gradually to the optimal level. 
Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator is applied to obtain consistent estimates. The 
results substantiate the existence of adjustment costs and corroborate the results from 
the static model that tax policy measured by King's tax ratios exerts a significant impact 
on firms' total debt and short-term debt. Finns under the 'Anglo-Saxon' corporate 
governance systems appear to bear lower adjustment costs and thus have a higher 
adjustment speed than those under more relation-based systems for all fon-ns of debt. In 
addition, firms bear lower adjustment costs in adjusting their long-tenn debt than short- 
term debt regardless of their corporate governance systems. 
Keywords: Leverage, Debt, Capital structure, Taxes, Dynamic, GMM 
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Chapter I Introduction 
1.1 Background 
There is a large volume of research on company financing decisions and the 
determinants of corporate capital structure have been the focus of controversy in the 
finance literature. The modem literature originates with Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) who have demonstrated that under strict assumptions, the cost of capital and 
thus the value of the firm is independent of its capital structure because investors 
can create or undo firm leverage through a simple arbitrage mechanism, by 
borrowing or lending on their own account. However, the recent theoretical 
literature suggests that once the assumption of perfect market conditions is relaxed, 
taxation, bankruptcy.. agency costs and asymmetric information play very important 
roles in determining corporate financing decisions. 
In theory, tax policy can have a significant impact on corporate capital structure. 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that if companies can deduct debt interest 
before arriving at taxable profits, a wedge is driven between the after-tax costs of 
equity and of debt, and the value of a firm increases linearly with leverage, 
suggesting that value maximization requires 100% debt financing. This creates an 
exception to their famous irrelevancy theorem (Modighani and Miller, 1958). 
Subsequent work points out the limitations of this model and attempts to explain the 
existence of an optimal leverage ratio for firms in the real world. Myers (1984) 
classifies the theories into two broad categories: pecking order theories and trade-off 
theories. The main implication of pecking order theory is that there is a strict 
ordering of financing typically from internal to external and within external from 
debt to equity. However, the main theories about taxes and capital structure are 
developed within the framework of the trade-off theory whose key prediction is that 
firms balance tax savings from debt against various leverage-related costs to 
determine their optimal capital structure. Some crucial elements of reality which 
have been incorporated in the model include bankruptcy and agency costs (e. g., 
Baxter, 1967; Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973), tax shield substitutes for debt 
(DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980), tax capacity of firms (Mayer, 1986), and also the 
interaction between corporate and personal tax systems (King 1974.1977: Miller, 
1977). Recent theoretical research has provided a more integrated view of tax and 
capital structure under this framework, but with a clearer account of the costs of 
financial distress and its avoidance (Strebulaev. 2007). 
There is a vast empirical literature on company financing decisions, in which tax is 
just one element in a general model of company leverage. Recent reviews of this 
literature include Prasad, Green and Murinde (2005) and Frank and Goyal (2008). 
Studies that focus specifically on tax and company financing typically find a 
positive relationship between a firmýs leverage and its marginal tax rate (MacKie- 
Mason, 1990; Givoly, Hayn, Ofer and Sarig, 1992; Graham, 1996a, Sarkar, and 
Zapatero, 2003). Non-debt tax shields are mostly found to have the predicted 
negative impact on leverage (MacKie-Mason, 1990; Givoly et aL, 1992; Shenoy 
and Koch, 1996; Graham and Tucker, 2006), but some studies find a positive or 
insignificant impact, which could be explained by the 'collateral effect* (Moore, 
1986) and the 'tax-exhaustion effect' (MacKie-Mason, 1990), respectively. Graham 
(2008) concludes that, in general, taxes do affect corporate financial decisions, but 
the magnitude of the effect is ýnot large, and certainly less than might be expected 
on the basis of theory. 
The three main approaches to understanding the impact of tax are based on panel or 
cross-section regression, event studies or simulation. Examples of these approaches 
include respectively Rajan and Zingales (1995), Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and 
Graham (2000). Each method has its problems. The main difficulty with the 
regression approach is probably the lack of suitable summary measures of a 
complex corporate tax schedule for use in the model. Statutory tax rates generally 
change infrequently and are common across firms within a country thus limiting the 
extent to which it is possible to calculate firm-specific responses to tax changes. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) overcome this problem by comparing financial decisions 
across countries since tax rates vary substantially across countries. They do find that 
the use of debt seems to be higher in countries with higher corporate tax rates. 
However, the results must be interpreted with caution given the institutional 
differences as well as the difference in accounting practices across countries. The 
commonly used financial statement-based average tax rates in many empirical 
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studies are not highly correlated with statutory tax burdens. When used as 
explanatory variables, the coefficients on these variables are more likely to 
understate the effects of the tax system on firm behaviour (Plesko. 2003). a result 
which is also corroborated by Graham (2008). 
To conclude, the empirical evidence on the impact of taxes on corporate financing 
decisions is far from conclusive and little is known about the magnitude of tax 
effects, which have formed the initial motivation for this research. 
1.2 Thesis Overview and Aims of the Research 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of corporate and personal taxation on 
financing decisions of European non-financial listed companies 
In this thesis, a new approach to the measurement of tax policy is adopted within a 
conventional regression framework using panel data. The impact of tax policy is 
studied in a balanced panel of 129 non-financial firms from II European countries 
from 1993 through 2005. This epoch is of great interest because all the EU countries 
experienced tax regime changes, and in countries such as Ireland there was a 
concerted policy of corporate tax reduction. By pooling firms with tax homes in 
different countries I am able to exploit both time series and cross-sectional 
variations in tax rates to a greater extent than is normally possible in such studies. 
Since most previous studies focus on a single country, it is also of interest to 
examine how far it is possible to trace the cross-country impact of tax changes. 
There are also difficulties in a cross-country analysis including comparability of 
accounting information and identification of the tax rates that are relevant to each 
company, given the extent of cross-border activity and the use of transfer pricing 
and capital transactions with subsidiaries (tunnelling) to minimize international tax 
obligations. These are general issues in any tax research, but are perhaps more acute 
in a cross-country study. 
I deal with the issue of comparability by using company data from Worldscope 
which is generally accepted to be the most comprehensive available international 
3 
company database (Ulbricht and Weiner, 2005). The tax rates faced by companies 
are based on the statutory tax rates for each jurisdiction, on the grounds that 
statutory rates correspond most closely to the instruments of tax policy. In 
comprehensive simulations of US corporate tax schedules, Graham (1996b) and 
Plesko (2003) have shown that the top statutory tax rate is the best proxy for the true 
marginal tax rate for most firms. This suggests that statutory tax rates can provide a 
reasonable measure of corporate tax incentives. The final issue is that of cross- 
border tax-minimizing transactions. The scope for these is greatest within large 
multinational companies, and my sample therefore consists exclusively of medium- 
sized quoted companies in the EU whose scope for cross-border tax minimizing 
transactions, particularly those affecting capital structure, is either small or 
negligible. Hall, Hutchinson and Michaelas (2004) did investigate the capital 
structure of a large sample of small and medium-sized EU companies and found 
substantial cross-country variations in capital structure determinants. Cross-country 
differences in taxation are one obvious possible source of these unexplained 
variations. Macroeconomic factors are also included in the models I estimate. These 
aim to capture institutional differences across countries other than tax factors. 
Finally, in contrast to many previous studies (for example, Hall et al., 2004), the 
analysis is not limited to a few variables. Instead, the analysis of tax policy is 
embedded within a more general model of company leverage ratios, controlling for 
a range of non-tax factors which are generally recognized to help determine 
company leverage. 
Previous research suggests that the level of leverage and its determinants vary 
significantly depending on the precise definition of leverage adopted. See especially 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Chittenden, Hall and Hutchinson (1996), Michaelas, 
Chittenden and Poutziouris (1999), and Bevan and Danbolt (2002). Furthermore, it 
can be argued that decomposing debt into its different components enables a 
finer 
test of the trade-offs inherent in the tax-cum-bank-ruptcy model (Song, 2005). 
Therefore, I consider and compare different definitions of leverage, distinguishing 
between a broad and a narrower definition, and among total debt, short-term debt 
and long-term debt. This taxonomy makes it possible to check 
how far the model is 
consistent with different theories of company financing, as well as to 
investigate the 
robustness of the results, a particularly important 
factor in a setting in which it is not 
4 
possible to control fully for cross-country differences in the reporting of financial 
and other variables in the model. 
More recent research on capital structure has focused on the dynamic adjustment 
process of firm leverage since the most commonly adopted static model of leverage 
has been criticized for making the assumption that firms adjust to their desired 
optimal capital structure immediately without encountering any costs. The optimal 
and observed capital structure may differ if adjustment costs exist. Hence, I also set 
up and estimate a dynamic adjustment model within which a firm's leverage is 
explained in terms of its leverage in the previous period and its target level, the 
latter being a function of both firm-specific characteristics and macroeconomic 
factors. The main studies which have applied this approach include De Miguel and 
Pindado (2001), Ozkan (2001), Gaud, Jani, Hoesli and Bender (2005) and Drobetz 
and Wanzenried (2006). 1 also look at the impact of market and institutional 
characteristics on the speed of adjustment by dividing the sample into two sub- 
samples according to their corporate governance systems: the relation-based system 
which predominates in Continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon system that 
prevails in the UK and Ireland. A different adjustment speed is allowed for the two 
sub-samples by introducing country dummies that interact with the speed of 
adjustment. Comparisons are made between long-term and short-term debt ratios. 
1.3 Contributions to Knowledge 
The thesis makes 5 major contributions to the literature. First, it offers a systematic 
review of the theoretical and empirical modelling of tax regimes and tax policies in 
the existing literature. Second, it provides a comprehensive summary of the tax 
systems and tax provisions of II major EU countries and adopts a new approach to 
the measurement of tax policy within a conventional regression framework. Third, 
this research is not confined to a sample of companies from a single country. 
Pooling firms with tax homes in different countries permits the analysis to exploit 
both time-series and cross-sectional variations in statutory tax rates to a much 
greater extent than is normally possible in such studies. Fourth, in the finance 
literature, surprisingly little is known about the size of tax effects on corporate 
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financing decisions. In this study, a simple procedure is performed to estimate the 
size of tax effects in each country based on the estimates from the basic capital 
structure model. This provides some new and important evidence that tax plays a 
role in firms' financing decisions but the effect is not large. Last hut not least, this 
thesis has extended the traditional static model of leverage to account for the 
dynamic adjustment process and obtained new evidence on the existence of 
aqjustment costs and ways in which they vary systematically across countries. 
Specifically, this study has compared adjustment costs between firms under two 
different corporate governance systems, and some interesting results are obtained. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters which are organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on how taxes affect firms' financing 
decisions. The review starts with the theoretical background and models built to 
explain the existence of an interior optimum firm-specific capital structure by 
relaxing the strict assumptions made by Modigliani and Miller (1958) in their 
famous irrelevancy theorem. Then the empirical evidence on whether and how taxes 
affect firms' capital structure decisions at both the corporate and individual levels is 
examined. Finally, I summarize the major empirical results from previous studies of 
determinants of corporate financing decisions other than tax factors. These have 
provided both theoretical and empirical support for my choice of control variables 
in subsequent empirical chapters. 
Chapter 3 first introduces and justifies the model and panel data methodology 
employed in the empirical chapters, and then describes the selection of sample 
companies. The selection process is intended to give the best chance of identifying 
tax effects through variations in statutory tax rates by concentrating on medium- 
sized companies from a substantial cross-section of European countries over a 
relatively long time period and therefore is of great importance in my study. 
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Chapter 4 introduces background knowledge- about tax systems and discusses the 
tax policy changes in sample European countries during the period examined. A 
good understanding of tax regimes is a prerequisite for modelling the effects of 
different tax statutes and measuring the tax burden on firms and investors in the 
subsequent empirical chapters. More details about corporate and personal taxation 
as well as tax rates on different types of income are summarized for each sample 
country in appendices to Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 reviews the modelling of tax systems in the previous literature. Different 
tax variables adopted in empirical studies on the tax effects are summarized and 
their limitations are discussed. The upshot of the discussion is that it is never 
possible to find a 'perfect' proxy for tax policies for every individual firm. 
Therefore, King's tax ratios (the debt-equity and debt-retention margins) based on 
top (bracket) statutory tax rates are calculated and adopted in the present study. This 
choice assures both the exogeneity of the tax variables and also sufficient cross- 
sectional and time series variation needed to identify the impact of tax changes. 
Chapter 6 examines the impact of tax regimes and changes in the regimes on 
company financing decisions at the aggregate level for a sample of European 
companies during the period 1993 to 2005 within a conventional model of leverage, 
controlling for non-tax factors suggested by the theory of corporate finance. 
Different measures of leverage, ftom broader to narrower ones which represent 
different levels of company liabilities, are employed as a check on the robustness of 
the underlying model and of the estimates of the impact of tax changes. Panel 
diagnostics are perforined first and the Hausman-Taylor (198 1) estimator and the 
Arellano and Bover (1995) GMM estimator are chosen to control for different forms 
of endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. The results are compared and 
some implications for choosing appropriate estimation procedures are drawn. The 
size of tax effects on leverage ratios are then estimated based on the results. 
Chapter 7 extends the analysis in Chapter 6 by examining the sources of debt in 
more detail. Total debt is decomposed into short-term and long-term debt and the 
estimation results are compared to see if there exist significant differences in the 
determinants of different components of debt, as suggested by the previous 
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literature. Consistent with Chapter 6, the model is estimated using both the 
Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator and the Arellano and Bover (1995) GMM 
estimator. The size of tax effects on the components of total debt is calculated 
Chapter 8 further extends the analysis by relaxing the assumption in static models 
that there are no costs incurred in the adjustment of capital structure for firms. A 
partial adjustment model is employed and the GMM approach proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (199 1) is applied to investigate whether taxes and other firm-specific and 
macroeconomic factors have a significant impact on firms' capital structure when 
taking account of adjustment costs. In the third section, a country dummy is 
included in the partial adjustment model to accommodate different adjustment costs 
between two types of companies classified by their corporate governance systems: 
the Anglo-Saxon system and the relation-based system. The adjustment speed and 
thus the corresponding costs in adjusting different components of debt to their target 
levels are compared between companies under the two governance systems. 
Chapter 9 summarizes the main findings of the thesis and suggests further possible 
research directions implied by its findings. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The choice of investment financing is central to the economic performance of 
corporations and is one of the most studied fields of business decisions. There are 
three main sources of funding: retained earnings, debt instruments, or the issuing of 
new shares. The outcome of the choices among these three sources gives the capital 
structure of the firm. 
The modem debate on capital structure starts from the seminal work of Modigliani 
and Miller (M&M, 1958). M&M assume that 
(1) There are no corporate or personal taxes. 
(2) Capital markets are perfect, so 
(i) There are no transaction costs. 
(ii) Investors have equal access to all information, so there are no costs 
associated with bankruptcy or financial distress. 
(iii) Compensation contracting is perfect, so there are no agency problems. 
Under these strict conditions, M&M consider two firms, unlevered and levered, 
with identical operating cash flows. In this framework, they demonstrate that capital 
structure does not have any implications for firm value. Therefore, the value of a 
firm and hence the cost of capital is independent of how its investment is financed. 
Through a simple arbitrage mechanism, investors can create or undo leverage, and 
thus undo anything firms do. The conclusion of the analysis is that arbitrage will 
assure that leverage would not raise the average cost of capital. During the past 50 
years, economists have focused their research on whether corporate financing 
decisions become relevant if these assumptions are relaxed. 
This chapter will review both theoretical and empirical research that investigates the 
consequences of relaxing the assumptions and highlight how taxes affect firmsý 
financing policies and firm value. A general summary of the empirical literature on 
the determinants of corporate financing other than tax factors is also given. 
9 
2.2 Theories of the Impact of Taxation on Capital Structure 
After their first paper about corporate capital structure in a perfect market, M&M 
(1963) modify their model to accommodate corporate tax and this is also the first 
paper to demonstrate clearly the role of the tax benefit of debt. Since interest 
payment is a deductible expense when calculating corporate tax, leverage tends to 
reduce the cost of capital to a firm and thus increase its market value. By 
including corporate taxes, M&M show that the value of the firm increases as the 
level of leverage rises by an amount equivalent to the present value of the future 
tax shield benefits. With perpetual debt for example, the value of a firm with debt 
financing is 
I,, ' v+ 
TcrDD 
+TD wvth debt no debt 
VIO 
debt c (2.1) 
where 7-c is the corporate income tax rate, rD is the coupon rate of debt, and D is 
the amount of debt the firm holds. The term -r(, D represents the tax advantage of 
debt. Hence,, according to M&M, the more debt financing a firm uses, the greater 
will be the market- value of the firm. In this model, the maximum market value of a 
levered firm is reached when it approaches one hundred percent debt financing. The 
optimal financing policy for firms is to finance entirely with debt. 
However, the model M&M described is recognized as extreme; it is never claimed 
that the real world follows all their assumptions. In the real world, corporations do 
not behave the way M&M have proposed. Rather, they appear to target an optimal 
capital structure. Therefore, subsequent research has been dedicated to developing 
models relaxing the restrictive assumptions made by M&M (195 8,1963). 
Myers (1984) classifies capital structure theories into two main categories: the 
trade-off theory which argues that a firm's target leverage is determined by 
balancing tax savings from debt against leverage related costs, and the pecking 
order theory in which firms have no target debt ratios but follow a strict ordering of 
financing. The tax theories are mostly framed within the tax benefit and bankruptcy 
cost trade-off model. This section first reviews the theoretical tax literature within 
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the trade-off framework and then has, a brief summary of the pecking order theor yý 
which may not directly focus on taxes but also provides some implications for the 
tax effects. 
2.2.1 The Trade-off Framework 
In a trade-off framework, a firm evaluates the various costs and benefits of 
alternative leverage plans. It is assumed an interior optimal capital structure is 
obtained where the marginal costs and marginal benefits are balanced. Frank and 
Goyal (2008) divide trade-off theories into two categories: the static trade-off 
theories and the target adjustment theories. 
2.2.1.1 Static Trade-off 
According to Frank and Goyal (2008), a firm is said to follow the static trade-off 
theory if the firmý's leverage is determined by a single period trade-off between the 
tax benefits of debt and the tax related costs such as bankruptcy and agency costs. 
2.2.1.1.1 Bankruptcy Cost 
The early literature attempts to extend the M&M analysis to allow for the possibility 
of bankruptcy. Baxter (1967) was among the first to explore debt-related costs. He 
points out that as firms' reliance on debt expands, the profitability of the arbitrage 
operation expressed by M&M may become illusory. The 'risk of ruid raises the cost 
of capital for highly-levered firms. The risk arises from the fact that the unlevered 
firm can experience changes in earnings, but a succession of bad years would 
substantially increase the probability of bankruptcy for the highly-levered firm since 
it may not be able to meet its interest obligations. There are also opportunity costs 
associated with bankruptcy in both direct and indirect forms. Direct costs include 
notification costs, court costs, and legal fees for the bankruptcy process, while 
indirect bankruptcy costs include lost tax credits, increased costs charged by 
suppliers, and lost sales. Indirect costs could also arise from cutbacks in research 
and development, maintenance, advertising and educational expenses when the finn 
runs into financial distress. All these costs may ultimately result in lower firm value. 
The main idea of the theory is that an interior leverage optimum is determined by a 
trade-off between the tax-saving advantages of debt against the deadweight costs of 
bankruptcy. According to Baxter (1967), the 'risk of ruin' is not linearly related to 
the level of debt issued. The tax advantage of debt is greater than the corresponding 
bankruptcy costs when leverage is very low, while for high levels of debt the 
(potential) cost of bankruptcy dominates, which implies a U-shaped cost of capital 
curve and a correspondingly inverted U-shaped firm value curve. This conclusion 
inspired other researchers to explore the existence of optimal capital structure of 
firms. 
Kim (1978) uses mean-variance analysis in the context of the capital asset pricing 
model to show that when firms are subject to bankruptcy costs, they would stop 
issuing debt before they reach 100 percent debt financing. Firms that aim to 
maximize the value of their shareholders would search for their optimal capital 
structure instead of maximizing their borrowing. Using a state-preference model, 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) specify both the tax-deductibility advantage of debt 
and the risk of a firm unable to meet its debt obligation (which would result in 
bankruptcy). They define the problem of optimal capital structure to be the 
determination of the level of debt such that the resulting division of states (into 
those in which the firm is solvent and those in which it is insolvent) yields the 
maximum market value of the firm. Brennan and Schwartz (1978) build their model 
on M&M's risk-class assumption to compare the value of a levered firm with an 
otherwise-identical unlevered firm. They point out that the tax savings of interest 
payments end once the firm goes bankrupt. Issuing additional debt will increase the 
tax savings as long as the firm survives. However, it will reduce the probability of 
the firm's survival. The two influences may result in an increase or a decrease in 
firm value when an additional unit of debt is issued and the financing decision 
depends on which of these two influences prevails. An optimal debt-equity ratio is 
achieved where the marginal benefit of tax saving is equal to the marginal cost of 
bankruptcy cost as one more unit of debt is issued. 
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2.2.1.1.2 Differential Personal Tax 
Miller (1977) argues that although bankruptcy costs and the associated agency costs 
do indeed exist, the evidence suggests that they are disproportionately small relative 
to tax savings, so the modelled trade-off between tax shelter and bankruptcy cost 
cannot explain the existence of an optimal capital structure. Miller (1977) 
introduces a progressive income tax system into his model and demonstrates that the 
existence of differential personal taxes can eliminate the 100% debt implication 
without the need for bankruptcy or agency costs. Given that corporate debt is 
perpetual, the gain from leverage, GL . for shareholders can be expressed as: 
GL 
)(I 
ps 
Y 
rph 
(2.2) 
where r(, is the corporate income tax rate, z-p,, is the personal income tax rate 
applicable to income from equity, -r is the personal income tax rate applicable to r ph 
income from bonds, and D is the amount of debt the firm issues. The term 
-C, rPS 
specifies the degree to which the disadvantage of personal tax (I 
- lrpý 
) 
offsets a firtn's incentive to use debt financing. 
Note that when personal tax rates on income from equity and bonds are set equal to 
zero (-rP, = Tpý = 0), the expression reduces to rcD, the M&M (1963) result of the 
tax advantage of holding corporate debt. However, insofar as investors also face 
personal income taxes, with a higher tax rate on debt than equity income, the total 
tax advantage of debt is lower. When the rates happen to satisfy the equation 
(I 
-, r,, 
X1 
- -cps 
)= (I 
- -rpý 
), which means that the retention rate for debt is equal to 
the retention rate for equity income, the net tax advantage of debt is zero. By 
making the simplifying assumption that the tax rate on income from equity is zero 
and all debt securities are risk-free, Miller (1977) shows that the personal tax 
disadvantage of debt combined with supply side adjustment just serves to offset the 
tax advantage of debt at the firm level. In equilibrium, the marginal costs of debt 
and equity net of personal and corporate taxes should be equal. Investors with a tax 
preference for equity would hold equity while those with a tax preference for debt 
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would hold debt. Firms would be indifferent between debt and equity financing and 
issue enough of the two, in the aggregate, to satisfy the demand of investors. This 
means there would be no optimal debt-equity ratio for any individual firm. However, 
there is an equilibrium level of aggregate corporate debt and therefore an 
equilibrium debt-equity ratio for the whole corporate sector. Different firms with 
different leverage would be able to find a market among investors in different tax 
brackets. 
2.2.1.1.2.1 Financial Leverage Clienteles 
By studying differential personal income taxes, Miller (1977) suggests the existence 
of individual investor preferences about corporate leverage. In Miller's (1977) 
assumed tax environment, Kim, Lewellen and McConnell (1979) examine the 
hypothesis that investors will sort themselves into tax-induced shareholder leverage 
clienteles. By comparing the after-tax cash flows generated from investing in 
common stocks of both levered and unlevered firms, they find evidence of a 
bimodal distribution of corporate leverage structure: investors with personal tax 
rates (-rp) higher than the corporate income tax rate (rc ) will hold stocks of firms 
with zero leverage, while the stocks of high-leverage firms are demanded by 
investors whose tax rates are lower than the corporate rate. Their explanation for the 
result is that when -rP < 7-c ý the cost 
for investors of borrowing on personal accounts 
is higher than that incurred by borrowing through firms, because the corporate 
interest tax shieldý rD'FC ý 
is greater than the personal interest tax shields, rD 7- P 
(where rD is the coupon rate of corporate bonds). 
Subsequent research by Kim (1982) points out that although Kim et al. 's (1979) 
approach is sound, they treat the portfolio risk as an exogenous variable under the 
assumptions of Miller's (1977) world, and thus their financial leverage clientele 
argument is subject to criticisms based on either certainty or risk neutrality. Also, 
previous studies fail to consider the possibility of losing personal and corporate 
interest tax shields due to insufficient taxable income. Different from Miller's (1977) 
assumption of constant personal and corporate tax rates, Kim (1982) assumes that 
the interest tax shields start to reduce the marginal tax rate of both investors and 
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firms beyond a certain finite amount of borrowing. In a mean-variance framework, 
Kim (1982) examines both the demand and supply sides of corporate leverage and 
demonstrates that if the tax rates are treated as endogenous variables and the 
possibility of losing corporate interest tax shields is allowed, there will be an 
interior optimal corporate capital structure for firms, and the arguments for financial 
leverage clienteles proposed by Kim et al. (1979) remain viable. Moreover. the 
results suggest that by combining the analysis of supply and demand sides, the 
shareholder leverage clienteles may reduce both the magnitude of the tax 
advantages of debt and the leverage-related costs. 
2.2.1.1.3 Non-debt Tax Shields 
Debt interest is not the only tax shield that firms can benefit from. Non-debt tax 
shields such as depreciation, investment tax credits, and loss carry-back and carry- 
forward provisions, enable firms to deduct their profits from particular activities 
which are given favoured tax treatment. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) extend 
Miller's (1977) model by linking non-debt corporate tax shields with cross-sectional 
variation in debt policy. They employ a two-date state-preference model and argue 
that the existence of non-debt tax shields can moderate the tax benefit of debt 
interest payment and hence overturn the leverage irrelevancy theorem. At some 
level of debt, corporate tax shields are lost even though no default occurs. The 
supply curve of debt is no longer perfectly elastic over the entire feasible leverage 
range as described in Miller's (1977) model. When the debt level is higher than the 
one where all corporate tax shields are fully utilized, the supply curve will be 
smoothly upward sloping. The marginal tax benefit is not constant and no longer 
always equal to the statutory tax rate. Instead, it decreases as leverage is added to 
the capital structure, which results in a unique interior optimal capital structure. 
Different from Miller's (1977) model, bankruptcy cost is a significant consideration 
here. No matter how big or small default costs are, the market relative price of debt 
and equity will adjust, so the net tax advantage of debt and marginal default costs 
are of the same order of magnitude in this model. 
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2.2.1.1.4 Risk Aversion 
Auerbach and King (1983) generate a more general model than Miller's (1977) to 
explore investors' behaviour with respect to both tax rates and risk-aversion under a 
mean-variance framework. They emphasize that different marginal tax rates of 
substitution between assets faced by investors, and different marginal tax rates for 
investors and firms, would produce arbitrage incentives, so constraints are very 
important in determining whether an equilibrium exists or not. They argue that tax 
preferences are not sufficient to explain investor specialization in debt or equity 
(and thus determine an equilibrium debt-equity ratio) but that the degree of risk 
aversion also plays an important role. The specialization of investors in low and 
high leverage firms implied by Miller (1977) is moderated on the existence of risk 
aversion. 
2.2.1.1.5 Corporate Tax System, Legal Constraints, and Tax Exhaustion 
King (1974,1977) emphasizes the importance of the interaction between personal 
and corporate tax systems and this gives rise to a hierarchy of funds based merely 
on tax considerations (in particular the differences in the tax rates that apply to 
dividend income and capital gains) and certain institutional and legal constraints. 
Under the classical system, the taxation of the firm and shareholders are totally 
separated. Corporation taxable profits are taxed at the corporate tax rate while 
shareholders are liable to personal income tax on their dividends, implying that 
dividend income is effectively taxed twice. The two-rate system, aiming to alleviate 
at least some of double taxation of the classical system, places different tax rates on 
distributed and undistributed profits, with the former being lower. Under an 
imputation system, shareholders receive credits for tax paid by the firm and can use 
the credits to offset their personal income tax on dividends. King (1977) examines 
the financial decisions related to a single marginal choice by assuming one of the 
three sources of funding at a given level with a choice then to be made between the 
other two under different tax systems. 
In King"s (1977) model, four tax variables are considered: corporate income tax rate 
(c), personal tax rate on dividend income (MD)ý personal tax rate on capital gains (z), 
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and personal tax rate on interest income (m, ). By considering bilateral margins. 
three cases are distinguished under the classical system: 
If equity is given, and G-m, NI - c)(l -z), the firm chooses to finance with debt 
over retentions. 
GO If retentions are given, and (I - ml )>(I - 
00 
- MD 
). then the firm chooses to 
finance with debt over equity. 
(iii) If debt is given, and (I - mD 
N' 
-Z), the firm chooses to finance with equity over 
retentions.. 
King (1977) also argues that the elimination of any provision for the tax 
deductibility of interest payments removes the incentive for firms to use debt. The 
optimal financial policy is a choice between issues of new shares and retained 
earnings. 
Legal constraints on corporate behaviour are also considered in King's (1977) 
model. For example, dividends must be less than or equal to current profits after tax 
while companies are not allowed to buy back their own shares. Both of these 
constraints aim to prevent firms from avoiding tax. Mayer (1986) follows the 
approach of King (1974,1977) in a partial equilibrium stochastic model and adds 
the additional constraints that corporate tax payments are non-negative and that 
companies can carry forward accumulated losses to subsequent periods. He points 
out that as soon as uncertainty about the level of taxable earnings is introduced, the 
value of tax deductions and allowances becomes dependent on the firm's financial 
and investment policy, and it will not be optimal for firms to pursue an extreme 
financial structure. Firms will run into tax exhaustion well before they go bankrupt, 
which imposes significant costs on debt financing. Therefore, the important feature 
of the legal constraints discussed in King's model (1977) is no longer applicable - 
equality of costs of alternative forms of finance is reached before legal constraints 
are encountered. 
Keen and Schiantarelli (1991) follow King's (1974) partial equilibrium model to 
demonstrate that, excluding all other considerations (progressive tax rate. 
asymmetric information, and legal constraints, etc. ), corporate tax asymmetries 
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cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for an optimal financial decision. 
Considering three possible tax positions for firm determined by their degree of tax 
exhaustion, they conclude that the opportunities of riskless arbitrage would not 
disappear unless the firm were tax exhausted. Firms would continue to issue new 
debt until their tax capacity were exhausted. In addition, other considerations 
ignored in this model are necessary in obtaining a more rational explanation of 
corporate financing policy. 
2.2.1.1.6 The Theoretical Modelling of Corporate Debt Financing 
The implication of the trade-off theory is that the optimum leverage reflects a trade- 
off between the tax benefits of debt and the leverage-related costs. A useful 
comprehensive statement of this theory is the single period model built by Bradley, 
Jarrell and Kim (1984). As argued by the authors, the model captures the essence of 
the model of trade-off between tax advantage of debt and bankruptcy costs by Kraus 
and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976), Kim (1978), and Titman (1984), the agency 
cost theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), the non-debt tax 
shields argument of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), and the model of differential tax 
rates between income from debt and equity by Miller (1977). 
Several assumptions are made in the model. Investors are risk-neutral which 
suggests that they will only invest in either debt or equity, based on their after-tax 
return. Interest income is subject to a progressive tax rate, 7-P, . while 
dividend and 
capital gains are taxed at a single constant rate, rP, . The 
firm faces a constant 
marginal tax rate, -rc, based on its end-of-period wealth, and interest and principle 
payments are fully deductible in calculating its end-of-period tax bills. Non-debt tax 
shields exist to reduce the firm's total tax liability, such as depreciation and 
investment tax credits. However, they are not transferable either through time or 
across firms. If the firm cannot meet the promised debt payments to its bondholders, 
the costs associated with financial distress will reduce the value of the firm. 
Let X= the end-of-period earnings of the firm before debt payments and taxes, B 
the total end-of-period promised payments (interest and principle) to bondholders, 
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the total after-tax value of the non-debt tax shields if fully utilized, and k= the 
cost of financial distress per unit of end-of-period value of the firm. 
Therefore, the returns to bondholders and stockholders in different states defined by 
the level of firm earnings can be summarized by Table 2.1 (Frank and Goyal, 2008). 
Table 2.1 Returns to stockholders and bondholders in various states 
Earnings t5 State Debt Equity Tax Loss 
X<O - 
x 0<X<B X(I - k) 0 0 U 
x B<A'<B+01-r(- B X-B 0 0 
X>B+01-c(, B X-B--cc(X-B)+o -rc(X-B)-o 
If the earnings X are negative, no debt is paid and no earnings are received by equity 
holders. If the earnings are positive but not large enough to cover the debt payment 
B, the firm defaults and debt takes over which is associated with a deadweight loss 
of kYused in the process. No tax is paid by the firm. 
If earnings are enough to cover the debt payments, the state of thýe firm still depends 
on whether the non-debt tax shields can cover all the tax liability of the firm, i. e., if 
0> rc (X - B) . 
If income is not sufficiently high and non-debt tax shields are not 
fully utilized, no tax is paid and equity holders receive the difference between the 
earnings and the debt payments. In the largest range of states, the firm is able to 
fully utilize all the non-debt tax shields and then the equity holders receive 
X-B- -cc (X - B) +0 and the corporate tax is paid by the amount -cc (X - B) - 0. 
Therefore, the market value of debt is obtained by integrating the bondholders' 
after-tax returns across all states shown in Table 2.1: 
=IB X(I - k)f (X)dX] (2.3) 
VB ( f(X)dX + 
I+ ro R 
where ro = the risk-free rate of return, and f (X) is the probability density of X. 
The market value of equity is obtained by integrating the equity holders' after-tax 
returns across all states: 
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iý =( l+I-0 +o/'U 
[(X - B)(1 - -r(, ) + O]f 
. 
(X)dX 
(2.4) 
B). f (X)dX] 
Adding (2.3) and (2.4), the market value of the firm is: 
V= VB + Tý Af 
, 
ýf (X)dX +f X(I - k)f (X)dX] I+ ro 
1-7 
[(X - B)(1 - -r(, ) + Olf (X)dX (2.5) 
(X - B)f (X)dX] 
The conventional assumption is that the choice of leverage is determined by 
maximizing the market value of the firm. Therefore, if the optimum decision is 
interior, it can be obtained by the first order condition by differentiating (2.5) with 
respect to B and setting it equal to zero, i. e., c9V I aB = 0. 
1 7- 
ph aVlaB )1[1 - F(B)] [I - + 7-0 
7-C I-ps 
-cps)T, [F(B +0 Ir(, ) - F(B)] - kBF(B)j 
where F(. ) is the cumulative probability density function of B. 
(2.6) 
The first term in the curly brackets is the marginal net tax benefit of debt. The 
second term represents the increase in the probability of wasting interest tax shields 
when earnings are less than tax shields. The third term is the marginal increase in 
expected costs of financial distress. 
The essence of trade-off theory is to balance the tax advantages of debt against 
various leverage-related costs. The impact of these factors on firm leverage can be 
found from the model by re -differentiating the first-order condition with respect to 
each of the parameters of interest. Frank and Goyal (2008) have summarized the 
results as follows: 
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1. The firm's optimal debt levels are negatively related to the costs of financial 
distress (k); 
2. The firm's optimal debt levels are negatively correlated with the non-debt 
tax shields (0) of the firm. 
3. The optimal level of debt increases as the personal tax rate on equity (7- P, 
increases. 
4. The optimal level of debt decreases as the tax rate on interest (, rp, ) increases. 
The model discussed above can also be used to illustrate some existing theories of 
capital structure as special cases. 
Setting rp =k=0=0 gives the Miller's (1977) irrelevancy model, so that (2.6) 
reduces to aV / c9B -I [I - F(B)]z-(ý - [I - F(B)]r,, h I /(I + ro) . 
The first term is the 
marginal tax advantage of debt measured as the product of corporate tax rate (z-(. ) 
and the probability that the firrn will meet its debt payment QI - F(B)]). The second 
term is the marginal tax premium that the firm expects to pay the bondholders. 
Firms will continue issuing debt until, due to the progressivity of tax rate on income 
from bonds, the personal tax rate on interest is equal to the corporate tax rate. 
Therefore, the net tax benefit of debt is zero in equilibrium. 
Alternatively, setting -r., =0, no personal tax on income from stocks, gives the 
model by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). In this case, (2.6) turns to: 
0V/ OB [I - F(B)] (7-c - rrý) - rc [F(B +0/ -cc) - F(B)] (2.7) 
- (I - z-,, 6)kBf (B) I /(I + ro) 
Therefore the firm will stop issuing debt when 
TC - Ir ph = 
ý, rc [F(B +0/, r(, ) - F(B)] + (I - rpý)kBf (B) I /[I - F(B)] (2.8) 
As long as either of 0 and k is positive, rc will be greater than r,,, which means 
the firm will stop issuing debt while the personal tax rate on interest is less than the 
corporate income tax rate. In equilibrium, the first term in (2.7) is positive which 
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suggests the net tax advantage of debt is positive. The second term represents the 
increase in the probability of wasting interest tax shields when the non-debt tax 
shields are greater than taxable income. The third term stands for the marginal 
increase in the costs of financial distress. Overall, the model demonstrates that the 
firm's optimal leverage can be determined by a trade-off between the expected tax 
advantage of debt and expected costs associated with leverage. 
2.2.1.2 Dynamic Trade-off 
The static trade-off model is a single period model. In the last few years, some 
researchers have considered the trade-off theory with an explicit treatment of the 
fact that the operation of firms lasts for more than a single period 
Brennan and Schwartz (1984) develop a model which represents a first step towards 
the analysis of a dynamic financial policy. They analyse a continuous time model 
with taxes and debt-related agency and bankruptcy costs. Under the assumption that 
firms react to adverse shocks immediately by rebalancing their tax saving and tax 
related costs without any adjustment costs, their model reinforces the argument that 
firms maintain high debt levels to take advantage of tax benefits. 
Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) introduce recapitalization costs into the 
analysis to avoid the unrealistically rapid balancing problem in Brennan and 
Schwartz's (1984) analysis. Under the dynamic framework, it is assumed that the 
firm allows its debt ratio to vary within a certain range. The rebalancing takes place 
at an upper and lower limit. Finns repay debt when making profits and will 
recapitalize as long as the lower leverage limit is reached. Their simulations suggest 
that even small adjustment costs can give rise to a delay in rebalancing and wide 
variations in firms' debt ratios. Furthermore, the numerical solutions suggest that the 
tax advantage of debt is positively related to the corporate income tax rate and 
negatively correlated with the personal tax rate. 
The early attempts to empirically analyse the dynamic trade-off model have been 
hindered by the technical difficulties in estimations. Recently, the development of 
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econometric techniques enables researchers to adopt new approaches to study a 
dynamic capital structure model. More details about the empirical modelling of a 
dynamic model are discussed in Chapter 3.2.2 and Chapter 8. 
2.2.2 The Pecking Order Theory 
One other influential theory of corporate leverage is proposed by Myers and MaJluf 
(1984), which states that because of asymmetric infon-nation between managers and 
investors, the managers of a fin-n may not be able to accurately convey inside 
information to outsiders. In this case, firms choose their financing sources following 
a hierarchical order. To be more specific, a firm's manager has better information 
about the true value of the firm than investors, so the manager may issue new shares 
only when the market overestimates the value of shares or because the firm needs 
further funding for new investment projects. Therefore, when a firm issues new 
securities.. investors may regard this action as a signal that the firm's share price 
may be too high, and demand a higher rate of return on equity. Myers and MaJluf 
(1984) then point out that the firm will fund all projects using retained earnings if 
possible. If retained earnings are inadequate, then debt financing will be used. Thus, 
for a firm in normal operations, equity financing will not be used. To conclude, 
firms work their way up the pecking order to finance investment, beginning with 
internal funds, followed by debt, and equity as the last resort. 
Pecking order theory does not directly focus on tax effects on corporate financial 
policy. However, it would appear that taxes reinforce the finn's preference for 
new debt issues over equity issues and create an incentive to issue new debt even 
when internal finance is available for new Projects (Gordon and MacKie-Mason, 
1990). 
2.3 Empirical Evidence on the Effect of Taxes 
Some recent survey papers have reviewed the empirical literature of capital 
structure decisions. The key contributions include Frank and Goyal (2008) and 
Graham (2008). Frank and Goyal (2008) synthesize capital structure theories 
into trade-off theories and pecking order theories and summarize the related 
empirical evidence of the determinants of corporate leverage. but not particularly 
of tax factors. Graham's (2008) paper focuses more specifically on tax and 
provides a general review of tax research related to capital structure, payout 
policy, and organizational form. The aim of this section is to provide a brief and 
compact summary of empirical studies on how taxes affect corporate financial 
decisions. 
2.3.1 The Tax Advantage of Debt 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that the tax benefits of debt add to firm value by 
the amount of the product of corporate tax rate and corporate debt levels. However, 
this is an upper bound because the result is obtained under strict assumptions, 
ignoring costs and other factors that could reduce the corporate tax benefit of 
interest deductibility (such as personal taxes and bankruptcy costs). To examine 
whether and to what extent the tax advantage of debt increases firm value, research 
is conducted using large-sample regressions to quantify exactly the net benefits of 
debt. 
Fama and French (1998) regress firm value on values of dividends, interest 
payments, and control variables for profitability, i. e., expected net cash flows, 
which include earnings, investment, and research & development (R&D) 
expenditures. A problem with this approach is whether the control variables absorb 
the information about profitability in financing decisions. If they do not, the 
regression coefficients could be biased. Fama and French (1998) conduct a series 
of regressions under both level-form and first-difference specifications, and 
predict a positive relation between firm value and interest payments. However, the 
coefficient on interest payments is either insignificant or negative, hence 
producing no evidence that debt has net tax benefits that increase firm value. They 
attribute this result to the inadequacy of control variables for profitability. The 
debt coefficient may convey information about profitability which is missed by 
control variables and therefore obscure the effects of tax on corporate financial 
decisions. 
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To overcome the measurement problem, Kemsley and Nissim (2002) regress future 
profitability on firm value and debt instead of regressing firm value on debt and 
profitability, using both linear and nonlinear equations. In this approach any random 
measurement error of future operating profitability can be captured by the 
regression residual and no longer biases the debt coefficient. Reversing the 
regression gives rise to a strong positive relation between firm value and debt and 
the estimated value of debt tax advantage is approximately 10 percent of firm value 
net of the personal tax disadvantage of debt. 
Graham (2000) develops a simulation method to measure the tax benefits of debt, 
which provides information about not only the marginal tax rate but the entire tax 
benefit function. Graham (2000) specifies the expected tax benefit of an incremental 
dollar of interest deduction under different possible states of the world. He points 
out that the marginal tax benefits of debt decline as debt level increases, because 
interest deductions reduce taxable income. This increases the probability that the 
debt tax shield in all current and futures states cannot be fully utilized, which in turn 
reduces the tax benefit of each incremental dollar of interest deduction. Graham 
(2000) estimates that the tax benefit of debt equals 9.7 percent of firm value and 
falls to 4.3 percent when personal tax disadvantage is considered. 
Staderini (2001) emphasizes the interest payment deductibility of debt and tries to 
quantify the tax advantage of debt over equity by constructing Miller's (1977) index. 
Effective tax rates are used for calculation. Taking into account the main aspects of 
tax treatment of capital income, both at company level and at personal level, the 
gain from leverage is 
GLETR 
TEOU 
Y 
TDEB 
)- (2.9) 
where rEoýj is the effective tax rate on income from equities and 7DEB is applicable 
to income from bonds. Using a panel of firms for the years 1993-1998, he confirms 
a significant tax bias in favour of debt financing. 
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2.3.2 Non-debt Tax Shields 
The trade-off theory implies that firms should issue debt as long as the marginal 
benefit of doing so is larger than the marginal cost. Since the marginal benefit of 
debt is a decreasing function of debt levels, non-debt tax shields and the probability 
of encountering financial distress, the incentive of using debt is expected to decline 
with these three factors. 
As suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), non-debt tax shields, such as 
depreciation deductions and investment tax credits, are negatively related to debt 
usage because they have a substitution effect for interest deductions and thus 
moderate the tax benefit of debt. Ross (1985) also argues that firms with non-debt 
tax shields have less need to exploit the debt tax shield. In other words, debt is 
ýcrowded out' and the incentive to use debt financing diminishes as non-debt tax 
shields increase. 
Table 2.2 Non-debt tax shields and firm leverage 
+ Insignificant [sign] 
Bradley et al. (1984) MacKie-Mason (1990) Titman and Wessels (1988) 
Downs (1993) Chiarella, Pham, Sim and Allen and Mizuno (1989) 
Boyle and Eckhold 
Tan (199 1) Kim (1996) [-] 
(1997) Givoly et al. (1992) Song(2005) [_]2 
Song(2005)1 Bathala and Carlson 
(1995) 
Shenoy and Koch (1996) 
Hirota (1999) 
Song(2005)1 
Graham and Tucker (2006) 
Notes: 
1. A positive effect is found on the short-term debt ratio but a negative effect on long- 
tenn debt ratio. 
2. total debt ratio only 
Table 2.2 summarizes the empirical evidence of the influence of non-debt tax 
shields on firm leverage. Although most studies suggest a significant negative 
relationship, there are still some that find a positive or insignificant correlation. 
This surprising result could be partly explained by Dammon and Senbet (1988). 
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They demonstrate that the model of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) fails to fully 
incorporate the productive side of the economy because the firm's investment 
decisions and non-debt tax shields are assumed to be exogenous. Extending the 
model by incorporating investment allows the optimal level of non-debt tax 
shields to be determined endogenously, so if high tax rate firms both invest a lot 
and borrow to finance their investment, a positive relation between debt and non- 
debt tax shields may arise, which overturns the substitution effect advanced by 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). As a result, non-debt tax shields are not necessarily 
negatively associated with leverage at the individual firm level. 
Moore (1986) provides a different explanation regarding collateral assets. He 
suggests that firms with substantial non-debt tax shields always have a large 
amount of real assets that can be used as collateral to secure debt. A firm with 
valuable asset collateral can often borrow on relatively favourable terms and 
hence have low borrowing costs, and so may borrow more than those with less (or 
no) collateral. The effect of non-debt tax shields on firms' leverage choice is 
therefore ambiguous. Scott (1977) also suggests that firms increase their value 
when selling secured debt by expropriating wealth from their existing unsecured 
creditors (Smith and Warner, 1979). A firm following an optimal financial policy 
should therefore issue as much secured debt as Possible, implying a positive 
relationship between collateral assets (and thus non-debt tax shields) and a firmýs 
leverage. Thus, by considering the debt securability effect in isolation, both debt 
levels and non-debt tax shields should increase as new assets are purchased, and 
thus a positive relation will exist between them. 
Another explanation of why some studies fail to find a significant relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and debt policy is provided by MacKie-Mason (1990). 
He argues that non-debt tax shields should only affect leverage decisions to the 
extent that they affect firms' marginal tax rates on interest deductions. He uses 
discrete choice analysis to study incremental financing decisions, in order to avoid 
the assumption that firms have an optimal debt ratio target. By studying the effect of 
two tax shields: tax loss carry-forwards and investment tax credit, he shows that 
although non-debt tax shields always lower the average tax rate, they only lower the 
marginal tax rate when firms are already (or close to being) tax exhausted. 
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Therefore, increases in available non-debt tax shields for firms far away from tax 
exhaustion are not likely to have any effect on debt policy. However, for firms that 
are tax exhausted and face zero rates, the level of tax shields has a significant effect 
on the effective marginal tax rate and thus on corporate financing decisions. 
Subsequent work by Trezevant (1992) tests the joint prediction of the substitution 
effect of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and the tax exhaustion hypothesis of 
MacKie-Mason (1990) that an increase in non-debt tax shields gives rise to a 
decrease in leverage. Different from previous studies, a good empirical environment, 
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 in the United States, is selected to study 
the relationship between changes in non-debt tax shields and changes in debt levels 
of firms. This allows each firm to act as its own control and does not require the 
many control variables that would be necessary in a static cross-sectional study. 
After controlling for the debt securability effect, the probability of losing tax shields 
and debt ratio, a significant negative relationship between changes in debt level and 
non-debt tax shields is found for firms with a high probability of losing the 
deductibility of tax shields. This provides strong support for the substitution effect 
and the tax exhaustion hypothesis. He also finds that a regression of the change of 
leverage ratio on the combined debt securability and substitution effects results in a 
significant positive coefficient, which confirms the findings of previous studies. His 
explanation for this result is that the debt securability effect (common to all firms) 
may dominate the substitution effect (which is only applicable to firms which are 
close to or already face tax exhaustion). 
2.3.3 The Personal Tax Disadvantage of Debt 
In the trade-off theory of financing choice, firms choose their unique optimal capital 
structure by balancing the benefits of debt financing with the costs of financial 
distress. The primary benefits of debt arise from the tax deductibility of interest 
payments. Recent research has shown a positive relation between taxes and debt 
levels (MacKie-Mason, 1990; Graham, 1996a; Shum, 1996) although this research 
does not emphasize the personal disadvantages of debt financing. 
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At the personal level, personal tax rates differ for income from different sources. 
Generally, the personal tax rate on interest income is higher than that on income 
from common stocks. Other things equal, the pre-tax return needs to be higher on 
debt than on common stocks, or no investor would like to invest in debt. Therefore, 
there is a 'personal tax penalty' associated with interest deductions (Graham, 1999). 
On the other hand, advantages of debt financing do exist, to the extent that interest 
payments can be deducted from taxable income in computing corporate income tax 
at firm level. The net tax benefit per unit of interest income relative to equity 
income can be expressed as 
(1 -, rp )- (1 -, r, - X, -, r, ) 
or: 
7C - 
l'rP 
- 
(1 
- 'r(' 
ýE 1 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
Here r(, is the corporate income tax rate, 'r, ) is the personal tax rate on interest 
income, and 'rE is the personal tax rate on equity income. The second term in (2.11), 
, rp - (I - -r, ý,, represents the personal tax penalty (Graham, 1999). 
Miller (1977) argues that, in equilibrium, the personal tax disadvantage of debt should 
exactly offset the tax advantage of debt at the firm level, which means that a firm- 
specific optimal capital structure does not exist. It is therefore also important to 
investigate whether and to what degree personal taxes affect corporate financing 
decisions. 
Graham (1999) uses firm-specific data to test the effect of personal taxes. Through 
cross-sectional regressions for each year from 1980 to 1994, he identifies a positive 
(negative) relation between the corporate tax rate (personal tax penalty) and debt 
levels and shows that the adjustment for personal taxes is statistically important 
when exploring tax effects. His result also suggests that the personal tax 
disadvantage reduces but does not eliminate the tax advantage of debt that arises 
from the deductibility of interest payments, which therefore provides evidence 
against Miller's (1977) theoretical predictions. 
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2.3.4 Capital Gains Tax 
Capital gain is the amount by which the selling price of an asset, commonly stocks 
and bonds, exceeds its initial purchase price. A realized capital gain is represented 
by assets sold at a profit. An unrealized capital gain is represented by assets that 
have not yet been sold but would result in a profit if sold. In many jurisdictions 
including the United Kingdom, a capital gains tax (CGT) is charged on realized 
capital gains. 
Although King (1977) has theoretically examined the effect of capital gains tax on 
the financing decisions of a firm whose objective is to minimize the overall tax 
liabilities of its shareholders, almost all previous empirical tests are concerned with 
the relationships among optimal capital structure, corporate and personal tax rates on 
income streams, and other control factors, such as non-debt tax shields. Capital gains 
tax is usually ignored in empirical studies largely because, invariably, capital gains 
are taxed only when they are realized. Furthermore, in most jurisdictions, realized 
gains on some individual securities can be set against realized losses on others so as 
to calculate the net taxable gains. This implies that the actual capital gains tax will 
depend on the aggregate of security transactions by a taxpayer. In other words, the 
tax law confers upon investors a valuable timing option to realize or defer capital 
losses and gains. Therefore, the true effective tax rate on companies' retained 
earnings depends heavily on investors' trading strategies. The analysis of the effect 
of capital gains tax would require knowledge of when the shareholder wishes to 
realize his or her gains and losses - which may depend on income, wealth and other 
factors out of the firm's control. It is therefore difficult to allow for the capital gains 
tax rate in a simple model. SchUrhoff (2005) studies the corporate policy distortions 
caused by capital gains taxation at the personal level in a dynamic trade-off theory 
model. After incorporating the lock-in effect of realization-based capital gains taxes, 
he finds that the firm's optimal policy is both non-stationary and path-dependent 
because the endogenous evolution of the owners' capital gains tax basis affects 
corporate decision making. 
In practice therefore, most researchers tend to assume in theory that capital gains 
are realized and taxed on a continuous basis, i. e. as they arise, and choose to use 
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a tax rate on equity income calculated as some combination of dividends and 
capital gains. 
2.3.5 Tax Reform and Corporate Leverage 
The inherent difficulties in making use of either cross-sectional or time series 
changes in tax rates limit the extent to which researchers study the impact of taxes 
on corporate financial behaviour. The majority of the small number of studies of the 
impact of tax regime changes on capital structure are focused on the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (TRA thereafter) in United States. The TRA abolished some non-debt 
tax shields available to firms (making the interest deductions more attractive to 
firms), lowered the corporate tax rate (decreasing the value of tax shields), reduced 
the preferential treatment of capital gains and cut personal tax rates (reducing the 
relative attractiveness of equity over debt). All these changes did provide a new 
opportunity to test for tax effects. 
Givoly et al. (1992) argue that much previous research uses cross-sectional analysis 
to investigate the association between a firm's leverage and its tax attributes and 
ignores the dynamic specification of capital structure. However, tax reforms provide 
a unique opportunity for economists to assess in a controlled environment the 
interaction between taxes and leverage decisions. They conduct a cross-sectional 
analysis of firms' reactions to the TRA which considers the changes of leverage 
rather than the levels of leverage. By comparing the 'before' and 'after' leverage of 
the same firm, non-tax factors that might affect a firm's capital structure are held 
constant, which increases the explanatory power of the research. A positive relation 
is found between leverage changes and corporate tax rates and a substitution effect 
between debt and non-debt tax shields is documented. In addition, the results 
provide indirect evidence that personal taxes play a role in corporate financing 
decisions. 
Kim (1996) also studies the impact of the TRA on firmsý issue behaviour and the 
determinants of corporate capital structure. In order to perform a more precise test 
of theory, Kim (1996) investigates firms' financing decisions at the margin (how 
firms choose between different instruments when in need of new capital). Choice- 
theoretic models are employed to address this question. A tax reform dummy 
variable is applied to distinguish between securities issued before and after 1986. 
The results show that firms tended to issue more debt after the TRA, in response to 
the reduction of the maximum corporate income tax rate, the cuts in personal 
income tax rates, and the elimination of investment tax credits. The results also 
support theories based on the trade-off between corporate tax shields and other 
factors., including non-debt tax shields, costs of financial distress and agency costs. 
2.4 Empirical Evidence on Other Factors Influencing Capital 
Structure 
The discussion so far has concentrated on the testing of specific theories, mainly on 
how taxation affects the financing decisions of firms. Other studies are empirically 
oriented and examine the influences on corporate capital structure of a number of 
specific variables. This literature is fairly extensive and tends to use more or less ad 
hoc control variables to measure the underlying concepts to be tested, as suggested 
by the theories of corporate finance. These variables are potentially related to the 
assessment of firms' default risk and thus affect firms' financing decisions under the 
tax benefit/bankruptcy costs trade-off framework. Results of these studies are 
examined and summarized in this section. The discussion is organized according to 
the main variables used in this large literature. Those common characteristics that 
are thought to determine capital structure include asset tangibility, asset 
intangibility, size, profitability, growth opportunities, firm risk, liquidity and 
industry classification. Each of the variables and the ways they affect firm leverage, 
not only under the trade-off framework but also the pecking order and signalling 
framework, are discussed in turn. Comparison is made between a priori 
expectations and empirical findings. 
2.4.1 Asset Tangibility 
The tangibility of assets represents the effect of the collateral value of assets on firm 
leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). It measures a firm's ability to secure its debt in 
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the event of financial distress. From a trade-off perspective, tangibility can have an 
important impact on the costs of financial distress. In addition, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that issuing debt to finance investment incurs agency costs. These 
costs result from conflicts of interest between debt-holders and stockholders. since 
the stockholders of levered firms have an incentive to invest in high-risk projects 
and thus transfer wealth away from debt-holders (these projects, if successful, offer 
high returns which accrue exclusively to the stockholders, but they also increase the 
likelihood of failure). This asset substitution problem is harmful to debt-holders 
who do not share in profits but who do share in the costs of bankruptcy. This 
problem can be greatly mitigated where assets can be used as collateral to secure 
debt. The borrowers are restricted to using loaned funds for specific projects and 
creditors are given an improved guarantee of repayment. Firms with more tangible 
assets therefore face favourable terms and lower borrowing costs in the debt market 
than fin-ns with few tangible assets. Hence, both the trade-off and agency theories 
predict a positive relationship between measures of leverage and the proportion of 
tangible assets. 
However, Grossman and Hart (1983) suppose a negative relationship between 
leverage and the level of fixed assets, because of the conflict between managers and 
shareholders. As pointed out by Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers prefer to 
have higher perquisites and lower effort levels, provided that they do not have to 
pay for these through lower wages or by a lower market value of their personal 
equity holdings. It is also argued that the agency costs of managers consuming 
excessive perquisites are higher for firms with low levels of assets used as collateral. 
Since bondholders monitor high-levered firms more closely, managers of such firms 
are less able to consume more than the optimal level of perquisites. Shareholders 
therefore would like firms with few collateral assets to be highly geared. As a result, 
such firms might voluntarily choose higher debt levels. 
Recent empirical studies suggest that the relationship between tangibility and firm 
leverage also depends on the measures of debt applied. Van der Wijst and Thurik 
(1993), Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and Song (2005) find that tangibility is positively 
correlated with long-term debt and negatively related to short-term debt. 
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Table 2.3 summarizes the empirical findings on the impact of tangibility on fin-n 
leverage ratios. The results are mixed: the positive relationship predicted by trade- 
off theory is confirmed by Downs (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Shenoy and 
Koch (1996) and many other researchers. However, there are still a few studies with 
significant negative or insignificant results. 
Table 2.3 The influence of tangibility on firm leverage 
+ Insignificant [sign] 
Downs (1993) Van der Wijst and Titman and Wessels (1988) 
Van der Wij st and Thurik 
Thurik (1993) Chiarella et al. (199 1) 
(1993)1 Bevan and Danbolt Bhaduri (2002) ]3 
Raj an and Zingales (199 5) 
(2002) 
Shenoy and Koch (1996) 
Song (2005)1 
Kim (1996) 
Shurn (1996) 
Hirota (1999) 
Colombo (2001) 
Staderini (2001) 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002)' 
Antoniou, Guney and 
Paudyal (2002) 
Drobetz and Fix (2005) 
Song(2005) 
Graham and Tucker (2006) 
Drobetz and Wanzenried 
(2006) 
Notes: 
1. long-term debt only 
2. short term debt only 
3. positive for short-ten-n borrowing and negative for long-tenn borrowing 
2.4.2 Asset Intangibility 
Asset intangibility is another measure of a firmý's asset structure. Intangible assets 
include patents, trademarks, copyrights, research and development costs, and 
capitalized advertising costs. These should not help a company to secure 
its debt 
because they are more likely to lose their value in times of financial distress. 
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Many empirical studies use both research and development costs and advertising 
costs to measure the intangibility of firms. Table 2.4 presents a summary of 
empirical findings in the literature. Although most of them provide strong evidence 
to suggest that intangible assets are negatively correlated with firm debt levels, a 
few results suggest that they may be positive predictors of leverage. This could be 
attributed to the particular measure of asset intangibility used (levels or change in 
the levels of research and development costs), which is more likely to proxy the 
growth opportunities of finns. 
Table 2.4 The influence of intangibility on firm leverage 
+ Insignificant [sign] 
Crutchley and Jensen (1996) Bradley et al. (1984) Jahera and Lloyd (1996) 
Graham (19 96 a) Titman and Wessels (19 8 8) Gordon and Lee (2001) [_]2 
Gordon and Lee (2001) Jensen,, Solberg and Zorn Song(2005) ]3 
Drobetz and Fix (2005) 
(1992) 
Bathala, Moon and Rao 
(1994) 
Jahera and Lloyd (1996)1 
Bhaduri (2002) 
Song(2005) 2 
Notes: 
1. significant for market value of leverage and insignificant for book value of leverage 
2. for short-terrn debt only 
3. positive for long-term debt ratio and negative for total debt ratio 
2.4.3 Size 
The trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and finn size. 
The argument is that firm size may be often thought of as an inverse proxy for the 
probability of bankruptcy (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) because large firms tend to be 
more diversified and are less likely to fail than smaller companies (Titman and 
Wessels,, 1988) and thus can issue debt at relatively low costs. Moreover, it is argued 
that larger finns also have lower transaction costs and higher liquidation values and 
therefore lower agency costs than smaller firms. Hence, large firms may be expected 
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to have higher debt ratios. However, Raj an and Zingales (1995) argue that if the costs 
of financial distress are low, the positive relationship should not be strong. 
Alternatively, it is argued that size can be seen as a proxy for information 
asymmetry between firm insiders and capital markets (Drobetz and Fix, 2005). 
Large firms are more closely observed by analysts and investors and have fewer 
asymmetric information problems. They should therefore be more able to issue 
equity. This would suggest a negative relationship between firm size and debt levels. 
Table 2.5 shows that most empirical research into the influence of size on firm 
leverage obtains a positive relationship, which corroborates the a priori expectations. 
However,, some studies have found a negative dependence. Titman and Wessels (1988) 
suggest that if this negative correlation exists, it should be associated with small firms t: ý 
using more short-term debt to finance their investment, since smaller firms incur 
higher transaction costs when issuing long-term debt or equity. 
Table 2.5 The influence of size on firm leverage 
+ Insignificant [sign] 
Chiarella et al. (199 0' Titman and Wessels Chiarella et al. (199 1) [+] 
Downs (1993) (1988) Drobetz and Fix (2005) [+]4 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
Givoly et al. (1992) Graham and Tucker (2006) 
Kim (1996) Staderini (2001) 
Shurn (1996) Bhaduri (2002)2 
Shenoy and Koch (1996) 
Song (2005)3 
Hirota (1999) 
Colombo (2001) 
Antoniou et al. (2002) 
Bhaduri (2002) 2 
Song(2005) 
Drobetz and Fix (2005)4 
Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) 
Notes: 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
short-term debt only 
positive for long-term borrowing and negative for short-ten-n borrowing 
negative for long-term debt ratio only 
significant in the static model and insignificant in the dynamic model 
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2.4.4 Proritability 
Pecking order theory suggests that firms prefer to finance new investment first 
from retained earnings, then debt, and new equity as a last resort. Since the 
availability of internal funding depends on profits, a negative correlation is 
expected between profitability and leverage. On the other hand, the trade-off 
hypothesis suggests that firms with high current cash flows should have easy 
access to credit markets (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Furthermore, high 
profitability greatly reduces the probability of financial distress of firms. 
Therefore, firms with high profitability would have lower borrowing costs and 
therefore high level of debt usage. Thus, profitability is expected to be positively 
related to leverage. In addition, Ross (1977) argues that high levels of debt 
financing can be used by managers to signal a firm's optimistic future to the 
market because debt financing ensures that managers are obliged to make 
efficient investment decisions rather than pursue individual objectives which 
might increase the probability of bankruptcy (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Therefore, 
high debt levels may be associated with high profitability. 
Table 2.6 summarizes the literature on profitability and leverage. The evidence is 
mixed but most of the studies support the traditional pecking order hypothesis. 
Table 2.6 The influence of profitability on firm leverage 
+ Insignificant [sign] 
Downs (1993) Allen and Mizuno (1989) Titman and Wessels 
Boyle and Eckhold (1997) Raj an and Zingales (1995) (1988) [-] 
Gropp (2002) Shum (1996) Kim (1996) 
Hirota (1999) 
Banerjee, Heshmati and 
Wihlborg (1999) 
Staderini (2001) 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) 
Antoniou et aL (2002) 
Drobetz and Fix (2005) 
Song(2005) 
Graham and Tucker (2006) 
Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) 
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2.4.5 Growth Opportunities 
Within an agency cost framework, Myers (1977) argues that firms with substantial 
growth opportunities should be able to mitigate agency problems by using less debt. 
Managers of a firm that issues debt have an incentive to engage in asset substitution 
and to transfer wealth from debt-holders to shareholders, which results in an 
increase in the interest rate on bonds demanded by investors and deters firms from 
borrowing. Firms with high growth prospects are more likely to pass over profitable 
investment opportunities if they are highly levered and will choose equity over debt. 
Thus!, agency cost theory predicts a negative relation between firm leverage and 
growth opportunities. The trade-off theory also supports a negative relationship 
between leverage and growth. The argument is that growth firms lose more of their 
value when they go to financial distress. 
In contrast, pecking order theory suggests that the relationship between total 
leverage and growth could be positive. Higher growth opportunities imply a higher 
demand for funds. If firms require external finance, they prefer debt to equity, which 
implies a positive correlation between growth opportunities and leverage. 
Table 2.7 summarizes the main empirical papers that have examined the influence 
of growth opportunities on firm leverage and the results are quite mixed. 
Table 2.7 The influence of growth opportunities on firm leverage 
+ Insignificant [sign] 
Titman and Wessels (198 8) Rajan and Zingales (1995) Downs (1993) 
Chowdhury and Miles Hirota (1999) Kim (1996) [+] 
(1989) Antoniou et al. (2002) Gropp (2002) [± ]2 
Boyle and Eckhold (1997) Drobetz and Wanzenried Bhaduri (2002) [_]3 
Staderini (2001) (2006)1 
Bhaduri (2002) 
Notes: 
I. only significant for market values of leverage 
2. positive if fin-ns plan net investments that are large relative to the fixed assets 
already in place 
3. short-tenn debt only 
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2.4.6 Firm Risk 
The theoretical literature suggests that the greater the risk faced by a finn, the lower 
its debt level. The risk of a firm is usually measured by the volatility in its earnings, 
which is clearly relevant to the assessment of its default risk. DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) argue that firms with high earnings volatility face a higher cost of debt since 
investors are not able to accurately forecast future earnings from publicly available 
information and therefore demand a higher premium to provide debt. In addition, 
greater volatility of cash flows increases the probability that earnings will drop below 
the level of debt service commitment. Thus, a fin-n would either arrange funds at high 
costs to meet the payment of interest or face the risk of bankruptcy. Conversely, firms 
financed by equity can choose not to pay dividends if they face financial distress. 
Therefore,, finns with high volatility would avoid issuing debt when seeking funds, 
and a negative relationship between earnings volatility and leverage is expected. 
The results of empirical investigations of the influence of risk on finn leverage are 
shown in Table 2.8. Most have found a negative dependence, as expected. 
Table 2.8 The influence of firm risk on firm leverage 
+ Insignificant [sign] 
Shenoy and Koch (1996) Bradley et al. (1984) Titman and Wessels 
Song(2005) Chowdhury and Miles (1989) 
(1988) [-] 
MacKie-Mason (1990) Allen and Mizuno 
(1989) [-] 
Givoly et al. (1992) Antoniou et al. (2002) 
Downs (1993) 
Kim (1996) 
Shum (1996) 
Boyle and Eckhold (1997) 
Hirota (1999) 
De Miguel and Pindado (2001) 
Drobetz and Fix (2005) 
Song (2005)1 
Notes: 
1. negative for long-term debt ratio only 
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2.4.7 Liquidity 
Pecking order theory suggests that firms prefer to finance first with internal funds, 
which implies that firms require financial slack to avoid resort to external finance 
(Myers, 1977). Therefore, firms with greater liquidity assets may use these assets to 
finance their investments to avoid raising external capital and hence are expected to 
have lower leverage. In contrast, the liquidity of a firm measures a company .s 
ability to repay short-term creditors out of its total cash or cash equivalents. 
Therefore, under the trade-off framework, firms with high liquidity ratios may 
support a relatively higher debt ratio because they are more able to meet their short- 
term obligations. 
Table 2.9 shows the main empirical research that has examined the influence of 
liquidity on firm leverage. Most studies find a negative correlation. 
Table 2.9 The influence of liquidity on firm leverage 
+ Insignificant [sign] 
Gordon and Lee (200 1) Jordan, Lowe and Taylor (199 8) Chiarella et al. (199 1) 
Ozkan(2001) Antoniou et al. (2002) 
De Miguel and Pindado (2001) 
Gordon and Lee (2001)' 
Notes: 
1. positive for long-terrn borrowing and negative for total and short-term borrowing 
2.4.8 Industry Classification 
Many factors that influence capital structure may be common to firms in industrial 
groups. Firms in the same industry often face common product and factor markets 
and thus similar economic conditions. They are also more likely to face the same 
investment opportunities and have similar capital requirements. Harris and Raviv 
(1991) find evidence that "Drugs, Investments, Electronics, and Food have 
consistently low leverage while Paper, Textile Mill Products, Steel. Airlines, and 
Cement have consistently high leverage" (pp. 333-334). Titman (1984) suggests that 
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firms which manufacture machines and equipment requiring specialized servicing 
and spare parts have especially high liquidation costs and hence should have less 
debt -a conjecture supported by the results of Titman and Wessels (198 8). 
Jordan et al. (1998) question whether all types of firms face such industry effects in 
their capital structure. Using a sample of UK small firms, they argue that small 
firms often operate in niche markets and this reduces the impact of broad industry 
influences on capital structure. 
Table 2.10 summarizes the empirical findings on the influence of industry 
classification on firm leverage. The evidence supports the argument that firms 
within different industries do have different leverage levels. 
Table 2.10 The influence of industry classification on firm leverage 
Significant Insignificant 
Bowen, Daly and Huber (1982) Drobetz and Fix (2005) 
Titman and Wessels (198 8) 
Allen and Mizuno (1989) 
Munro (1996) 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature relating to how, 
and to what extent, taxes affect corporate financing policies. 
Since M&M"s famous irrelevancy theorem about the capital structure of firms in 
perfect capital markets there have been many attempts to explain why firms in the 
real world may target optimal leverage ratios. Most of this research focuses on 
relaxing the M&M assumptions. Various models explain the financing behaviour of 
firms by considering the presence of taxes combined with other factors, such as 
bankruptcy and agency costs, risk aversion and legal constraints. Most of the 
models have shown that taxes can in theory drastically change the results of the 
irrelevancy theorem. 
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In the empirical literature, most of the studies find that taxes affect corporate 
financial decisions, but that the magnitude of the effect is not always as large as 
theories have predicted. Regressions are conducted to explore the relationship 
between taxes and firm leverage, with results showing that the tax advantage of debt 
adds to firm value and that high-tax rate firms tend to use more debt than low-tax 
rate firms. With respect to non-debt tax shields, evidence shows that they can 
substitute for debt shields, which can partly explain the conservative debt policy of 
many firms. However, non-debt tax shields should only matter to the extent that 
they affect the marginal tax rates of firms. Some studies demonstrate that non-debt 
tax shields also have a securability effect. The relationship between non-debt tax 
shields and corporate leverage should depend on which of the two influences 
prevails. 
Several studies consider the personal tax disadvantages of debt and show that the 
adjustment for personal taxes is statistically important when exploring the effects of 
taxes on corporate financial policy. 
Capital gains tax may be another important influence on firrnsý financial policy but 
it is usually ignored in the empirical literature because of its realization-based 
feature. Some recent research shows that, because the endogenous evolution of 
investors' capital gains tax basis affects corporate decision making, the optimal 
financial policy of firms is non-stationary and path-dependent. 
Besides taxation, various firm-specific characteristics have been believed to 
influence firms' financing decisions. These include tangibility, intangibility, size, 
profitability, growth opportunities, firm risk, liquidity and industry classification. 
The empirical findings on the relationships between these characteristics and capital 
structure have been presented and compared with theoretical predictions. Some 
conflicting theoretical results arise from the two main competing theories, the trade- 
off theory and pecking order hypothesis. Conflicting results in empirical work may 
be due to differences in the measurement of the firm characteristics employed in 
different studies. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology and Data 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to describe the methodology and the data set employed to 
empirically examine the financial practices of the corporate sectors of a sample of 
European countries under different tax regimes. The second section of the chapter 
introduces the basic model and methodology employed in the subsequent empirical 
chapters. The third section describes the selection and characteristics of sample 
firms and the sources of tax data. 
3.2 Methodology Adopted 
The objective of this section is to discuss the econometric models to be used in 
empirical investigation in the determinants of capital structure for sample 
companies. The nature of the study requires pooling of cross-sectional and time- 
series company data, i. e. panel data analysis. 
The advantages of using panel data can be summarized as follows (Hsiao, 2006, 
2003; Baltagi, 2005): 
First, panel data give a large number of data points, and therefore increase the 
degrees of freedom and reduce the collinearity among variables. Hence, we would 
expect more efficient econometric estimates using panel data than pure cross- 
sectional or time-series data sets. Second, it is often argued that empirical estimates 
in pure cross-sectional or time-series studies may be biased due to their ignoring the 
effects of certain variables in the model specification which are correlated with the 
included explanatory variables. Panel data sets provide both the inter-temporal 
dynamics and the individuality of the entities, which may enable researchers to 
control for the effects of missing or unobserved variables. Third, panel 
data sets 
allow one to model the dynamics of adjustment, such as modelling changes 
in firms' 
financing behaviour at different time periods. Fourth, panel data methodology 
provides the possibility of learning about an individual entity's 
behaviour by 
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observing the behaviour of not only itself but also the behaviour of others, based on 
the assumption that individual behaviours may be similar, conditional on certain 
variables. Therefore, we would expect a more accurate description of an individual's 
behaviour. 
3.2.1 The Static Model 
The widely accepted model to empirically test corporate capital structure theory 
using panel data has the following form: 
1,2,..., N- (3.1) 
Here y,,,, is a measure of leverage for company i at time t. The explanatory variables 
x,, may include company- and time-varying variables, time-invariant variables 
(such as the industry classification of a firm), and company invariant variables (such 
as statutory tax rates or interest rates within a country). These explanatory variables 
are not derived directly from any optimization programme, but are variables thought 
to measure factors which may be correlated with firm leverage based on the 
different theories of capital structure. u,, is the composite error taking the form: 
Uit ::::::::: Pi + t7i + v,, (3.2) 
For each t, u,, is the sum of the unobserved individual effect p, the time effect 77, 
and an idiosyncratic error vil . 
Estimation of (3.1) is generally more straightforward if simplifying assumptions can 
be made about the error components (3.2). Panel diagnostics are performed first to 
clarify the structure of the error term in the subsequent empirical chapters. Since the 
test statistics show little evidence of time effects in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, this 
discussion ignores the time effect and focuses on a model with an error term that has 
the form: 
Uil : -- Pi + vil (3.3) 
Most early studies employed cross-sectional data rather than panels and applied the 
OLS estimator. However, these may be criticized for ignoring the heterogeneity 
across firms. If firm specific effects ( p, ) 
do exist, the pooled OLS regression 
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generates inconsistent estimates because the unobserved firm heterogeneity may be 
correlated with the regressors, i. e. E(x, flu,, )# 0, t=1,2,..., T, which violates the 
assumption of OLS estimation. 
There are three basic methods in panel data analysis. They are OLS in first 
differences. the fixed effects estimator, and the random effects estimator. More 
recently, instrumental variable approaches, such as the Hausman-Taylor (1981) 
estimator and the Arellano and Bond (199 1) estimator, have become widely used to 
control for different forms of endogeneity. 
3.2.1.1 OLS in First Differences 
The idea of estimating 8 using OLS in first differences is to transform the 
equations to eliminate the firm effects pi. The first step to transfon-n the variables is 
to first-difference (3.1 ) and (3.2) to get: 
Ya - Yit - Y1.1-1 I xil ý--x 11 - Xi'l-I I 
ull U 
il - uQ_l = vil - VQ-l 
The first-difference transformation effectively removes the individual specific effect 
p, and transforms the equation into 
Yit - Xit 18 + un 
(3.4) 
I Under the assumption that E(X,, v,, ):: -- 0, t-1,2,..., T, it follows that in (3.4) 
x, u,, 0, t=2,..., T, and that the OL S estimator of the transformed equation 
will generate consistent estimates of 8- 
3.2.1.2 The Fixed Effects Model 
The fixed effects model assumes that the slope coefficients are constant for all firms, 
but that the intercept varies across firms. 
Consider the linear unobserved effect model for T time periods 
Yj, -= X/1,6 + Pi + V, ýý 
(3.5) 
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Given that ý (y,,, xi, ), i=1,2,..., N; t=1,2,..., T I is a random sample, the 
assumptions underlying the fixed effects model are 
I Ix,, t Tj is strictly exogenous with respect to v,, such that 
E(v, Ix,, p, 0 T), 
where v, = 
(Vil 
1, 
iT and x, = 
(Xil 
XiT 
2. The errors are conditionally homoskedastic and not serially correlated; thus: 
E(vj, )=0, 
2 10 i=j, t=s 
oth erwise 
There are T cross-sectional equations to be estimated in the model (3.5), and they 
can be written as 
yi, = x ß+ Diui + vi, 
where D is a dummy variable which is I if observation belongs to firm i and zero 
otherwise. 
This can be estimated by OLS but is computationally burdensome. Therefore, an 
alternative method of eliminating the unobserved effects u, is to apply the 'within' 
transformation. The first step is to calculate the time average of each cross section in 
(3.5) to get the single cross section equation 
yl = X1,8 +, Ui + V-1 (3.6) 
7' 7' T 
where 1: x x, and Vi vi, y 
-, 
yu T 1=1 TT 
Subtracting equation (3.6) from equation (3.5) for each t gives the transformed 
equation in terms of deviations from the time means: 
xV y, l -y, -- 
(x, 
- -i 
), 6 + (v,, - -, 
) 
or 
Yll 
where y, - Y, x, - x-, , and 
iý, = v,, - v-, 
(3.7) 
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This transfon-nation of the original equation removes the individual specific effect 
p, - Applying OLS estimation to equation (3.7) would generate the within group 
estimator which is consistent since E(5ý, iýll )=0 
3.2.1.3 The Random Effects Model 
The random effects approach to estimating 8 effectively puts p, into the error term 
of the model. In fact, the random effects estimator requires more assumptions than 
those needed for fixed effects model: the orthogonality between p, and x,, . 
The assumptions underlying the random effects approach in terms of conditional 
means are 
E(v, Ix,, p, 
) 
-0t-II..., Tý 
E(u, Ix, ) - E(, u, ) -0tT, 
E(p, p 
07 2i-j 
.j0 otherwise 
where v, = 
(Vil 
I ... I 
ViT)f and xi =: 
(Xil 
ý, -ý XiT 
)f 
E(iii, ) = 0, 
2 
E(vj. 
10 t=s 
otherwise 
Under these assumptions, the random effects approach obtains consistent estimates 
using GLS. 
3.2.1.4 The Comparison between Fixed and Random Effects Estimators 
Different ways to treat error terms impose a major problem for researchers: how to 
choose between fixed and random effects models. In the more common case, when 
T is finite or even 'small' and N is large, whether to treat the effects as fixed or 
random is not an easy question to answer. It can make a significant difference in the 
estimates of the parameters. The arguments about choosing between random and 
fixed effects can be summarized as follows. 
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First,, in fixed effects models, time-invariant explanatory variables cannot be 
included. In fact, by failing to estimate time-constant variables, such as gender, race, 
or industry, the fixed effects estimator has been criticized for ýwasting' useful 
information contained in the relations among individual means (Owusu-Gyapong, 
1986). However, when the interest is only in time-varying explanatory variables, it 
is convenient not to have to worry about modelling time-constant factors that are 
not of direct interest (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Second. the random effects model uses the orthogonality between p, and x,, to 
significantly reduce the number of parameters that have to be estimated. When 
applying the fixed effects approach directly without using the within transformation, 
we have to estimate not only the coefficients of the explanatory variables but also 
the coefficients of a set of dummy variables for each specific firm, and thus suffer 
from an enormous loss of degrees of freedom when N is very large relative to the 
size of T. 
Third,, the random effects model identifies the population parameters that describe 
the individual -level heterogeneity. Therefore, the random effects model is more 
appropriate when inferences are made about a population from which N 
individuals are randomly drawn. In contrast, the fixed effects model cannot estimate 
the parameters that describe the individual-level heterogeneity, so the inference 
from the fixed effects model is conditional on the fixed effects in the sample and 
thus more appropriate if inferences are going to be confined to the effects in the 
model. As a result, the random effects model is more efficient and allows a broader 
range of statistical inference. 
However, although many arguments are in favour of random effects models, 
another key consideration in choosing between a random effects and fixed effects 
approach is whether or not p, can be viewed as random draws from a common 
population, or in other words, whether the extra orthogonality conditions imposed 
by the random effects estimator are valid. If not, the fixed effects estimator is 
consistent but the random effects estimator is not consistent. If the explanatory 
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regressors are uncorrelated with p, , the fixed effects estimator is still consistent, 
albeit inefficient, while the random effects estimator is consistent and efficient. 
Hausman (1978) proposes a test based on the difference between the random effects 
and fixed effects estimators. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the 
unobserved firm effects p, are uncorrelated with explanatory variables. If this 
assumption is violated, the fixed effects estimator is consistent but the random 
effects estimator is inconsistent, and there would be a significant difference between 
the two estimators, which is interpreted as evidence against the random effects 
orthogonality assumption. 
3.2.1.5 Hausman-Taylor Estimator for Error Components Models 
Instrumental variable estimators are aimed at dealing with the correlation between 
the error components and all or some of the explanatory variables. The endogeneity 
could arise from two sources in the estimated model: from the unobserved 
individual-level effects, or from the idiosyncratic error term. 
The Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator, which is based on instrumental variables, is 
suitable for panel data random effects models in which some of the explanatory 
variables are correlated with the unobserved individual -level random effects. In 
particular, they consider a model of the form 
Yit :. -- XIIP + Z, )/ + pi + vil (3.8) 
where the ZI are cross-sectional time-invariant variables, pi - IID(O, up 2) and vit - 
IID(O, o7,2 ). Hausman and Taylor (1981) split X and Z into two sets of variables: 
Z :::::: [z where X, and Z, are assumed exogenous in that 
X'- [XI; X2] and J; 
Z21 
they are uncorrelated with p, and v, while X, andZ2 are endogenous since they 
are correlated with p, but not with v, . 
Therefore, the model to be estimated can be rewritten as 
yt, = Xjjj A+ X20132 + 
ZD71 + Z2t72 + Pi + Vit 
Since for any variable W, the within transfonnation is defined as 
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1 7' 
Wil =W,, -W, where =-YW 
fv-, 
T 1=1 
It 
The within transformation would sweep out the p, and remove the bias, but it 
would also remove the Z, and hence the within estimator will not give an estimate 
of2l, and 21,. 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) propose obtaining the residuals from the within 
estimation 
il ::::::: - 
Xlit AW- X-? 
ii 
ß2H' 
and averaging them over time to get 
iT 
d =-Yd T 
0.2 is The estimate of the variance of the idiosyncratic error component , 
7' 
d2 
N-n 
where N is the total number of observations in the sample, and n is the number of 
panels in the sample. 
Regressing the time means of the residuals (d, ) on Z, andZ2 using X, and Z, as 
instruments provides intermediate, consistent estimates of )/, and )/., . denoted by 
1, and721F 
The variance of the random effect 072 can then be estimated using the within p 
estimates ý and 
ý21V 
. First, 
let 7111' 
yit - X, it 
PI H7 -x-z-Z, ýjrf it 2ii 
Affl' 
Then define 
17 
N 
Hausman and Taylor (198 1) show that, for balanced panels, 
plim, ---, s, = 
Tup + o-, 
Therefore, s' is the estimate of 
072 
lu 
p 
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Also, define 0, as 
II a- i- 
+ 
The standard random effects GLS transformation is performed on each of the 
variables using 0,. The transformation is given by 
W 
where W, is the within-panel mean. 
The Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimates of the coefficients of the model can be 
obtained directly by fitting an instrumental variables regression of the GLS- 
transformed yi, on X, *, and Z,,,, with instruments Xi,, and Zli 
3.2.1.6 Arellano-Bover Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimator 
The Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator controls for the endogeneity as between the 
regressors and the unobserved individual effects, but not between the regressors and 
the idiosyncratic error which is common in a conventional model of leverage due to 
the appearance of balance sheet ratios on both sides of the regressions. 
The Arellano and Bover (1995) GMM estimator controls for all forms of 
endogeneity which may be relevant and has the particular advantage that it enables 
the identification of not only time- and firm- varying variables but also time- and 
firm- invariant variables which would be swept out using the popular Arellano and 
Bond (199 1) estimator. 
To clarify this, rewrite (3.8) in matrix notation as: 
y =WO+ u= Xß+Z; v+u 
(3.9) 
Here, y is an NT xI vector of leverage ordered by year and by firm: 
Y, 7= (YI,,..., YNI .... .... y, T,..., yvT); and 
W is an NTx(G+H) matrix of explanatory 
variables (N firms and T years) partitioned as 
W= (X, t7,0 Z) :X are (H) firm- and 
time-varying explanatory variables; Z are (G) time-invariant variables; and 'T 
is a 
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TxI vector of ones. Also, X and Z are partitioned to distinguish between exogenous 
and endogenous explanatory variables: X= (XI, X2); and Z z-- Vi, 4-ý). such that (XI. Zi) 
are 'exogenous' and (X2,4-, ) are *endogenous". Note that this basic setup is analogous 
to that of Hausman and Taylor (1981) but the Arellano-Bover (1995) procedure 
allows for substantially more general (weaker) assumptions about the correlations 
between the error components and the variables of the model. Thus, the endogenous 
variables X2, and Z2 may be correlated with the idiosyncratic error term, ij,: but X1, 
and Z, are not. However, since there are no dynamics in the model, the lagged values 
of X., are assumed to be uncorrelated with v,,: E(vX,, X2,, -j, 
ZI, p) = 0; (i > 0). 
As usual, (3.9) can be interpreted as T cross-section regressions, each corresponding 
to a certain year. Arellano and Bover (1995) proposed to pre-multiply this system of 
T equations by a non-singular TxT transformation matrix: 
IT 'IT] 
K is any (T - I)xT matrix of rank (T - 1) such that K'T = 0. Arellano and 
Bover 
(1995) show that the resulting parameter estimates 0 are invariant to choice of K. 
For example. K could be the first difference operator or the first T-I rows of the 
within-group operator. Then the transformed errors are given by: 
u+ =Hu 
Ku, 
Using the within-group operator splits the model into T-I within-group equations 
and the Tth (between) equation which is helpful in order to implement the 
orthogonality restrictions implied by the model. Since the first (T - 1) transformed 
errors do not contain the firm effects p, all exogenous and predetermined variables 
(XI, X2,, 
-j, 
j>O, Zj) are valid instruments in these equations. Defining 
YNT 
- tT17', IT OIN) as the within-group operator, QXI and QX2, '_ý are valid 
alternatives to Xi, X2, t-j. The Tth equation must 
be instrumented by variables which 
are uncorrelated with u, and therefore uncorrelated with the 
firm effect (p) and with 
the idiosyncratic effect (v). 
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Given. a matrix of instruments (M such that E(M'Hu) =0 
The H-transformed version of (3.9) can be estimated by GMM and ý is given by: 
[W'HM(M'HQHM)-'M'HW]-'W'HM(M'HQH'M)-'M'HY 
The covariance matrix (Q) may be estimated from the residuals of a preliminary 
consistent estimator or from an estimator which restricts the form of Q, to 
correspond to a particular error component model for example. 
3.2.2 Dynamic Panel Data Models 
Many economic relationships are explicitly or implicitly dynamic in nature and 
panel data allow us to rely on the inter-individual differences to reduce the 
collinearity between current and lagged variables to study the dynamics of time- 
adjustment. 
The prototypical dynamic linear model with a lagged dependent variable among the 
regressors takes the form 
yil -a+ x',, 8 +ui-1,2,..., N; yi, t-l I It ý 
u,, follows a one-way error component model 
if =Pi 
+V if 
where P, - IID 
(0ý 
a') and v,, - IID 
(0,7 
,2) and cov(p, v,, 
Since y, is a function of P, it follows that y, -, 
is also a function of g. Therefore, 
y,,, -,, a right-hand 
regressor, is positively correlated with the error term. The OLS 
estimator is biased and inconsistent. 
Nickell (198 1) demonstrates that the within-group transformation does not eliminate 
this bias that arises in the dynamic panel data model. Although 'U, 
is wiped out, 
(Yj'j_j --I I(Yi2 
+***+YiT)) will still be correlated with (vi, -I 
(Vi2 
++ ViT 
T-T-I 
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since is negatively correlated with -I while -Iy, and iý,, also T-IT-I 
move together. 
An alternative transformation to wipe out the individual effects is the first difference 
transformation (Baltagi, 2005). Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982) suggest first 
differencing the model to eliminate the firm effects and then using either 
(instruments in dif ferences) or simply y,,, -,, 
(instrument in 
levels) as an instrument for Ay,,, 
-, = y,,, -, - 
YO-2 since each of these variables is 
correlated with Ai,,,, 
-, = YO-I - Yi., -2 
but not with Av,, = vi, - v,,, -, as 
long as the i,,, 
themselves are not serially correlated. Instrumenting with YQ-2 seems preferable 
since it maximizes sample size, as AY,,, -2 
is not available until t=4 whereas yi,, -2 
is available at t=3 and an additional period of data is significant in short panels. 
Also, Arellano (1989) finds that for simple dynamic error components models, 
using Ayi,, -2 as 
instruments leads to a singularity point and very large variances 
over a significant range of parameter values while the estimator using YO-2 does 
not encounter such problems and is therefore recommended. 
However, the instrumental variable estimation is criticized for not making use of all 
the available moment conditions (Ahn and Schmidt, 1995) and not taking into 
account the differenced structure of the residual disturbances (Baltagi, 2005). 
3.2.2.1 Arellano and Bond Difference GMM Estimator 
Arellano and Bond (199 1) propose a GMM procedure called difference GMM that 
is more efficient than the Anderson and Hsiao estimator. They use an instrument 
matrix of the form: 
FII [Yil') Xil ') X12 ý Xid 0 
IffF Yi2 ý Xil ý Xi2 ý X6 -X14 ml 
= 
0 I 
lyij 
I ... ý 
yi, 7'-2 ý Xil 
X1 
,T 
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where the rows correspond to the first-differenced equations for i= 3A... -T of 
firm i and x,, are strictly exogenous regressors with E(x,, v,., )=O for all 
t, s= L2,..., T. The moment equations are given by E(Mj'Al, j 
)=0. 
if x,, are predetermined but not strictly exogenous with E(xj, II, s)# 
0 for s<t, and 
x X, zero otherwise, then only [x I- I are valid instruments for the 
differenced equation at period s. 
However, it is argued that the first-difference transformation suffers from the 
weakness that it magnifies gaps in unbalanced panels. Another way of 
transforming the estimated equations, called 'forward orthogonal deviations' or 
'orthogonal deviations', is proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). Instead of 
subtracting the previous observation from the contemporaneous one, it 
subtracts the average of all future available observations from the 
contemporaneous one for each of the first (T-1) observations. The 
transformation formula is: 
11 1/2 
-11 -i, l-l 
(fit 
+ zQ+l ++z i7_ 
Tt=2,3,..., 
T, 
IT-t+I] 
T-t+2] 
For consistency with the first difference transform, the orthogonal deviations- 
transformed variables are lagged one period. This transformation implies that if the 
idiosyncratic error term v,, is serially uncorrelated, the transformed error term V, *, 
will have the same property and be uncorrelated with all the right-hand side 
variables of the period t-s for s ý: 2 ; therefore, all these variables are valid 
instruments. 
Arellano and Bond (199 1) compare the one- and two-step difference GMM to the 
OLS, within-group transformation and Anderson and Hsiao difference and levels 
estimators using Monte Carlo simulations and find that difference GMM exhibits 
the least bias and variance in estimates. 
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3.2.2.2 Blundell and Bond System GMM Estimator 
TT 
However, Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that if y is close to a random walk, past 
levels convey little information about future changes. As a result, untransformed 
lags are weak instruments for differenced dependent variables and then give rise to a 
poor performance of difference GMM. Blundell and Bond (1998) develop the 
approach proposed in Arellano and Bover (1995) and relate the levels restrictions 
explicitly to the initial conditions process. 
Instead of transforming (first differences or orthogonal deviations) the regressors to 
remove the fixed effects, Blundell and Bond (1998) difference the instruments to 
make them exogenous to the fixed effects. They show that an additional stationarity 
restriction on the initial conditions process allows the use of an extended system 
GMM estimator which uses lagged differences of y, as instruments for equations in 
levels in addition to lagged levels of y, as instruments for equations in first 
differences (Baltagi, 2005). 
The estimation of the model can be based on a stacked system consisting of (T - 2) 
equations in first differences and the (T - 2) equations in levels corresponding to 
periods 33,..., T. The instrument matrix for this system can be written as 
mi 
A))12 v 
ml 
0 
where M, is defined as 
Ayj3 
Ayj, 
T-1 
[Vil 
ý Yi2l mi 
0 
0 
[Yil 
I ... I Yi, T-2 
I 
In system GMM, time-invariant variables which would 
disappear in difference 
GMM can be included. 
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3.2.3 Summary of Estimators 
All the estimators discussed above can be used to estimate capital structure models 
within static or dynamic framework. However, a lot of research on corporate 
financial policy uses fairly basic estimation procedures. In the static capital structure 
model, the most commonly used approaches are the pooled OLS or fixed effects 
panel data regressions (e. g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc- 
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001). One problem associated with these studies is that 
they do not consider the possible endogeneity arising from the error term of the 
estimation equation. Instrumental variable estimators are suggested to deal with this 
problem but there can be potential difficulties associated with this estimator since 
they tend to be inefficient (see Ahn and Schmidt, 1995). Green and Murinde (2008) 
evaluate the impact of various estimation procedures and find that the GMM 
estimator provides considerable efficiency gains compared with within-group 
instrumental variable estimators. This result emphasizes the importance of using an 
appropriate estimation procedure. Under the dynamic framework, the most 
commonly used method is the Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator (e. g. Ozkan, 
2001; De Miguel and Pindado, 2001). In my research, one of the contributions is to 
choose the appropriate estimation techniques for the problems diagnosed in the 
error term of estimated models. 
3.3 Sample and Data 
Company accounts data are obtained from Worldscope/Datastream. The purpose of 
the research is to study the impact of tax regime changes on firmsý 
financing 
behaviour in European countries. However, Graham and Tucker (2006) find that 
large firms with foreign subsidiaries are most likely to use tax shelters to avoid and 
evade taxes. One of the most popular tax shelters is tax-motivated transfer pricing, 
which enables income to shift from high-tax 
OECD parent companies to 
subsidiaries in other countries with 
low corporate income tax rates. Moreover, 
tunnelling, defined as the transfer of assets rather than of prices 
between 
subsidiaries, is substantial 
in multinational companies (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez- 
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de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000). This can also be used by multinational companies to 
minimize their tax payments. Therefore, financial decision-making for large firms 
becomes more sophisticated and less transparent, and it is practically difficult to 
exactly match large firms' tax status and their debt levels. In order to avoid this 
problem, medium-sized European companies are chosen for study over a relatively 
long time series. Sample firms are selected from the top 501-1500 companies in 
European Union in Worldscope/Datastream according to their market value. Such 
firms are likely to have fewer internationally distributed plants than the top 500 and 
therefore less opportunity for transfer pricing or other measures aimed at 
international tax shifting. A further advantage of studying middle-sized companies 
is that Gordon and Lee (2001) provide evidence that the impact of tax on the 
financing activities of smaller US companies is greater than that for larger 
companies. It will therefore be interesting to compare their results with those 
obtained here for the EU. 
The sample firms are from the following (11) old European Union (EU) member 
countries before the enlargement: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. 
The process of selecting the sample companies is summarized as follows: 
Top 501-1500 companies within Worldscope/Datastream according to their market value 
Less 
Companies from countries other than the II sample countries 
Less 
Financial companies 
Less 
Firms with accounting data less than 13 years 
Less 
Companies with missing data 
Less 
Firms whose sales or EBIT were non-positive in any account year 
Final sample: 129 
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These filters leave a balanced panel of 129 private non-financial companies that 
report balance sheets. income statements, and cash flow statements every year 
during 1993 to 2005. However, the pre-tax corporate income data during 1992-2004 
are required for calculating the effective tax rates. A list of the sample companies 
with their SIC codes are given in Appendix 3.1. 
Company data within Worldscope are reported in the local currency: the euro, apart 
from the UK and Sweden. For the UK and Sweden, daily exchange rates were 
obtained from Datastrearn to calculate yearly mean exchange rates matched up to 
each company's report date, and then used to convert pounds and krona into euros. 
Data for any calendar year in the samples include companies reporting at any time 
in that year. All the countries have a corporation tax year that coincides with 
calendar year except that UK has a tax year from I April to 31 March. Therefore, 
most sample companies have a report date in December. A few companies have a 
regular June or July or September report date. Some UK firms report in end-March. 
To identifý7precisely the relationship between company financing behaviour and the 
whole economy., all the macroeconomic data used in the analysis such as tax rates, 
were matched up to the report date of each company. 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 show the country and industry composition of the sample 
companies. 
Table 3.1 Country composition of sample companies 
Country No. of Companies 
No. % 
Belgium 3 2.33 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
18 
18 
1 
13.95 
13.95 
0.78 
Ireland 
Italy 
4 
7 
3.10 
5.43 
Netherlands 13 10.08 
Portugal 1 0.78 
Spain 6 4.65 
Sweden 7 5.43 
UK 51 39.53 
TOTAL 129 
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Table 3.2 IndustiT composition of sample companies 
SIC Code Industry Classification No. of Companies 
01 Agricultural Production-Crops I 
3 Oil and Gas Extraction 1 
15 General Building Contractors 7 
16 Heavy Construction, Excluding Building 3 
17 al Trade Contractors 1 
20 Food and Kindred Products 10 
23 Apparel & Other Textile Products 3 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 1 
26 Paper and Allied Products 2 
27 Printing and Publishing 4 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 4 
30 Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products 4 
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 4 
)3 Primary Metal Industries 1 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 3 
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 7 
336 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 4 
37 Transportation Equipment 7 
38 Instruments & Related Products 6 
39 Misc. Manufacturing Industries 1 
44 Water Transportation 3 
45 Transportation by Air 1 
47 Transportation Services 1 
49 Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services 8 
50 Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 7 
51 Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods 5 
52 Building Materials & Garden Supplies I 
53 General Merchandise Stores 2 
54 Food Stores 1 
55 Automotive Dealers & Service Stations 1 
57 Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores 1 
58 Eating and Drinking Places 3 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 4 
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72 
Hotels and Other Lodging Places 
Personal Services 
1 
1 
73 Business Services 5 
75 Auto Repair, Services, and Parking 1 
79 Amusement & Recreation Services 2 
80 Yealth Services 1 
_ 87 Engineering & Management Services 6 
Total No. of Compan es 129 
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The main source of corporate and personal tax data was the European Tax 
Handbook (Kesti, 1993-1995,2000-2005; Kesti and Andersen, 1996-1998; and 
Kesti. Andersen, and Swanhagen, 1999). Some additional information was also 
obtained from the websites of OECD and KPMG. The calculation of the tax 
variables is explained in Chapter 5. 
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Appendix 3.1 List of Sample Companies 
Table A 3.1.1 Belgium 
F- 
No. CoMpany Name SIC Code 
II 
2 
CMB 
......... ...... DECEUNINCK ECH 
4491 
3089 
3 TESSENDERLO 3083 
Table A 3.1.2 France 
No. Company Name SIC Code 
I SPERIAN PROTECTION 3842 
2 BENETEAU 3731 
3 CASINO GUIPCI-IN. ADP 5141 
4 CLARINS 5999 
5 ELECTRICITE STRASBOURG 4911 
6 FROMAGERIES BEL 2022 
7 GUYENNE & GASCOGNE 5411 
8 HOTELS DEAUVILLE 7993 
9 LISI 3452 
10 MANITOU 3537 
II PLASTIC ONINIUM 3089 
12 RALLYE 5311 
13 SEB 3639 
14 SOPRA GROUP 7373 
15 SPIR COMM. 2711 
16 SR TELEPERFORMANCE 8742 
_ 17 VICAT 3273 
18 ZODIAC 50 
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Table A 3.1.3 Germany 
No. Company Name SIC Code 
I BAYWA VINK 5153 
2 _ BIJOU BRIGITTE _ 3961 
3 BMW PREF 3711 
4 BOSS (HUGO) 2329 
5 DOUGLAS HOLDING 5999 
6 GELSENWASSER 4941 
7 HOLSTEN-BRAUER-F-I 2082 
i8 J DEERE-LANZ VERWALTUNG 1 3) 524 
9 KRONES 3565 
io TKwsSAAT 133 
II LECHWERKE 4911 
12 : LEONI 3714 
13 ADM HAMBURG 2079 
14 RHOEN-KLINIKUM 8011 
15 1 RWE PREF. 4911 
16 SUED-CHEMIE 3295 
17 VOSSLOH 5084 
18 WEBER (GERRY) INTL. 2335 
Table A 3.1.4 Greece 
111 No. Company Name SIC Code 
I VIVARTIA 2026 
Table A 3.1.5 Ireland 
No. Company Name SIC Code 
1 FYFFES 5148 
2, GRAFTON GROUP 5074 
3 IAWS GROUP 2051 
4 UNITED DRUG 5122 
63 
Table A 3.1.6 Italy 
No. Company Name SIC Code 
I AUTOSTRADA TO-Ml 4785 
2 BENETTON 2331 
3 GRUPPO EDIT. L'ESPRESSO 7311 
4 INDESIT COMPANY 3633 
5 MONDADORI ED 2721 
6 SOGEFI 3714 
7 VIANINI LAVORI 1611 
Table A 3.1.7 Netherlands 
No. Company Name SIC Code 
I AALBERTS INDS. 3432 
BAM GROEP 1542 
BOSKALIS WESTMINSTER 1629 
4 FUGRO 8713 
5 GROLSCH 2082 
6 HEUMANS 1629 
7 HUNTER DOUGLAS 2591 
8 1 IMTECH 3699 
91 OCE 3861 
10 ORDINA 7373 
11 SLIGRO FOOD GROUP 5141 
12 SMIT INTL. CERTS. 4492 
13 1 USG PEOPLE 7361 
Table A 3.1.8 Portugal 
No. Company Name SIC Code 
I MODELO CONTINENTE 5399 
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Table A 3.1.9 Snain 
No. Company Name SIC Code 
11 
- 
CAMPOFRIO ALIMENTACION 2011 
2 CEMENTOS PORT. VALDERR. 3241 
3 EUROPISTAS CONCE ESPL 8741 
4 PROSEGUR 7381 
5 VIDRALA 3221 
6 VISCOFAN 3089 
Table A 3.1.10 Sweden 
No. Company Name SIC Code 
I B&B TOOLS 5084 
2 GETINGE 3842 
HEXAGON 3823 
4 HOLMEN 2621 
5 LATOUR INVESTMENT 3599 
6 SECO TOOLS 3541 
7 TRELLEBORG 3714 
Table A 3.1.11 UK 
No. Company Name SIC Code 
I ABBOT GROUP 1389 
2 AGA FOODSERVICE 3631 
3 AWG 4941 
4 BBA GROUP 4581 
5 BELLWAY 1521 
6 BERKELEY GP. HDG. UNITS 1522 
7 BODY SHOP INTL. 2844 
8, i BODYCOTE 
INTL. 3398 
9 BROWN (N) GROUP 5961 
10 BSS GROUP 5074 
11 CARPETRIGHT 5713 
12 COBHAM 3728 
13 CRANSWICK 2013 
1-4 CREST NICHOLSON 1521 
ý284jý3 
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Table A 3.1.11 UK (cont) 
No. Company Name SIC Code 
16 DAVIS SERVICE GROUP 7219 
17 DOMINO PRINTING SCIENCES 3555 
18 ELECTROCOMP. 5063 
19 FINDEL -5961 
20 FORT H PORTS 4491 
-2.1 
GKN 3714 
2-1 GREENE KING 5813 
23 I GREGGS 2099 
'14 HALMA 3829 
25 HOLIDAYBREAK 7011 
26 
. 
HOMESERVE 1711 
27 HUNTING 4925 
28 JOHNSTON PRESS 2711 
29 NORTHERN FOODS 2099 
30 NORTHGATE 7514 
31 
- 
PENDRAGON 5511 
32 PENNON GROUP 4941 
33 PZ CUSSONS 2841 
4 RENISHAW 3826 
35 ROTORK 3491 
36 RPS GROUP 8711 
37 SERCO GROUP 8744 
IL 38 SIG 5033 
39 SMITH (DS) 2653 
40 STANLEY LEISURE 7999 
41 TAYLOR WIMPEY 1531 
42 TRAVIS PERKINS 5211 
43 TRINITY MIRROR 2711 
44 VIRIDIAN GROUP 4911 
45 VT GROUP 8744 
46 WEIR GROUP 3561 
47 WETHERSPOON (JD) 5813 
48, WILSON BOWDEN 1521 
4 9 WIMPEY(GEORGE) 1522 
50 MARSTONS 5813 
51 YULE CATTO 2851 
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Chapter 4 European Tax Systems 
4.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to give a brief introduction to relevant features 
of the tax systems and tax policies in the sample European countries. A good 
understanding of tax regimes is a prerequisite for measuring the tax burden taken by 
both firms and individual investors and thus is of great importance for investigating 
the impact of tax regimes on corporate financing decisions. 
In this chapter, I first discuss the corporate tax status in sample countries, and then 
look at the taxation at individual level. More detailed tax policies and tax rates are 
summarized in Appendix 4.1 and Appendix 4.2 for each country. 
4.2 Corporate Income Taxes in the EU 
As economic integration within the European Union progresses with the 
introduction of a single currency for some members of the EU, more attention has 
been given to the differences that remain between member countries, and especially 
to the ways that companies are taxed. The interaction between the tax systems of 
different members has become more and more important since the tax policy of one 
member state could have spillover or externality effects on other members. In 
particular, the issue of tax competition is moving to the forefront of debates about 
tax systems. Tax coordination or tax harmonization which could be used as a 
measure to deal with economic inefficiency of tax systems and potentially harmful 
tax competition has been a controversial topic in both political and economic fields. 
4.2.1 The System of Corporate Tax 
The main difference among corporate tax systems is the interaction between the tax 
on corporate income and dividends to domestic shareholders. 
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Under a classical system, corporations and their shareholders are regarded as 
separate tax entities. The profits made by a company are subject to corporation tax 
at a flat rate, and then the shareholders in their turn are liable to a further tax, 
usually personal income tax when the same profits are distributed by way of a 
dividend. Therefore, the income is taxed twice, first at the corporate level and then 
again at the shareholder dividend level. 
There are various approaches to alleviate the 'double taxation' problem, and these 
approaches can be classified into two categories according to Bond et al. (2000): 
imputation systems and shareholder relief systems. Under an imputation system, 
part or all of the corporate tax paid is taken into account when calculating the 
personal income tax liabilities due to dividends received. In other words, an 
imputation system gives shareholders part or all of the credit for tax paid by the 
company which could be used to offset their personal tax payable on dividends. 
Shareholder relief systems simply reduce the personal income tax imposed on 
received dividends, and may not necessarily be explicitly related to an underlying 
corporate tax payment. 
During recent years, there have been many changes in corporate tax systems within 
the EU, and the main trend appears to be moving away from imputation systems. 
France, Ireland and Italy replaced the imputation system by a classical double 
taxation system in 2005,1999 and 2004, respectively; Germany has had a classical 
system from 2001 instead of its former two-rate system; In Portugal, the partial 
imputation system was replaced by a partial exemption system in 2002, which is 
essentially a classical system; In UK, the Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) regime 
was abolished in 1999. The government has reduced dividend tax credits for 
taxpaying shareholders and has ceased to refund these credits to most tax-exempt 
shareholders. 
Therefore, at the present time most countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) operate their corporate income taxes 
under a classical system in principle with different 
forms and levels of shareholder 
relief, Spain and the UK operate a partial 
imputation system; Greece has a 
dividend exemption system under which dividends paid by companies are 
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distributed from after-tax profits and are not subject to further taxation in the 
hands of the recipient. For some countries, e. g. Italy. dividend income is not added 
to the tax base and taxed at graduated rates, but is subject to a lower final 
withholding tax at flat rates. 
The tax systems of the sample countries during the period from 1993 through 2005 
are summarized in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Summary of tax systems 
Country Tax system: 1993-2005. 
Belgium Classical system 
France 199.3-2004 2005- 
Imputation system Classical system 
G 1993-2000 2001- ermany Two-rate system Classical system 
Greece Dividend exemption system 
I l d 1993-April 1999 April 1999- re an Imputation system Classical system 
I l 1993-2003 2004- ta y Imputation system Classical system 
Nether Classical system 
1993-2001 2002- Portugal 
Imputation system Partial exemption system 
Spain Imputation system 
. Sweden Classical system 
1993-April 1999 April 1999- 
UK 
Imputation system (ACT) Imputation system 
4.2.2 Corporate Tax Rates 
Tax rates, including statutory tax rates and effective tax rates, are a useful tool for 
comparing the impact of various tax systems and tax reforms across countries and 
over time, isolating the impact of tax from other factors that may also be changing. 
In this section, two types of tax rates are considered - the statutory marginal 
corporate income tax rate and an average tax rate constructed using 
firm-level 
accounting data. 
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4.2-2.1 Statutory Marginal Tax Rates on Corporate Income 
Corporate income tax rates vary within the European Union. Table 4.2 summarizes 
the flat or top bracket statutory corporate income tax rates for the II sample EU 
countries during the sample period 1993 to 2005. Local taxes (or the average across 
regions) are included where they exist. Any supplementary taxes are included only 
if they apply generally. Note that these are not necessarily the highest statutory 
marginal tax rates faced by corporations. The calculated tax rates range from 10 
percent to 57.8 percent. From Figure 4.1, it is quite obvious that generally the 
highest tax rates tend to be found in the larger EU countries, e. g. Germany and 
France, while the lowest tax rates tend to be found in the smaller countries, e. g. 
Ireland, although there are some exceptions. Looking at the time series of corporate 
income tax rates for the II countries, the tax rates are relatively stable over time and 
there has been a downward trend in most of the countries sampled. 
4.2.2.2 Average Tax Rates Using Accounting Data 
The second type of tax rates considered is an average tax rate constructed using 
accounting data on individual firms. Using information from companies' accounts, 
an average tax rate is calculated as the ratio of corporate income tax paid to pre- 
tax income for each firm. ' This accounting measure will be based on the actual 
source of finance and asset structure of individual firms. On the other hand, 
accounting data will also reflect the full range of investments made by individual 
firms over many years. Therefore, the average tax rate cannot be used as a 
measure of tax policy. 
1 The income tax paid used to calculate the average tax rate includes not only the federal income Z-: ) 
taxes and state income taxes but also the foreign income taxes and some deferred taxation charges. 
Therefore, it is quite possible that the average tax rate is higher than the statutory tax rate, as 
shown in Table 4.3. 
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The mean value of the individual firm average tax rates in each country in each year is 
calculated. However, the sample size is very small for some countries and there are 
verv limited firm level data. especially for Greece and Portugal, so the estimates of the 
average tax rates for these countries are very imprecise. In Table 4.3. the mean and 
standard deviation of the individual average tax rates are presented for each country 
from 1993) to 2005. Generally speaking, the mean taken across companies for each 
sample country shows a slight downward trend over time in most countries. indicating a 
reduction in the tax burden on firms. The standard deviation shown here is across firms 
in each country. A high level of variation in firm-level tax rates may indicate many 
things, such as heterogeneity of profitability levels. 
4.2.3 Trends in Tax Revenue 
In spite of the reduction of corporate income tax rates, the government revenues from 
corporate income taxes do not show a similar downward trend. Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 
report the corporate income tax revenue as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage of 
total tax revenue in II sample countries. From the data we can see that although much 
attention has been devoted to the taxation of corporate income by both politicians and 
economists, corporate income tax only amounts a very small proportion of GDP and a 
relatively small proportion of total tax revenue. It is not a major source of government 
revenue in the EU. Over the period 2000-2001 1. 
the corporate income tax rates fell in 
four countries (France, Germany, Ireland and Italy). However, the reduction in 
corporate tax rates did not necessarily bring about a decrease in corporate tax revenue 
as a share of GDP and as a share of total tax receipts in these countries. This, at first 
sight, surprising result may be partly attributed to a trend towards broader corporate tax 
bases in recent years. 
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4.3 Personal Income Taxation 
4.3.1 The Importance of Personal Taxation 
Corporate financial policy could be the final target of tax reform. However, more often. 
it is just an intermediate target to reach the final target of having an adequate level of 
investment (Staderini, 2001). Tax provisions at both corporate level and personal level 
affect a firm"s choice among different sources of finance, and therefore enter the 
calculation of cost of capital and finally have a significant impact on a fin-n's 
investment decisions. 
The reason that personal taxes are important in determining a firm's leverage is that 
existing tax systems provide differential tax treatments for interest, dividends and 
capital gains. According to the market arbitrage condition that after-tax rewards of the Z__ 
three kinds of income must be the same, differential tax treatments at the personal level 
imply differential costs to firms for different sources of finance. 
4.3.2 Personal Taxation in the Sample European Countries 
There are three main taxes imposed on the income from investment at the individual 
level, the personal income taxes on interest income, the personal income taxes on 
dividend income, and the capital gains tax. 
4.3.2.1 Taxes on Interest Income 
For most sample countries (France; Germany; Ireland; Netherlands, 1993-2000; Spain; 
the UK). interest income derived by resident individuals is included in their taxable 
income and subject to income tax at the ordinary progressive rates. In Netherlands 
(2001-2005) and Sweden, interest income is subject to a flat rate. For other countries 
ý(Belgium; Greece; Italy; 
Portugal), interest income is subject to a final withholding tax 
at a lower flat rate. 
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4.3.2.2 Taxes on Dividend Income 
For some countries under imputation tax systems (France. 1993-2004, Ireland, 
1993/94-1998/99, Spain, the UK) and Germany (1993-2000). individual investors must 
include in their taxable income the amount of dividend received grossed-up by the tax 
credit and then set off against their tax liability on the dividend and the credit. Under 
the classical system. the taxation of dividends at a personal level is separated from the 
corporate taxation. Therefore, dividend income is subject to the progressive personal 
income tax rate (Ireland, 1999/2000-2005. Netherlands. 1993-2000). However. in those 
countries with shareholder relief, dividends are usually subject to a final withholding 
tax at a lower flat rate (Belgium; Italy; Portugal, 1993-2001), or only part of the 
dividend income is included in taxable income and taxed accordingly (France, 2005, 
Germany. 2001-2005; Portugal, 2002-2005). In Netherlands (2001-2005) and Sweden 
(1993.1995-2005), tax on dividend income is imposed at a flat rate. For Greece and 
also Sweden in the year of income 1994, corporate pro-fits are taxed only at the 
corporate level and there is no income or withholding tax on dividends. 
4.3.2.3 Capital Gains Tax 
In many countries, capital gains realized on the transfer of shares on non-substantial 
holdings by individuals are subject to a flat rate (France; Ireland; Italy, 1999-2005; 
Sweden). More favourable treatments are given in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy 
(1993-1998), Netherlands and Portugal, where this kind of capital gains are not taxable 
for non-substantial holdings. However, in the UK, capital gains are treated as the top 
slice of taxable income at different rates according to the extent to which the gain falls 
within the relevant income bracket. The calculation of capital gains tax in Spain is more 
complicated than other sample countries since the effective tax rates depend on the 
number of years over which the capital gains are accrued. However. the highest 
possible tax rate applied on capital gains is the highest statutory personal income tax 
rate. 
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The highest possible statutory marginal personal income tax rates on interest income. t-- - 
dividend income. and long-term capital gains inclusive of surtaxes if applicable in the 
II sample countries over the period of 1993 to 2005 are summarized in Appendix 4.2. 
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Appendix 4.1 Summary of Tax SysteMS2 
A 4.1.1 Belgium 
1. Taxation of Companies 
1.1 Tax System 
The Belgian corporate tax system is a classical double taxation system. modified by 
exemption for qualifying participations held by corporate shareholders. 
1.2 Taxable Period 
The assessment is based on the taxable income of a financial year. The assessment year 
is the year following the end of the financial year if the financial year is based on the 
calendar year. If not. the assessment year is the year during which the financial year 
ends. 
2. Taxation of Individuals 
2.1 Capital Gains 
Capital gains realized by individuals not engaged in business activities are, in principle. 
not taxable. 
2.2 Dividends and Interest 
As a rule, dividends and interest are subject to withholding tax if they constitute income 
from Belgian sources or income from foreign sources collected through an intermediary 
established in Belgium. 
When dividends and interest are subject to a withholding tax. this withholding tax is 
final. 
2.3 Taxable Period 
For individuals the taxable period coincides with the calendar year. The assessment 
year is the calendar year following the taxable period. 
2 The source of this appendix is the European Tax 
Handbook (Kesti. 1993-1995,2000-2005: Kesti and 
Andersen, 1996-1998; and Kesti el al., 1999). 
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A 4.1.2" France 
1. Taxation of Companies 
1.1 Tax System 
(1) Imputation system applicable until 2004 
Until 2004, France applied an imputation system under which shareholders were 
entitled to a tax credit. the 'avoir fiscal'. 
Before 1995. the system was a full imputation system since all of the corporation tax 
was imputed to the individual shareholders. 
However, from 1995 to 2004. a surcharge was levied on corporate income tax due, and 
the tax credits were granted to the shareholders only at the rate of corporate income tax 
but not at the rate of the surcharge. Therefore. the previous system of full imputation 
became a partial imputation system. 
(2) Classical system applicable from 2005 
The imputation system was generally abolished with effect from I January 2005. 
Dividends paid to corporate shareholders and assessed to tax from I January 2005 are 
taxed under a classical system. 
For dividends distributed to individual shareholders from I January 2005, the classical 
system was modified in that only 50% of the dividends received are subject to tax. 
1.2 Taxable Period 
The tax year is the calendar year or, if the taxpayer's financial year is other than the 
calendar year.. the financial year closed during the relevant calendar year. 
Corporate 
income tax is assessed on the income realized during the most recently closed financial 
year. 
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2. Taxation of Individuals 
"A Dividends 
(1) Imputation systern applicable until 2004 
Dividends received from resident companies entitle the shareholder to a tax credit (tile 
avoh-fiscal) equal to 50% of the dividend distribution. Until the introduction of the 
corporate income tax surcharge in 1995, France applied a full imputation system 
whereby the avoh-fiscal represented a full refund of the upstream corporate income tax 
on the income from which the dividends are distributed. From the year of income 1995. 
the imputation is partial, depending on the rate of the surcharge. 
(22) Classical system applicable from 2005 
Dividends paid to resident individuals from I January 2005 no longer carry an 
imputation credit. Instead, the dividends are assessed to income tax, but only for 50% 
of their amount. 
21.21 Interest 
French-source interest is generally subject to income tax at the progressive rates. 
However,, a final levy at flat rates may apply. For residents, it is generally optional 
between the progressive rates and the flat rates, except with respect to a few types of 
interest for which it is compulsory. 
2.3 Capital Gains 
Capital gains are subject to a flat rate of tax. 
2.4 Taxable Period 
The taxable period consists of a 12-month period and is generally the calendar year. 
However, individuals who earn business income may be assessed on the basis of an 
accounting period, which may be fixed freely 
by the taxpayer. 
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A 4.1.3 Germany 
1. Taxation of companies 
1.1 Tax System 
(1) Two-rate system applicable until 2000 
Before I January 2001, the German corporate tax system was a two-rate system. with a 
full imputation credit granted to resident shareholders to completely eliminate the 
economic double taxation of distributed corporate profits. A company in general has to 
withhold dividend withholding tax from distributed profits. which tax is fully creditable 
for the shareholder against his individual income tax. 
(2) Classical system applicable from 2001 
From I January 2001, Germany has a classical double taxation system of corporate 
income tax. The former two-rate system, with a full imputation credit granted to 
resident shareholders, was entirely abolished from I January 2002. 
1.2 Taxable Period 
The tax year is the calendar year. Taxable income is the income of the company's 
financial year that coincides with the calendar year. If a company's financial year is 
different from the calendar year,, taxable income is the income of the financial year that 
expires during the tax year. 
2. Taxation of Individuals 
2.1 Dividends 
(1) Two-rate system applicable until 2000 
Dividends are subject to progressive personal income tax rates, with a full imputation 
credit granted to resident shareholders to completely eliminate the economic double 
taxation of distributed corporate profits. 
(2) Classical system applicable from 2001 
Under the new system of corporate income taxation, the imputation credit is no longer 
granted with respect to dividends and other profit distributions. Economic 
double 
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taxation is mitigated by an exemption of 50% of such I income (half-income system). 
The half-income system applies to domestic and foreign dividends. 
2.2 Interest 
Interest income is taxed at progressive personal income tax rates. 
Capital Gains 
Capital gains derived from private transactions are generally not subject to tax. 
However, they are taxable if the total gains are at least EUR 512 during the tax year and r-I 
arise from the disposal of movable property, including shares and bonds, within I year 
of the date of acquisition, i. e. short term gains only. Zero-rate is chosen in the present 
analysis. 
2.4 Taxable Period 
The tax year (assessment year) is the calendar year. However, for income from a trade 
or business the taxpayer may choose a tax year that is different from the calendar year 
(financial year). in which case the income of the financial year is taxed as income of the 
calendar year in which the financial year ends. 
A 4.1.4 Greece 
1. Taxation of Companies 
1.1 Tax System 
Greece has a dividend exemption system under which dividends paid by companies are 
distributed from after-tax profits and are not subject to further taxation in the hands of 
recipient. 
1.2 Taxable Period 
The fiscal year starts on I January and ends on 31 December of the calendar year and 
refers to the financial (accounting) year ended on a date between I August of the 
previous calendar year and 31 July of the current calendar year. For example. 
fiscal 
year 2005, which covers the calendar year 2005, refers to the 
income of the financial 
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year that ended between I August 2004 and 31 July 2005. Financial years of companies 
normally end on 30 June or 31 December. 
2. Taxation of Individuals 
2.1 Dividends 
Domestic dividends are not subject to income tax or withholding tax in the hands of the 
shareholder. 
2.2 Interest 
A final withholding tax is levied on interest from bonds issued by resident companies. 
2.3) Capital Gains 
Individuals selling shares in a quoted corporation are, in principle, not taxable. 
2.4 Taxable Period 
The taxable period is the tax year. For individuals this corresponds to the calendar year. 
A 4.1.5 Ireland 
1. Taxation of Companies 
1.1 Tax System 
(1) Imputation system applicable up to 5 April 1999 
Up to 5 April 1999, Ireland had an imputation system for the assessment of corporate 
income. Dividends paid were not subject to withholding, but the company paying the 
dividend was liable to pay advance corporation tax (ACT), which was credited against 
its corporation tax liability (net of double tax relief credit). 
The ACT payment was also imputed to the shareholder as a tax credit. A resident 
individual shareholder was able to set this credit against his income tax liability on the 
dividend plus credit. The system was only a partial imputation system because not all of 
the corporation tax was imputed to the individual shareholder. 
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(2) Classical systern applicable from 6 April 1999 
From 6 April 1999. Ireland has, in principle. had a classical system for the assessment 
of corporate profit. 
Reduced Rate for Manufacturing Companies: 
There is a special 10% rate for manufacturing and certain other companies. The rate 
applies only to profits from the manufacturing itself. Therefore., up to 1999, the 
associated ACT rate for manufacturing companies is 1/18. 
1.2 Taxable Period 
The corporation tax year is from I January to 31 December. The assessment relates to 
the company's accounting period, rather than to the corporation tax year I April to 31 
March which determines the rate of tax. An accounting period starts when a company 
commences a trade, becomes resident for tax purposes in Ireland or acquires a first 
source of income. The accounting period normally ends 12 months after it started. 
2. Taxation of Individuals 
2.1 Dividends 
(1) Imputation system applicable up to 5 April 1999 
Dividend income was taxed at progressive personal tax rates. Tax credits were granted 
for individuals to set against their income tax liability on the dividend plus credit. The 
system was only a partial imputation system because not all of the corporation tax was 
imputed to the individual shareholder. 
(2) Classical system applicable from 6 April 1999 
Tax is withheld on dividends paid by corporations to shareholders. Any tax withheld 
may be credited against the recipient's final income tax liability. 
2.2 Interest 
Interest income is taxed at progressive personal income tax rates. 
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2-3) Capital Gains 
Capital gains are subjject to a flat rate. 
2.4 Taxable Period 
Before I January 2002, the income tax year ran from 6 April in any year to 5 April of 
the next year. From I January 2002 the income and capital gains tax year has been 
aligned with the calendar year. Trading income is usually assessed on the basis of the 
accounting period ending in the year of assessment. Other income and capital gains are Z-- z! ) 
assessed on the current-vear basis. 
A 4.1.6 Italy 
1. Taxation of Companies 
1.1 Tax System 
Before year 2004. Italy applied a full imputation system. Dividends received from 
resident companies or derived from a substantial participation were included in taxable 
investment income and grossed-up by an imputation credit, then an equal amount was 
credited against the tax computed on the gross amount. However, dividends received by 
individuals were subject to a final withholding tax at a flat rate. 
Effective for financial years starting on or after I January 2004, Italy has applied a 
classical system of taxation of corporate pro-fits. The former imputation system was 
abolished and replaced by a 95% participation exemption for corporate shareholders 
and a 60% exemption for individual shareholders who hold the participation in a 
business capacity. Individual shareholders not holding the participation in a business 
capacity are also entitled to the 60% exemption if they own more than 2% of the voting 
power or 5% of the capital in listed companies. or more than 20% of the voting power 
or 25% of the capital in other companies. Otherwise, dividends derived by individuals 
are subject to a final withholding tax. 
2 Taxable Period 
The tax year for corporate income tax purposes is the financial year of the company, as 
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determined by law or articles of incorporation. If the financial year is not so determined, 
or if it is longer than 2 years, the tax year is the calendar year. 
2. Taxation of Individuals 
2.1 Dividends 
Before I July 1998. dividend income was treated as part of taxable income and taxed at 
progressive income tax rates. However, individuals could elect to pay a 12.5% final 
withholding tax on dividends. Tax credit was not available where the individual had 
elected for the taxation of dividends at source with the 12.5% withholding tax. The 
final withholding tax rates are chosen in my research for the period from 1993 to 1997. 
As of I July 1998, dividends received in respect of a non-substantial participation to 
private individuals are subject to a 12.5% final withholding tax. In this case, the 
imputation credit is not granted. 
2.2 Interest 
Interest, when not derived in the course of a business activity, is generally subject to a 
final withholding tax; the rates range between 6.25% and 30% (the most common rates 
range between 12.5% and 27%). 
2.3 Capita ains 
Net capital gains arising during the year from the alienation of shares, quotas of limited 
liability companies, other capital certificates of resident and non-resident entities, 
convertible bonds, options and similar rights are subject to a substitute tax which 
replaces income taxes and must be paid on assessment. However, capital gains arising 
on the transfer of shares quoted on an Italian stock exchange not exceeding 2% of the 
capital of the company of which such shares form part are exempt from the substitute 
tax. 
As of 1999, capital gains on substantial participations are subject to the rate of 
27%; 
otherwise, the rate is 12.5%. 
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2.4 Taxable Period 
For individual taxpayers, the tax year is the calendar year. 
A 4.1.7 Netherlands 
1. Taxation of Companies 
1.1 Tax System 
The Netherlands corporate income tax is based on the classical system, which means 
that corporate profits are fully taxed and distributions from the taxed profits are again 
fully taxed in the hands of the shareholders. However, in the case of qualifying 
distributions to corporate shareholders, double taxation is eliminated through the 
participation exemption. In the case of individual shareholders with a substantial 
shareholding, economic double taxation is mitigated through a lower flat rate of income 
tax on dividends. 
1.2 Taxable Period 
In general. the tax year is the calendar year. Corporate taxpayers may, however. adopt a 
different tax year in accordance with their articles of association. A company with a tax 
year other than the calendar year is subject to tax according to the law applicable to the 
replaced tax year. Taxable income is the income that is derived during a tax year. 
2. Taxation of Individuals 
2.1 Dividends and Interest 
Before 2001, taxes were generally collected during the tax year by withholdings and 
pre-assessments, with or without a final assessment the next year. Dividends and 
interest from profit-sharing bonds paid by a resident company to its shareholders or 
creditors were subject to a withholding tax. Resident taxpayers could credit the tax 
against their income tax due. Therefore, taxes on dividends and interest were effectively 
paid at the personal income tax rates. 
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From I January 2001 investment income. including dividends (other than those on 
substantial shareholdings). interest and royalties, is no longer subject to income tax as 
such. Instead. the worldwide average net value of the assets of the taxpayer as at I Z-- 
January and 31 December of the tax year is deemed to produce a 4% net yield. This net 
vield is taxed at a flat rate of 30%, resulting in a tax of 1.2% on the net assets. 
2.2 Capita ains 
In general, capital gains are not included in taxable income, except capital gains 
realized in the course of a business and certain non-speculative gains. and other capital 
gains derived through the sale of other disposal of a substantial interest shareholding in 
a resident or non-resident company. 
2.3 Taxable Period 
The tax year is the calendar year. Taxes are generally collected during the tax year by 
'"-, ay of withholding and by advance payments, with or without a final assessment 
during the following year. 
A 4.1.8 Portugal 
1. Taxation of Companies 
1.1 Tax System 
(1) Partial imputation system up to 31 December 2001 
The Portuguese corporate income tax system was a partial imputation system, under 
which resident corporate or individual shareholders, quotaholders or partners may 
credit part of the underlying corporate income tax 
(IRC) paid by the distributing 
company against their own liability for IRC or 
individual income tax (IRS), as the case 
may be. Furthermore. a near total elimination of 
double taxation of domestic-source 
dividends received by resident corporate shareholders, quotaholders or 
partners is 
achieved under the affiliation privilege 
for inter-company dividends, and other reliefs. 
(2) Partial exemption system after I January 2002 
From I January 2002 the partial imputation system that was used 
to mitigate the effects 
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of economic double taxation of domestic dividends was replaced by a partial exemption 
system. According to both systems, qualifying domestic dividends derived by resident 
corporate shareholders are fully exempt in their hands. Under the new system., a 50% 
exemption is granted in respect of such dividends where the participation exemption 
does not apply, as well as in respect of gross dividends derived by resident individual 
shareholders. 
1.2 Taxable Period 
Accounting and tax periods coincide with the calendar year. 
2. Taxation of Individuals 
2.1 Dividends 
1. Partial imputation system up to 31 December 2001 
Dividends were subject to a final withholding tax unless the recipient elected to treat it 
as a payment on account. If he so elected, the tax withheld was regarded as an advance 
payment. and he was granted a credit of a certain percent of the underlying corporate 
income tax attributable to such dividends. For dividend from shares quoted on the 
Lisbon Stock Exchange and from newly privatized corporations for the first 5 years, 
only part of it was taxable. 
2. Partial exemption system after I January 2002 
From I January 2002 the partial imputation system was abolished and replaced with a 
partial exemption system, under which resident individuals must include 50% of the 
gross domestic dividends received in their taxable income for progressive income tax 
purposes. In general, domestic dividends are subject to withholding of IRS at a rate of 
15%. The withholding tax is an advance levy; it is credited against the taxpayer's final 
tax liability. 
2.2 Interest 
A final withholding tax is levied on interest income from public 
bonds unless the 
recipient elects to treat it as a payment on account. 
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In addition to the final withholding taxes on income from any securities. a 5% non- 
deductible and non-creditable substitute inheritance and gift tax is withheld on 
dividends from any shares and on interest from bonds, unless expressly exempt. 
2.3 Capital Gains 
The net annual gains realized from disposals for consideration of shares and bonds are, 
in principle. subject to tax at the final rate of 10%, unless the transferor opts for their 
inclusion in his taxable income for tax purposes. in which case the 10% is treated as a 
payment on account. An exemption from tax applies to long-term capital gains from 
shares in Portuguese corporations. 
2.4 Taxable Period 
As a rule, the tax year coincides with the calendar year. 
A 4.1.9 Spain 
1. Taxation of Companies 
1.1 Tax System 
Spain applies a partial imputation system. Resident individual shareholders are granted 
an imputation tax credit. 
1.2 Taxable Period 
As a general rule, the tax year coincides with the calendar year. but companies may file 
their returns with reference to their financial year. The tax year may not exceed 12 
months. Corporate income tax must be computed and paid by the taxpayers under the 
self-assessment method. 
2. Taxation of Individuals 
2.1 Dividends 
A resident individual must include in his taxable income the amount of dividends 
received (before withholding tax) from a resident company. An imputation credit 
is then 
granted against his income tax liability. 
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2.21 
Interest 
Interest derived by resident individuals is fully taxable. 
Dividends and interest are subject to withholding tax. The tax withheld is generally 
treated as an advance payment and credited against the taxpayeCs final tax liability. 
2.3 Capital Gains 
Before 1999. capital gains (or losses) were classified in two groups, namely: 
(1) Ordinary capital gains, i. e. those arising from a transfer of property for 
consideration or by an inter vivos gift which has been owned for I year or less, 
as well as (for tax computation purposes) unsubstantiated capital gains, i. e. 
unjustified increases of net wealth. 
(2) Irregular (special) capital gains, i. e. those arising from the transfer of property 
owned for more than I year. 
From 1999. capital gains (and losses) are classified as short-term capital gains or long- 
ten-n capital gains. 
(1) Short-term capital gains include gains arising from a transfer for consideration, 
or from an inter vivos gift, or property that was owned for 2 years or less. It also 
includes increases of net wealth which would be difficult to justify by the 
income declared. 
(2) Long-term capital gains are gains arising from the transfer of property and 
rights to a share subscription owned for more than 2 years. 
Ordinary capital gains (short-term capital gains) constitute the ordinary taxable base 
and are subject to progressive tax rates. 
2.4 Taxable Period 
The taxable period for individuals is the calendar year. 
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A 4.1.10 Sweden 
I. Taxation of Companies 
1.1 Tax System 
Taxation of corporate profits follows the classical system. Double taxation may be 
eliminated or modified. in the case of corporate shareholders. by participation 
exemption. or. in the case of individual shareholders, by the relief granted for dividends 
paid by small companies. 
For the year of income 1994 only, double taxation of corporate profits of Swedish 
companies was abolished as far as distributions to resident shareholders were concerned. 
Corporate profits were taxed only at the corporate level and no withholding or income 
tax was levied on dividends received by resident shareholders, companies or 
individuals. This system was cancelled, effective I January 1995. 
1.2 Taxable Period 
Corporate income tax is assessed in I year, i. e. in the assessment year, on the basis of 
income during the previous year, i. e. the income year. The income year follows the 
financial year. 
2. Taxation of Individuals 
2.1 Taxable Income 
For the purposes of computing taxable income and granting a deduction for losses, the 
concepts of 'category of income' and 'source of income' are important. The 3 
categories of income of individuals are (1) employment income, (2) business income 
and (3) capital income. 
Capital income includes dividends, interest and all other income derived from a capital 
investment. In addition, capital income includes capital gains from the sale of 
immovable property pertaining to a business, and capital gains from movable property 
not pertaining to a business. 
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2.2 Interest. Dividends and Capital Gains 
National income tax on capital incon7e is imposed at a flat rate. No municipal income 
tax is imposed on capital income. 
For the year of income 1994 only, no withholding or income tax is levied on dividends 
received bv resident shareholders. 
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2.3 Taxable Period 
The tax year is normally the calendar year. Tax assessment is made in the year 
following the tax year. i. e. in the assessment year. 
A 4.1.11 United Kingdom 
1. Taxation of Companies 
1.1 Tax S-vstem 
(1) The ACT up to 5 April 1999 
From 1973 the United Kingdom used the imputation system for the assessment of 
corporate income. Dividends paid were not subject to the withholding of income tax, 
but the company paying the dividend was liable to make a payment of non-refundable 
advance corporation tax (ACT) to be set off against its corporation tax (CT) liability. 
The ACT payment was imputed to the shareholder as a tax credit. A resident individual 
shareholder could set this credit against his income tax liability on the dividend plus 
credit. The system could not claim to be a pure imputation system, because not all of 
the corporation tax was imputed to the individual shareholder. 
(2) Partial imputation system after 6 April 1999 
Advance corporation tax (ACT) was abolished with effect from 1999. but 
notwithstanding its abolition, the corresponding imputation credit attaching to a 
dividend remains intact, albeit at the rate of 1/9 and non-repayable. It can however be 
set against shareholders' total tax liabilities. 
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1.2 Taxable Period 
The tax year for corporation tax purposes is from I April to 31 March. Companies pay 
tax on a current year basis. with respect to basis periods (accounting periods). They are 
chargeable on the profits of the basis Period ending in the year of assessment. The basis 
period is the period ending on an accounting date in the tax year not less than 12 
months after the trade was started. Otherwise, the basis period is the accounting period Z-- 
following the one that ended in the preceding tax year. 
2. Taxation of Individuals 
'. 1 Dividends 
(1) The ACT up to 5 April 1999 
From 1993-94 and following, dividends plus credits were treated as the highest part of 
an individual's income, and to the extent that they fell within the lower or basic rate 
bands. they were taxed at the dividend rate of 20%, matching the lower rate and the 
credit attaching to the dividends. Thus, an individual with taxable income would have 
no further liability of tax. 
(2) Partial imputation system after 6 April 1999 
Dividend income (dividend plus attaching one ninth of the tax credit) fon-ns the top 
slice of taxable income. To the extent that dividend income falls within the lower or 
basic rate bands, it is taxed at the dividend income ordinary rate of 10% and thereafter 
at the upper rate of 32.5% (and that rate is less than the highest income tax rate of 40%). 
2.2 Interest 
Interest income is taxed at progressive personal income tax rate. 
2.3 Capital Gains 
Until 2001-02, capital gains tax was levied at the progressive personal income tax rates. 
From 2002-03. capital gains tax is levied at the income tax rates, the chargeable gain 
being treated as the top slice of taxable income and taxed at the rates of 10%, 20% or 
40% according to the extent to which the gain falls within the relevant 
income bracket. 
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2.4 Taxable Period 
The year of assessment (or tax year) for income and capital gains runs from 6 April to 5 
April iii the next year. 
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Appendix 4.2 Summary of Corporate and Personal Income Tax 
RateS3 
Table A 4.2.1 Belgium 
corporate income tax personal income tax 
tax 
tax rate' 
interest 
income dividend income 
capital 
gains 
system top 
bracket 
rate 
top rate rates' rates' imputation rate 
S4 rate 
1993 CL 40.17(39) 4/. 23(41) 11.15 (FWH) 27.875(FWH) - 0 
1994 CL 40.17 (-")'9) 42.23(41) 14.495 (FWH) 27.875(FWH) - 0 
1995 CL 40.17(39) 42.23(41) 14.495 (FWH) 27.875(FwH) - 0 
1996 CL 40.17(39) 42.23(41) 16.275 (FWI-I) 27.125(FWH) - 0 
1997 CL 40.17(39) 42.2 3 (4 1) 16.275 (FWH) 27.125(FWH) - 0 
1998 CL 40.17(39) _ 42.23(41) 16.275 (FWH) 27.125(FWH) - 0 
1999 CL 40.17(39) 42.23(41) 16.275 (FWH) 27.125(FWH) - 0 
2000 CL 40.17(39) 42.23(41) 16.275 (FWH) 27.125(FWH) - 0 
2001 CL 40.17(39) 42.23(41) 16.275 (FWH) 27.125(FWH) - 0 
2002 CL 40.17(39) 42.23(41) 16.275 (FWH) 27-125(FWH) 0 
2003 CL 33.99(33) 35.535 (34.5) 16.275 (FWH) 27.125(FWH) 0 
2004 CL -333.99 (33) 
35.53 5 (34.5) 16.275 (FVM) 27.125(FWH) 0 
2005 CL 33.99(33) 35.535 (34.5) 16.275 (FWH) 27.125(FWH) 0 
Notes: 
1. This column shows the basic statutory (flat or top marginal) corporate income tax rate inclusive of 
surtax. The statutory corporate rate exclusive of surtax is shown in round brackets. 
2. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on interest income to a resident individual 
shareholder, inclusive of austerity and municipal surtax (if any). 
3. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on dividend income to a resident individual 
shareholder, inclusive of austerity and municipal surtax (if any). 
4. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on long-term capital gains, inclusive of surtax (if 
any). 
CL: classical system (Dividend income is taxed at the shareholder level 
in the same way as other 
types of capital income, e. g. interest income. ) 
FWH: final withholding tax 
The source of this appendix 
is the European Tax Handbook (Kest,, 199'3-1995,2000-2005-, Kesti 
and Andersen, 1996-1998; and 
Kesti et al., 1999). 
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Table A 4.2.2 France 
corporate income tax personal income tax 
tax 
tax ratýel 
interest 
income dividend income 
capital 
gains 
system 
rates' rates' 
imputation 
rate rateS4 
1993 IM 33.33 61.2 61.2 0.3333 19.4 
1994 
I 
IM 33.33 
- 
61.2 
- 
61.2 0.3333 19.4 
1995 IM 36.67 (33.33) 61.2 61.2 - 0.3333 19.4 
1996 IM 36.67 (33.33) 59.9 59.9 0.3333 20.9 
1997 IM 41.67 (3-3.333) 64 64 0.3333 26 
1998 IM 41.67 (33.33) 64 64 0.3333 26 
1999 IM 40 (33.333) 64 64 0.3333 __ 26 
2000 IM 37.77 (33.33) 63.25 63.25 0.3333 _ 26 
2001 IM 36.43 (33.33) 62.75 62.75 0.3333 26 
2002 IM 35.43 (33.33) 59.58 59.58 0.3333 26 
2003 IM 35.43 (33.33) 58.09 5 8.09 0.3333 26 
2004 IM 35.43 (33.33) 58.39 1 58.39 
_ 0.3333 26.3 
2005 PIN 34.93 (33.33) 59.09 35.045 27 
Notes: 
1. This column shows the basic statutory (flat or top marginal) corporate income tax rate 
inclusive of surtax (if any). The statutory corporate rate exclusive of surtax is shown in round 
brackets. 
2. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on interest income to a resident individual 
shareholder, inclusive of surtax (if any). 
3. This column shows the top statutory personal income tax rate inclusive of surtax (if any), 
imposed on dividend income (on grossed-up dividends where gross-up provisions apply), 
before taking account of imputation systems, tax credits and tax allowances. 
4. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on long-term capital gains, inclusive of surtax 
(if any). The tax is imposed if the proceeds are over certain limits. 
IM: imputation system (dividend tax credit at shareholder level for full or part of underlying 
corporate profits tax) 
PIN: partial inclusion system (A part of received dividends is included as taxable income at the 
shareholder level. ) 
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Table A 4.2.3 Germany 
corporate income tax personal income tax 
tax tax rates' 
interest 
income dividend income 
capital 
gains 
system distributed undistributed rates 
2 
rateS3 imputation rate rateS4 
1993 TRAM (3 6) 52.3 57.8(50) 53 53 0.36 0 
1994 TR/IM 46.285(30) 5-33.635 (45) 53 53 0.3 0 
1995 TR/IM 48.65(30) 56.5528 (45) 56.975 56.975 0.3 0 
1996 TRAM 48.81 (30) 56.7076 (45) 56.975 56.975 0.3 0 
1997 TRAM 48.86(30) 56.7592 (45) 56.975 56.975 0.3 0 
1998 TRAM 48.25 (30) 56.005(45) 55.915 55.915 0.3 0 
1999 TR/IM 43.28(30) 51.5636 (40) 55.915 55.915 0.3 0 
2000 TRAM 43.28(30) 51.5636 (40) 53.805 53.805 0.3 0 
2001 PIN . 38.30225 (25) 
51.1675 25.58375 - 0 
2002 PIN 38.30225 (25) 3 51.1675 25.58375 - 0 
2nn- 003 PIN 39.62838 (25) 51.1675 25.58375 - 0 
2004 PIN 38.30225 (25) 47.475 23.7375 - 0 
2005 PIN 38.30225 (25) 44.31 22.155 - 0 
Notes: 
1. This column shows the basic statutory (flat or top marginal) corporate income tax rate on 
distributed and undistributed profits inclusive of solidarity surtax and business tax. The statutory 
corporate rate exclusive of surtax and business tax is shown in round brackets. 
2. This column reports the top marginal statutory tax rate on interest income to a resident 
individual shareholder, inclusive of solidarity surtax (if any). 
3. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on dividend income to a resident 
individual 
shareholder. inclusive of solidarity surtax (if any). 
4. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on long-term capital gains, 
inclusive of surtax (if 
any). 
IM: imputation system (dividend tax credit at shareholder level for 
full or part of underlying 
corporate profits tax) 
PIN: partial inclusion system (A part of received dividends 
is included as taxable income at the 
shareholder level. ) 
TR: two-rate system (Distributed dividends are taxed at higher rates than retained earnings at 
the 
corporate level. ) 
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Table A 4.2.4 Greece 
corporate income 
tax personal income tax 
tax tax rate' 
interest income dividend income capital 
gains 
system 
rates' rates' 
imputation 
rate rateS4 
_1 
993 NST 35 15 (FWH) 0 - 0 
1994 NST 35 15 (FWH) 0 - 0 
1995 NST 35 15 (FWH) 0 - 0 
1996 NST 35 15 (FWH) 0 - 0 
1997 NST 33 5 15 (FWH) 0 - 0 
1998 NST 35 15 (FWH) 0 - 0 
1999 NST -35 15 (FWH) 0 - 0 
2000 NST 5 10 (FWH) 0 - 0 
2001 NST 35 10 (FWH) 0 - 0 
2002 NST 35 10 (FWH) 0 - 0 
2003 NST 35 10 (FWH) 0 - 0 
2004 NST 35 10 FWH) 0 - 0 
2005 NST 3) 2 10 (FWH) 0 0 
Notes: 
1. This column shows the basic statutory (flat or top marginal) corporate income tax rate. 
2. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on interest income to a resident individual 
shareholder. inclusive of surtax (if any). 
3. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on dividend income to a resident individual 
shareholder, inclusive of surtax (if any). 
4. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on long-term capital gains, inclusive of surtax 
(if any). 
NST: no shareholder taxation of dividends (no other tax than the tax on corporate profits) 
FWH: final withholding tax 
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Table A 4.2.5 Ireland 
corporate income 
tax personal income tax 
tax tax rate' 
interest 
income dividend income 
capital 
gains 
system rateS2 rates' 
imputation 
rate rates' 
1993/94 IM 40/10 48 48 0.25/0.0526 40 
1994/95 IM 40/10 48 48 0.25/0.0526 40 
1995/96 IM 38/10 48 48 0.2-3/0.0526 40 
1996/97 IM 38/10 48 48 0.23/0.0526 40 
1997/98 IM 36/10 48 48 0.21/0.0526 40 
1998/99 IM 32/10 46 46 0.11/0.0526 20 
1999/00 CL 28/10 46 46 -)0 
2000/01 CL 24/10 44 44 - 20 
2001 
Apr-Dec) CL 20/10 42 42 - 20 
2002 CL 16/10 42 42 - 20 
2003 CL 12.5/10 42 42 - 20 
2004 CL 12.5/10 42 42 - 20 
2005 CL 12.5/10 42 42 - 20 
Notes: 
1. This column shows the basic statutory (flat or top marginal) corporate income tax rate. The 
reduced rate of 10% is for manufacturing and certain other companies with an associated 1/19 
imputation rate under the imputation system. 
2. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on interest income to a resident individual 
shareholder, inclusive of surtax (if any). 
3. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on dividend income to a resident 
individual 
shareholder, inclusive of surtax (if any). 
4. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on long-term capital gains, 
inclusive of surtax 
(if any). 
CL: classical system (Dividend income is taxed at the shareholder 
level in the same way as 
other types of capital income, e. g. interest income. ) 
INC imputation system (dividend tax credit at shareholder level for full or part of underlying 
corporate profits tax) 
IN 
Table A 4.2.6 Italy 
orporE cc porate income tax o, po, ý personal income tax 
tax system tax rate' 
interest 
income dividend income 
capital 
gains 
rates' rateS3 imputation rate rateS4 
1993 IM 52.2(36) 27 (FWH) 12.5 (FWH) - 0 
1994 IM 52.2(36) 27 (FWH) 12.5 (FWH) - 
- 0 
1995 IM 52.2 (36) 
_27 
(FWH) 12.5 (FWH) - 0 
1996 
I 
IM 5-3). 2 (3 7) 27 (FWH) 2 I ý. 5 (FWH) - 0 
1997 IM 53 -22 (3 7) 27 (FWH) 12.5 (FWH) 0 
1998 IM (MCL)* 41.25(37) 27 (FWH) 12.5 (FWH) - 10 
1999 IM (MCL)* 41.25(37) 227 (FWH) 12.5 (FWH) - 12.5 
2000 IM (MCL)* 41.25(37) 
_ _27 
(FWH) 12.5 (FWH) - 12.5 
2001 IM (MCL)* 40.25(36) 217 (FWH) 12.5 (FWH) - 12.5 
2002 IM (MCL)* 40.25(36) 27 (FWH) 12.5 (FWH) - 12.5 
2003 IM (MCL)* 38.25(34) 27 (FWH) 12.5 (FWH) - 12.5 
2004 PIN (MCL)** 37.25 (33) 27 (FWH) 12.5 (FWH) 12.5 
2005 PIN (MCL)** 37.25 (33) 27 (FWH) 12.5 (FWH) 12.5 
Notes: 
1. This column shows the basic statutory (flat or top marginal) corporate income tax rate 
inclusive of local surtax. The statutory corporate rate exclusive of surtax is shown in round 
brackets. 
2. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on interest income to a resident individual 
shareholder, inclusive of surtax (if any). 
3. This column shows the top statutory personal income tax rate inclusive of surtax (if any), 
imposed on dividend income. 
4. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on long-ten-n capital gains, inclusive of surtax 
(if any). 
*Dividends from qualified participations and dividends received by entrepreneurs are included 
in taxable income and carry an imputation credit, which increases the shareholders' taxable 
income. Dividends received in respect of a non-substantial participation to private individuals 
are subject to a final withholding tax. 
"Participation exemption for individual shareholders who hold the participation in a business 
capacity. Otherwise, dividends derived by individuals are subject to a final withholding tax. 
MCL: modified classical system (dividend income taxed at preferential rates, e. g. compared to 
interest income, at the shareholder level) 
IM: imputation system (dividend tax credit at shareholder level for full or part of underlying 
corporate profits tax) 
PIN: partial inclusion (A part of received dividends is 
included as taxable income at the 
shareholder level. ) 
FVM: final withholding tax 
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Table A 4.2.7 Netherlands 
corporate income tax C personal income tax 
ta Y ax 
tax rate' 
interest 
income 
dividend income capital 
gains 
system top bracket 
rate 
top rate rates' rateS3 imputation rate rateS4 
1993 CL 35 40 60 60 0 
1994 CL 35 40 60 60 - 0 
1995 CL 35 40 60 60 - 0 
1996 CL 35 37 60 60 - 0 
_1997 
CL 35 36 _ 60 60 - 0 
1998 CL 35 35 60 60 - 0 
1999 CL 35 35 60 60 - 0 
2000 CL 35 35 60 60 - 0 
2001 CL 35 35 30 30 - 0 
2002 CL 34.5 34.5 30 30 - 0 
2003 CL 34.5 34.5 30 30 - 0 
2004 CL 34.5 34.5 30 30 - 0 
2005 CL 31.5 31.5 0 30 - 0 
Notes: 
1. This column shows the basic statutory (flat or top marginal) corporate income tax rate. 
I This column reports the top statutory tax rate on interest income to a resident individual 
shareholder, inclusive of surtax (if any). 
3. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on dividend income to a resident individual 
shareholder. inclusive of surtax (if any). 
4. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on long-term capital gains, inclusive of surtax 
(if any). 
CL: classical system (Dividend income is taxed at the shareholder level in the same way as 
other types of capital income, e. g. interest income. ) 
104 
Table A 4.2.8 Portugal 
corporate incom-e tax personal income tax 
tax tax rate' 
interest 
income dividend income 
capital 
gains 
system 
rates' rates' imputation rate 
. 
rateS4 
ý 1993 IM (PIN)* 39.6(36) 30 (FWH) 14 (FWH) 0 
1994 IM (PfN) * 39.6(36) 30 (FWH) 14 (FWH) - 0 
1995 IM (PIN) * 39.6(36) 25 (FWH) 11.25 (FWH) - 0 
1996 IM (PIN) * 
-19.6 (3 
6) 25 (FWH) 11 . 25 (FWH) - 0 
1997 IM (PfN) * 39.6(36) 25 (FWH) 11.25 (FWH) - 0 
1998 IM (PIN) * 37.4(34) 25 (FWH) 11.25 (FWH) 0 
1999 IM (PIN) * 37.4(34) 25 (FWH) 11.25 (FWH) 0 
2000 IM (PIN) * 35.2(32) 25 (FWH) 14 (FWH) 0 
2001 1 IM (PfN). * 35.1 (32) 25 (FWII) WH) 0 
2002 PIN 33 (30) 25 (FWH) 25 0 
2003 PIN 33 (30) 25 (FWH) 25 0 
2004 PIN 27.5(25) 20 (FWH) 20 0 
2005 PIN 27.5(25) 20 (FWH) 20 0 
Notes: 
1. This column shows the basic statutory (flat or top marginal) corporate income tax rate 
inclusive of surtax. The statutory corporate rate exclusive of surtax is shown in round 
brackets. 
2. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on interest income to a resident individual 
shareholder, inclusive of surtax (if any). 
3. This column reports the top effective statutory tax rate on dividend income to a resident 
individual shareholder, inclusive of surtax (if any). 
4. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on long-terrn capital gains, inclusive of 
surtax (if any). 
* Portuguese-source dividend income derived by resident individual taxpayer is subject to 
final withholding of tax. Only part of the dividend income is included in taxable 
income. 
IM: imputation system (dividend tax credit at shareholder level for full or part of underlying 
corporate profits tax) 
PIN: partial inclusion (A part of received dividends is included as taxable 
income at the 
shareholder level. ) 
FWH: final withholding tax 
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Table A 4.2.9 Spain 
corporate income 
tax personal income tax 
tax tax rate' 
interest 
income dividend income capital gains 
system 
rateS2 rateS3 imputation rate rates4* 
1993 IM 35 56 56 0.0909 56 
1994 IM 35 56 56 0.0909 56 
1995 IM 35 56 56 0.2857 56 
1996 IM 35 56 56 0.2857 56 
1997 IM 35 56 56 0.2857 56 
1998 fm 35 56 56 0.2857 56 
1999 IM 35 48 48 0.2857 48 
2.000 IM 35 48 48 02857 48 
2001 IM 35 48 48 0.2857 48 
2002 IM 35 48 48 0.2857 48 
2003 IM 35 45 45 0.2857 45 
2004 IM 35 45 45 0.2857 45 
2005 IM 35 45 45 0.2857 45 
Notes: 
1. This column shows the basic statutory (flat or top marginal) corporate income tax rate. 
2. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on interest income to a resident individual 
shareholder, inclusive of surtax (if any). 
3. This column shows the top statutory personal income tax rate inclusive of surtax (if any), 
imposed on dividend income (on grossed-up dividends where gross-up provisions apply), 
before taking account of imputation systems, tax credits and tax allowances. 
4. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on capital gains, inclusive of surtax (if any). 
* The effective tax rates on capital gains depend on the number of years over which the 
capital gains accrued. To simplify, the highest possible statutory tax rate applied on capital 
gains is chosen. 
IM: imputation system (dividend tax credit at shareholder level for full or part of underlying 
corporate profits tax) 
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Table A 4.2.10 Sweden 
corporate income 
tax personal income tax 
tax tax rate' 
interest 
income dividend income 
capital 
gains 
system 
rates' rates' 
imputation 
rate. rateS4 
1993 CL 
-30 
30 30 25 
1994 NST -)g 30 0 - 12.5 
1995 CL 28 
-30 
30 30 
1996 CL 28 30 30 - 30 
1997 CL 28 30 30 - 30 
1998 CL 28 30 30 - 30 
1999 CL -)8 30 30 - 30 
2000 CL 28 30 30 - 30 
2001 CL 28 30 30 - 30 
2002 CL -)8 30 30 - 30 
2003 CL 28 30 30 - 30 
2004 CL 28 30 30 - 30 
2005 CL 28 30 30 - 30 
Notes: 
1. This column shows the basic statutory (flat or top marginal) corporate income tax rate. 
2. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on interest income to a resident individual 
bondholder. inclusive of surtax (if any). 
3. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on dividend income to a resident individual 
shareholder, inclusive of surtax (if any). 
4. This column reports the effective top statutory tax rate on long-terin capital gains, 
inclusive of surtax (if any). 
CL: classical system (Dividend income is taxed at the shareholder level in the same way as 
other types of capital income, e. g. interest income. ) 
NST: no shareholder taxation of dividends (no other tax than the tax on corporate profits) 
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Table A 4.2.11 UK 
corporate income tax personal income tax 
tax tax rate' 
- 
interest 
income dividend income 
capital 
gains system top bracket 
rate 
top rate rates' rates' 
imputation 
rate rates' 
1993/94 IM 3 
_3 
3 40 40 0.2 40 
1994/95 IM 3) 3 33 40 40 0.2 40 
1995196 IM 3' 3 
_3 
3 40 40 0.2 40 
1996/97 IM 110 
_3 
3_ 33 40 40 0.2 40 
1997/98 IM 31 31 40 40 0.1 40 
1998/99 IM 31 31 40 40 0.2 40 
1999/00 IM 30 30 40 32.5 0.1 40 
2000/01 IM 30 32.5 40 32.5 0.1 40 
2001/02 IM 30 32.5 40 32.5 0.1 40 
2002/03 IM 30 32.75 40 32.5 0.1 40 
2003/04 IM 30 32.75 40 32.5 0.1 40 
2004/05 IM 30 32.75 40 32.5 0.1 40 
2005/06 IM 30 32.75 40 32.5 0.1 40 
Notes: 
1. This column shows the basic statutory (flat or top marginal) corporate income tax rate. 
2. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on interest income to a resident individual 
bondholder. inclusive of surtax (if any). 
3. This column shows the top statutory personal income tax rate inclusive of surtax (if any), 
imposed on dividend income (on grossed-up dividends where gross-up provisions apply), 
before taking account of imputation systems, tax credits and tax allowances. 
4. This column reports the top statutory tax rate on long-term capital gains, inclusive of surtax 
(if any). 
M imputation system (dividend tax credit at shareholder level for full or part of underlying 
corporate profits tax) 
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Chapter 5 The Empirical Modelling of Tax Systems 
5.1 Introduction 
The theoretical literature has demonstrated that taxes do affect firm leverage ratios. 
However. the empirical studies have been hindered by the lack of suitable summary 
measures of a complex tax schedule for use in the model. In recent years a number 
of studies have attempted to construct various tax variables to map the whole tax 
code to the tax burden taken by every individual firm. In this chapter, I review the 
empirical literature on the modelling of tax systems in order to identify the effects 
of taxes on corporate financial policy. The second section of the chapter summarizes 
the most commonly used tax variables in previous empirical studies and discusses 
their limitations. The third section introduces the tax variables employed in the 
subsequent empirical chapters. 
5.2 Review of the Empirical Modelling of Tax Systems 
It is widely accepted that tax policy can have an important impact on corporate 
financial decisions. However, the supporting empirical evidence is inadequate and 
little is known about the magnitude of the effects of tax. This may be due to the 
great difficulty of finding an appropriate and exhaustive measure of tax code. In the 
empirical literature, researchers have been forced to construct various tax variables 
based on financial statements of companies. 
5.2.1 Alternative Measures of Corporate Tax Rates 
How to properly quantify corporate tax rates is an important problem when 
examining the role taxes play on corporations' financing decisions. There are three 
main corporate tax rates used in empirical studies: the statutory rate, the effective 
average tax rate, and the (simulated) marginal tax rate. 
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5.2.1.1 Effective Corporate Tax Rates 
The most common practice to identify the tax effects on firms' financing behaviour 
is to use the effective tax rate. The most commonly used effective tax rate is 
calculated as the ratio of taxes paid to pre-tax earnings based on published company 
accounts data, as an explanatory variable (e. g. Booth et al., 200 14 ). The problem 
with this approach is that the average tax rate is the endogenous outcome of the 
present and previous years' corporate business decisions on investment, financing, 
write-offs, loss carry-backs, loss carry-forwards, etc. (Graham, Lemmon!, and 
Schallheim, 1998). Since all these are determined partly by the firm itself, the 
average tax rate cannot be interpreted as a measure of tax policy. 
Another reference to the failure of effective tax rates to measure tax burdens of 
firms is from Plesko (2003). He shows that the commonly used financial statement- 
based average tax rates are not highly correlated with statutory tax burdens. When 
used as explanatory variables, the coefficients on these variables are more likely to 
understate the effects of the tax system on firm behaviour. 
5.2.1.2 Statutory Corporate Tax Rates 
A more direct way to test for tax effects is based simply on statutory tax changes 
and to look at firms' financial policy over time as tax rates vary. Official tax rates 
may have the great advantage of providing an unambiguous measure of tax Policy. 
However, the problem associated with the statutory tax rate is that, in order to 
identify the effects of tax on firms' financial policy, sufficient variation in tax 
incentives either over time or across firms is required. Statutory tax rates generally 
change infrequently and are common across firms within a country in a given year. 
if fin-ns' profits approach a normal rate of return. Therefore, this limits the extent to 
which it is possible to calculate firm-specific responses to tax changes. There is 
another concern that the statutory tax rate might not be a good choice and cannot 
represent the whole tax burden taken by firms because the existence of non-debt tax 
shields creates a discrepancy between official tax rates and the effective tax rates. 
4 Booth, et al. (2001) used the effective tax rates in a set of individual country regressions. 
However, in a separate cross-country regression they used instead King's debt-equity condition. 
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Therefore. the statutory corporate income tax rate is rarely included as an 
explanatory variable in standard leverage regressions when testing for tax effects on 
corporate capital structure. 
5.2.1.3 (Simulated) Marginal Corporate Tax Rates 
More empirical studies are concerned with the effects of marginal tax rates on firms' 
financing decisions because the marginal tax rates reflect the change in tax 
associated with any particular financial decisions. 
The marginal tax rate is defined as the present value of current and expected future 
taxes paid on an additional unit of earnings today. Alworth and Arachi (2001) argue 
that if a firm has positive taxable income, the marginal tax rate is equal to the 
statutory tax rate. However,, the marginal tax rate may differ from the statutory tax 
rate due to loss carry-back and carry-forward provisions. If a firm has no taxable 
income. one extra unit of income in the current period would reduce the losses to be 
carried forward and used to offset taxable income in the future. The marginal tax 
rate is then equal to the present value of the tax paid on one additional unit of 
income in the first year when the firin is expected to have positive taxable income. 
Hence, the calculation of marginal tax rates depends on the tax code treatment of net 
operating losses and also the managers' expectation on future income flows. 
Therefore, the 'true' marginal tax rate is not observable and cannot readily be 
computed without reference to managers' expectations of future income flows. Also 
if managers' expectations are incorrect then future losses may not be carried back 
(in jurisdictions where this is possible). Shevlin (1990) develops a simulation 
approach to estimate company- specific marginal tax rates based on the tax statutes 
allowing inter alia for the carry-forward and carry-back of losses. This approach 
proxies managers I expectations of future earnings by assuming that taxable income 
follows a random walk with drift and the calculated marginal tax rates are then used 
in standard leverage regressions. This method has been modified by Graham 
(1996b) 
and applied in a number of studies. Examples include 
Graham (1996a: USA), 
Alworth and Arachi (200 1: Italy) and Bartholdy and Mateus (2003: Portugal). 
However, these estimates invariably require substantial pre- and post-sample data to 
calculate each year's marginal tax rates. There is also a subtle difficulty in 
interpreting calculated firm-specific marginal tax rates: such rates are actually ex- 
post rates, as they are functions of realized profits. However, company decisions 
may have been based on marginal tax rates assuming a different level of forecast 
profits from that which subsequently materialized. Shevlin (1990) and Graham 
(I 996b) seek to avoid this problem by using simulated forecasts based on a simple 
random walk model of taxable income. While this may be plausible it may still not 
represent managers' true model of forecast earnings. Furthermore, these rates do not 
allow for tunnelling which is likely to be an endemic Problem in interpreting the 
accounts of large international companies. Overall therefore, it is not clear that 
calculated marginal tax rates are substantially more reliable than statutory rates as a 
measure of the marginal tax rates that firms believed they faced when making 
financial decisions, and therefore as a guide to the effects of policy. 
Another problem associated with the simulated marginal tax rates stems from the 
fact that any measure of the tax rates based on actual company balance sheet data is 
not exogenous. A spurious relation exists between financial decisions and tax 
proxies under progressive tax systems. The more debt a firm issues, the more 
interest payment deduction it gets, and the less is its taxable income, which in turn 
reduces its tax rate. Therefore, if one regresses the debt ratio on proxies of the 
corporate income tax rate, the tax coefficient will be negatively biased. 
Graham et aL (1998) propose an approach to fix endogeneity. They examine 
cumulative financial policy by using 'but for' tax rates which are measured before 
the effects of aggregate financing decisions. The marginal tax rates are therefore 
calculated from the firm's operating income after depreciation but before interest 
payment is deducted. The regression shows a positive relationship between marginal 
tax rate and corporate debt levels. They also regress financial policy variables on 
control variables and on two alternative measures of the marginal tax rates that are 
endogenously affected by firms' past financing policy. The coefficients of 
both tax 
rate measures show incorrect signs when compared with those obtained 
from using 
the before-financing tax measure. The results suggest that the failure to properly 
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allow for endogeneity of tax measures may lead to a spurious negative relationship 
between tax and corporate leverage in estimation. 
5.2-1.4 Summary of Different Measures of Corporate Tax Rates 
Several proxies for corporate taxes have been widely used to study the impact of 
taxes on corporate financing decisions such as statutory tax rates, effective average 
tax rates, and simulated marginal tax rates. All the proxies have their limitations. L_ 
Tax polices are relatively stable over time and statutory tax rates do not vary much 
historically. In addition, all firms may face the same statutory tax rate in a given 
year within a country. The lack of cross-sectional and time-series variations in 
statutory tax rates makes it difficult to identify the effects of taxes on firm leverage. 
The effective average tax rate is easy to calculate using company accounts data and 
widely used in cross-sectional regressions. However, it is the endogenous outcome 
of firms' investment and financing decisions and reflects the impact on firms of the 
tax system as a whole and therefore cannot be regarded as a measure of tax policy. 
The calculation of simulated marginal tax rate attempts to capture the dynamic 
features of the tax code related to net operating loss carry-overs for individual firms 
and therefore assures a high degree of variation across firms and over time. 
However. the simulation procedure is quite complex and requires the proxies for 
managers' expectations by assuming perfect foresight or by forecasting the future 
stream of taxable income on the basis of the past record of company earnings. The 
calculation requires substantial pre- and post-sample data which may not be 
available for all studies. It can also be argued that the simulated marginal tax rate 
based on company accounts data still suffers from the endogeneity problem under 
progressive tax systems which may downward bias the estimates of the effects of 
tax variables. Therefore, it is still an open question how far simulated tax rates 
constitute a more reliable measure of the marginal tax rates that firms believed they 
faced when making financial decisions. 
Graham (I 996b) compares nine reasonable proxies for the corporate tax rate from 
the accounting and finance literature including the statutory marginal tax rate, the 
effective average tax rate and the simulated marginal tax rate. He 
demonstrates that 
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the simulated marginal tax rate is a N, ery reasonable proxy for the marginal tax rate 
and has a better prediction power for marginal tax status than other available tax 
proxies. If the simulated tax rate is not available, leaving aside loss carry-overs, the 
top (bracket) statutory tax rate is the best proxy for the true marginal rate for most 
(us) firmsý. 
5.2.2 Other Tax Variables 
Even if correctly calculated, it can be argued that the (marginal) corporate tax rate 
cannot fully explain the incentive to issue debt provided by the tax system, Other 
tax-related factors may also influence firms , tax status and thus their decisions to 
issue corporate debt. 
5.2.2.1 Non-debt Tax Shields 
Non-debt tax shields is another widely used tax variable in empirical studies of tax 
effects. According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), non-debt tax shields and debt 
interest are tax-shelter substitutes. Non-debt tax shields are always preferred to debt 
because they will not increase the probability of bankruptcy and are therefore 
expected to have a negative impact on leverage. Further discussion about non-debt 
tax shields can be found in Chapter 2.3.2. 
However, a similar problem to the effective tax rate is also presented by non-debt 
tax shields, which are typically estimated from company accounts using relevant 
variables such as depreciation (Titman and Wessels, 1988). However, book 
depreciation and tax depreciation are not necessarily the same. Trumbull (1968) 
argues that best depreciation for financial reporting varies from the best depreciation 
for income-tax purposes. The reasons why a company needs to report depreciation 
accurately in its financial statements are (1) to match firmsý expenses with the 
income generated by means of those expenses and (2) to accurately reflect firmsý 
financial status. On the other hand, tax depreciation is concerned with minimizing 
and deferring tax payments to the extent legally permissible. 
There is generally no 
Allowing for loss carry-overs, a simple dichotomous (Plesko) or trichotomous 
(Graham) variable 
is a good approximation to the 
'true' simulated marginal rate in the US. 
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requirement that treatments of depreciation for tax and accounting purposes should 
be identical. Therefore. depreciation reported on the company's financial statements 
based on accounting principles may bear little relation to tax depreciation recorded 
on the company's income tax returns. Other non-debt tax shields such as loss carry- 
overs can only be estimated indirectly,, using the simulation approach for example, if 
at all. Just as with the average tax rate, since all these are determined partly by the 
firm. estimated non-debt tax shields also cannot be interpreted as measures of tax 
policy. 
It may be argued that non-debt tax shields are taken fully into account using a 
simulation approach to calculate marginal tax rates. However. arguably, this 
overlooks the lumpy nature of financial decisions for many firms. A decision to 
postpone or bring forward a collaterisable investment or debt issue may have a 
discrete effect on the marginal tax rate. If a financial decision makes a firm 
ineligible (or eligible) for a tax deduction, it may potentially face a move from a 
marginal tax rate of 0% to 100% or vice versa, in this particular activity. The 
simulated marginal tax rate is unlikely to capture such an effect in full. 
5.2.2.2 Effects of Personal Taxes 
In the trade-off theory, firms' capital structure is determined by balancing the 
benefits of debt financing with the costs of financial distress, and the primary 
benefits of debt come from the tax deductibility of interest payments. Many recent 
studies have shown that corporate taxes affect financing decisions in the manner 
predicted by the trade-off theory. Most of these studies only focus on taxation at the 
corporate level. However, it is argued that the use of debt at the corporate level is 
associated with a 'personal tax penalty' (Miller, 1977). Differential taxation on 
different sources of income at the personal level provides a disincentive for firms to 
issue debt and may offset or even completely eliminate the corporate tax advantage 
to debt. 
Existing tax systems provide differential tax treatments for interest, dividends and 
capital gains. The personal tax rate on interest income is generally 
higher than that 
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on equity income due to the characteristics of capital gains. Capital gains tax can be 
deferred until the gains are realized. It can even be avoided if equity shares are held 
until death. Therefore, other things equal, investors would require the pre-tax return 
on interest to be higher than that on equity shares. Otherwise, no investor would like 
to invest in debt. The demand for higher risk-adjusted returns on debt may thereby 
discourage the use of debt at the corporate level. 
In an earlier theoretical paper, Miller (1977) argues that, in equilibrium, the tax 
advantage of debt at the firm level is completely offset by the personal tax 
disadvantage. Hence, it is of interest to quantify the personal tax disadvantage in the 
context of corporate financial decision making and to investigate whether personal 
taxes completely eliminate the corporate tax advantage to debt. 
5.2.2.2.1 Personal Tax Penalty: Graham (1999) 
Graham (1999) measures the tax advantage of debt net of the personal tax penalty as 
the difference between the after-tax earnings received from a unit of interest income 
less those from a unit of equity and includes it as an explanatory variable in the 
regressions. 
The net tax advantage to debt can be expressed as: 
(I 
-Tp)- 
(I 
--c'Al --r, 
) 
which can be re-written as 
-rc - 
[-c, 
- 
(1 
- -r, 
ý, 1 (5.2) 
where z-C is the corporate income tax rate, z-p is the personal tax rate on interest 
income and 'rE is the personal tax rate on equity income. T, is estimated as 
[d + (I - d)gaýp, where d is the dividend-payout ratio, g 
is the proportion of long- 
term capital gains that are taxable, and a measures the benefits from 
deterring 
taxes on capital gains. It is also assumed that dividends are taxed at the same rate as 
interest income. 
The second term in (5.2), 
[Tý, 
- 
(I 
- Tc 
#j ], represents the personal tax penalty. 
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To measure the net tax advantage of debt. estimates of four variables are required: d, 
gý a and r, in addition to the corporate tax rate -c(, . The modelling of (5.2) by 
Graham (1999) assumes that the only cross-sectional variation in (5.2) comes from 
the simulated corporate tax rate r(, and the dividend-payout ratio d. He also 
investigates whether the personal tax penalty is better measured as a single value 
across all firms in a given year or allowed to vary across firms depending on their 
dividend policy. Regressions in two different specifications are conducted, with the 
first one treating d as a firm-specific variable across firms and the second one using 
averaged d across firms to determine a single economy-wide personal tax 
adjustment for each year. He finds that the latter one shows weaker results and 
concludes that it is advantageous to use firm-specific information when adjusting 
for personal taxes. 
Through cross-sectional regressions, Graham (1999) identifies a positive (negative) 
correlation between the simulated corporate tax rate (personal tax penalty) and firm 
leverage which proves that it is statistically important to accommodate personal 
taxes when testing for tax effects. The estimates suggest that personal taxes reduce 
but do not eliminate the tax benefits of interest deductibility, which provides 
evidence to support Miller's (1977) basic theoretical point that the personal tax 
affects corporate financial decisions, but not his conclusion that there is complete 
offset of the corporate tax advantage of debt by the personal tax disadvantage. 
5.2.2.2.2 Personal Tax Effects: Alworth & Arachi (2001) 
Alworth and Arachi (2001) also emphasize the importance of allowing for personal 
taxes in the capital structure model and adopt a different personal tax variable from 
Graham (1999) to explore whether personal taxes affect corporate financing 
decisions. 
The personal tax variable is constructed based on the no arbitrage conditions 
in 
market equilibrium. 
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The deductibility of interest payment drives the cost of debt financing, p,, , below 
the risk adjusted equilibrium interest rate i. 
PD 
where c is the marginal corporate tax rate. 
Rearranging (5.3) we get: 
PD 
(5.4) 0- C) 
The after-tax return received per unit of debt investment for individual investors is: 
(I - MI)i (5.5) 
where m, is the personal income tax rate on interest income. 
The after-tax proceeds received per unit of equity investment in the form of 
dividends are: 
(1 - MD)OPE (5.6) 
where 0 is the additional potential disposable income which shareholders could 
receive if one unit of retained earnings were distributed (King, 1977), MD is the 
personal tax rate on dividend income and p, is the cost of equity financing. 
The after-tax earnings received on equity investment in the fonn of capital gains are: 
z), OF 
wherezz is the capital gains tax rate. 
(5.7) 
Therefore, in equilibrium with no arbitrage opportunities, the after-tax proceeds on 
debt investment should be equal to those on equity investment: 
(I -., n, )i = 
[a(l 
- m, )O +0- a)(I - z)]P., 
where a is the dividend-payout ratio. 
(5.8) 
The net tax advantage of debt relative to equity is calculated as the ratio of the net 
income per unit of interest income to net income per unit of equity 
income. 
Substituting (5.4) into (5.8), the equilibrium condition is 
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pl" 
=- (1-ml) 
IOD (I - c)[a(l - m, ))O + 
(I 
- 
Alworth and Arachi (200 1) argue that the term (I - c) represents the effect of 
corporate taxes on the relative cost of debt and equity financing and that the effect 
of personal taxes is captured by the fraction: 
PERS =: 
(1 
1) 
)0 
+ 
(1 
- aX1 - 
They include the variable PERS as well as the simulated marginal corporate tax rate 
in the regressions and identify a significant positive impact of both the corporate tax 
rate and the personal tax variable PERS on corporate leverage ratios. 
5.2.2.2.3 Summary 
The two empirical papers discussed above construct personal tax variables and 
include them as regressors in a conventional regression framework of corporate 
capital structure with simulated corporate tax rates. The simulation of marginal 
corporate tax rates based on company accounts data and also the dividend-payout 
ratio used to calculate the personal tax variable have provided sufficient cross- 
sectional and time-series variations to identify the impact of taxation on debt usage. 
A problem associated with this kind of study is that the dividend payment policy 
proxied by the dividend-payout ratio of companies is also an endogenous decision 
determined by the fin-n itself. Therefore, it is quite likely that the two constructed 
personal tax variables still cannot be interpreted as a measure of tax policy. 
5.2.3 King's Tax Ratios 
In a theoretical framework, King (1977) does not treat corporate and personal taxes 
separately but focuses on the interaction between them and shows that a firm's 
choice among debt, equity and retained earnings depends on three 
key ratios based 
on the after-tax income retention rates for these three sources of 
funds. Firms will 
choose the source of funds that has the 
highest retention rate. Table 5.1 gives 
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formulas for tax retention rates under different tax systems suggested by King 
)6. (1977 
, 
formulas for King's ratios are listed in Table 5.2. More details about the 
derivation of King's ratios are given in Appendix 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Retention rates under different tax systems 
Classical system on Imputati system Two-rate system with tax credits 
__ granted 
to distributed profits 
New issues (1 - 00 - MD) (1 - 00 - MD) - C,, )(I - M, ) 
(dividends) I-S + C', C1, -S 
Retained earnings (I - C)(I - Z) (I - C)(I - C Z) (capital gains) , 
Debt M M M 
xey 
c: corporate income tax rates 
MD: personal income tax rates on dividends 
m, : personal income tax rates on interest 
z capital gains tax rates 
s imputation credits 
For a two-rate system: 
Cd : rate of corporation tax on distributed profits 
rate of corporation tax on undistributed prof-its 
Table 5.2 King's ratios under different tax systems 
Two-rate system with tax 
Classical system Imputation system credit granted to distributed 
profits 
debt- Mi MI I- M1 
retentions c)(1 - Z) C)(1 - Z) C, 
)(I - Z) 
debt- I- MI S)(1 - MI) 
(1 Ml)(1 + Cd Cu - S) 
equity (1 00 MD) (1 00 - MD) (1 - Cu)(1 - MD) 
equity- 
'_MD '_MD MD) 
retentions 1-7 0- S)(, - Z) 
(1 + Cd Cu - S)(1 - Z) 
In principle, King's tax ratios can be employed as explanatory variables in a model 
of firm leverage. This procedure involves certain approximations. The tax costs of 
equity and retained earnings cannot be unambiguously allocated to dividend tax and 
capital gains tax respectively. A further practical issue is the choice of tax rates to 
calculate the numerical values of King's ratios. Chowdhury and 
Miles (1989) and 
6 King (1977) analysed the UK, but as he noted, it is straightforward to extend his calculations to 
any tax system. 
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Green and Murinde (2008) use statutory tax rates faced by firms and individual 
debt- and equity-holders and then include the calculated ratios in the regressions for 
British firms and Indian firms respectively. Green and Murinde (2008) also argue 
that since realized profits and tax rates may be very different from those which are 
anticipated when firms make their financial decisions, the highest statutory tax rates 
may represent the best rule of thumb applicable to company financing decisions. 
Within the personal sector, it is generally expected that informed investors will be 
concentrated within the highest income levels and corresponding tax brackets. 
However, there are problems with this procedure. King's ratios are bilateral (i. e. 
relative) tax prices that are strictly valid only if one form of financing is given. As 
King himself and inter alia Auerbach (2002) emphasize, in a setting in which debt, 
equity and retentions are determined simultaneously, tax effects on leverage depend 
also on dividend payout policy and constraints on tax arbitrage. As noted above, 
Alworth and Arachi (2001) allow for the existence of dividend payouts but not for 
their endogeneity. Further concerns with using King's ratios parallel those already 
noted above. For example, few statutory rate structures can be summed up in a 
single marginal tax rate. Statutory tax rates are true marginal rates only under 
restrictive assumptions, particularly because of the existence of non-debt tax shields. 
A firm which can newly utilize a deduction or which loses a deduction may face a 
marginal tax rate anywhere between zero and 100%, and there can be substantial 
inter-firm variation in true marginal tax rates (Graham, 1996a). Finally, in a short 
panel, there is often little or no time-variation in tax rates, and obviously none at all 
in a cross-section from a single country. 
5.3 The Tax Measures Adopted in the Research 
The upshot of all the considerations about constructing tax variables discussed above 
is that we are unlikely ever to find a unique mapping from the whole tax code to the 
tax actually paid by every individual firm. Therefore, I would argue that statutory tax 
rates (measured by King's tax ratios) and variables which measure the effects of the 
tax code (effective tax rates and non-debt tax shields) are all relevant in understanding 
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the effects of tax policy. Furthermore. statutory tax rates are unique in providing an 
unambiguous and essentially exogenous measure of tax policy. 
As for King's tax ratios. retention rates are calculated for each country using tax 
rates at the top income bracket for each tax, particularly having regard to the results 
of Graham (1996b) and Plesko (2003 )7 ; and then the model is estimated using these 
data. High-rate investors typically have great flexibility to move equity and debt 
cash flows between income and capital gains, but this affects the statute under 
which the tax is paid and not per se the applicable bracket. As discussed before, a 
major problem with the statutory tax rate is that tax policy and thus the official tax 
rates are relatively stable over time and common across firms in a given country. 
Therefore. the statutory rates do not display sufficient cross-sectional and time- 
series variation for testing. A central advantage of using company accounts data for 
firms from II European countries in my research is that I can exploit time-series 
and cross-sectional variation in tax rates. The sample includes over 60 distinct 
observations of relative tax prices derived from statutory tax rates, far more than 
would be obtained from a single country dataset. The calculated King's ratios are 
summarized in Table 5.3 to Table 5.13 for the sample countries during the period 
1993 to 2005. Obviously there have been significant changes in the theoretical 
incentive structure for debt, equity and retentions implied by the tax system both 
cross countries and over time. Furthermore, the top corporate tax rate does not 
correspond to the top income bracket in some years for Belgium, Netherlands, and 
the UK. Therefore, for the 3 countries, I show the King's ratios calculated using 
both the top bracket corporate tax rate and the top tax rate. 
King-s tax conditions applied here are expressed as ratios of retention rates. It is 
equally possible to express them as differences between retention rates. In either case, 
only two of the three conditions are independent. However, since the differences are 
linear, only two can enter a regression whereas, in theory, all three ratios could appear 
in the model, assuming that the impact of tax rates on leverage takes this specific non- 
linear form. ýChowdhury and Miles (1989) use all three ratios, presumably on this 
For debt- and equity-holders, if income is added to the tax 
base and taxed at graduated rates, then 
the top bracket marginal personal income tax rates are applied. 
However, if dividend and interest 
payments are subject to a 
lower final withholding tax at flat rates, then the lower rates are used. 
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basis. It is difficult to take an a priori view about the appropriate way in which the tax 
variables should enter the model. However, since the focus in this dissertation is on 
leverage, and to limit possible over-parameterisation of the model, only the debt- 
equity and debt-retention ratios are used as regressors in the empirical model. 
Table 5.3 King's tax conditions- Belgium 
Y To bracket rates Top rates ear D-R D-E E-R D-R D-E E-R 
1993 0.4850 1.0590 -0.2788 0.5380 1.1324 -0.2788 
1994 0.4291 0.9815 -0.2788 0.4801 1.0521 -0.2788 
1995 0.422 91 0.9815 -0.2788 0.4801 1.0521 -0.2788 
1996 0.3994 0.9202 -0.2713 0.4493 0.9887 -0.2713 
1997 0.3994 0.9202 -0.2713 0.4493 0.9887 -0.2713 
1998 0.3994 0.9202 -0.2713 0.4493 0.9887 -0.2713 
1999 0.3994 0.9202 -0.2713 0.4493 0.9887 -0.2713 
2000 0.3994 0.9202 -0.2713 0.4493 0.9887 -0.2713 
2001 0.3994 0.9202 -0.2713 0.4493 0.9887 -0.2713 
2002 0.3994 0.9202 -0.2713 0.4493 0.9887 -0.2713 
2003 0.2684 0.7405 -0.2713 0.2988 0.7822 -0.2713 
2004 0.2684 0.7405 -0.2711 0.2988 0.7822 -0.2713 
2005 0.2684 0.7405 
_-0.2713 
0.2988 0.7822 -0.2713 
Key: 
D-R: debt-retention margin; 
D-E: debt-equity margin; 
E-R: equity-retention margin 
Table 5.4 King's tax conditions- France 
To (bracket rates 10 Lo Year D-R 
1 
D-E E-R 
1993 -0.2779 0 -0.2779 
1994 -0.2779 0 -0.2779 
1995 -0.2399 0.0526 -0.2779 
1996 -0.1995 0.0526 -0.2396 
1997 -0.1660 0.1429 -0.2703 
1998 0.1660 0.1429 -0.2703 
1999 -0.1892 0.1111 -0.2703 _ 2000 _ -0.2020 0.0712 -0.2551 
2001 -0.2081 0.0488 -0.2449 
2002 -0.1540 0.0325 -0.1807 
2003 -0.1228 0.0325 -0.1505 
2004 -0.1256 0.0325 -0.1531 
2005 0.1387 -0.0320 -0.1102 
Key: 
D-R: debt-retention margin 
D-E: debt-equity margin 
E-R: equity-retention margin 
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Table 5.5 King's tax conditions- Germany 
Year TO To (bracket rates 
D-R D-E E-R 
1993 0.1137 0.3863 0.1966 
1994 0.0137 0.3512 -0.2498 1995 -0.0097 0.4293 -0.3071 1996 -0.0062 0.4345 -0.3072 1997 -0.0050 0.4362 -0.3072 
1998 0.0020 0.4148 -0.2918 
1999 -0.0898 0.2742 -0.2857 
2000 -0.0463 0.2742 -0.2515 
2001 -0.2085 0.0636 -0.2558 
2002 -0.2085 0.0636 -0.2558 
2003 -0.1911 0.0869 -0.2558 
2004 -0.1487 0.1163 -0.2374 
2005 -0.0974 0.1595 -0.2216 TZ - 1%XY: 
D-R: debt-retention margin 
D-E: debt-equity margin 
E-R: equity-retention margin 
Table 5.6 King's tax conditions- Greece 
Y Top (bracket) rates ear D-R D-E E-R 
1993 0.3077 0.3077 0 
_1994 
0.3077 0.3077 0 
_1995 
0.3077 0.3077 0 
_1996 
0.3077 0.3077 0 
1997 0.3077 0.3077 0 
_ 1998 0.3077 0.3077 0 
_ 1999 0.3077 0.3077 0 
2000 0.3846 0.3846 0 
2001 0.3846 0.3846 0 
2002 0.3846 0.3846 0 
2003 0.3846 0.3846 0 
2004 0.3846 0.3846 .0 
_ _ 2005 _ 0.3235 0.3235 0 
Key: 
D-R: debt-retention margin 
D-E: debt-equity margin 
E-R: equity-retention margin 
124 
Table 5.7 King's tax conditions- Ireland 8 
Top brackýeet rates tr 
Year Manufa cturing c mpanies Non-mlanu o -n cturing com panies 
D-R D-E E-R D-R D-E E-R 
1993/94 -0.0370 0.0527 -0.0852 0.4444 0.2500 0.1556 
1994/95 -0.0370 0.0527 -0.0852 0.4444 0.2500 0.1556 
1995/96 -0.0370 0.0527 -0.0852 0.3978 0.2419 0.1255 
1996/97 -0.0370 0.0527 -0.0852 0.3978 0.2419 0.1255 
1997/98 -0.0370 0.0527 -0.0852 0.3542 0.2344 0.0970 
1998/99 -0.2500 0.0-527 -0.2875 -0.0074 0.3088 -0.2416 
1999/00 -0.2500 0.1111 0.3) 250 -0.0625 0.3889 -0.3250 
2000/01 -0.2222 0.1111 -0.3000 -0.0789 0.3158 
- 
-0.3000 2001(Apr-Dee) 
-0.1944 0.1111 -0.2750 -0.0938 0.2500 -0.2750 
2002 -0.1944 0.1111 -0.2750 -0.1369 0.1905 
- 
-0.2750 
2003 -0.1944 0.1111 -0.2750 -0.1714 0.1429 -0.2750 
2004 -0.1944 0.1111 -0.2750 0.1714 0.1429 -0.2750 
2005 -0.1944 0.111 -0.2750 
_ 
-0.1714 0.1429 -0.2750 
Key: 
D-R: debt-retention margin 
D-E: debt-equity margin 
E-R: equity-retention margin 
Table 5.8 King's tax conditions- Italy 
To (bracket) rates TO Year D-R D-E E-R 
1993 0.5272 0.7454 
1994 0.5272 0.7454 - 
1995 0.5272 0.7454 -0.1250 
1996 0.5598 0.7827 -0.1250 
1997 0.5598 0.7827 -0.1250 
1998 0.2426 0.4201 -0.1250 
1999 0.4201 0.4201 0 
2000 0.4201 0.4201 0 
2001 0.3963 0.3963 0 
2002 0.3963 0.3963 0 
2003 0.3511 0.3511 0 
2004 0.3295_ 6.3295 0 
2005 0.3295 0.3295 
Key: 
D-R: debt-retention margin 
D-E: debt-equity margin 
E-R: equity -retention margin 
There is a 
Calculated 
separately. 
reduced corporate rate of 10% for manufacturing and certain other companies. 
King . 's tax ratios are shown for manufacturing and non -manufacturing companies 
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Table 5.9 King's tax conditions- Netherlands 
Year Top bracket rates Top rates 
D-R D-E E-R D-R D-E E-R 
1993 -0.3846 0.5385 -0.6000 -0.3333 0.6667 -0-6000 1994 -0.3846 0.5385 -0.6000 -0.3333 0.6667 -0.6000 
1995 -0.3846 0.5385 -0.6000 -0.333-3 0.6667 -0.6000 
1996 -0.3846 0.53385 -0-6000 -0.3651 0.5873 -0.6000 1997 - 0. -3 846 0.5385 -0.6000 -0.3750 0.5625 -0.6000 
1998 -0.3846 0.5385 -0.6000 -0.3846 0.5385 -0.6000 
1999 -0.3846 0.5385 -0.6000 -0.3846 0.5385 -0.6000 
2000 -0. ) 846 0.5385 -0.6000 -0.3846 0.5385 -0.6000 
2001 0.0769 0.5385 -0.3000 0.0769 0.5385 -0.3000 
2002 0.0687 0.5267 -0.3000 0.0687 0.5267 -0.3000 
2003 0.0687 0.5267 -0.3000 0.0687 0.5267 -0.3000 
2004 0.0687 0.5267 -0.3000 0.0687 0.5267 -0.3000 
2005 0.0219 0.4599 -0.3000 0.0219 0.4599 -0.3000 
Kley: 
D-R: debt-retention margin 
D-E: debt-equity margin 
E-R: equity-retention margin 
Table 5.10 King's tax conditions- Portugal 
TO ates o (bracket) r Year D-R D-E E-R 
1993 0.1589 0.3476 -0.1400 
1994 0.1589 0.3476 -0.1400 
1995 0.2417 0.3991 -0.1125 
1996 0.2417 0.3991 -0.1125 
1997 0.2417 0.3991 -0.1125 
1998 0.1981 0.3500 -0.1125 
1999 0.1981 0.3500 -0.1125 
2000 0.1574 0.3458 -0.1400 
2001 0.1574 0.4651 -0.2100 
2002 0.1194 0.4925 -0.2500 
2003 0.1194 0.4925 -0.2500 
2004 0.1034 0.3793 -0.2000 
2005 0.1034 0.3793 -0.2000 
Key: 
D-R: debt-retention margin 
D-E: debt-equity margin 
E-R: equity-retention margin 
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Table 5.11 King's tax conditions- Spain 
Y Top (bracket) rates ear D-R D-E __ E-R 
1993 0.53 85 0.3986 0.1000 
1994 0.53) 85 0.3986 0.1000 
1995 0.5385 0.0989 0.4000 
1996 0.5385 0.0989 0.4000 
1997 0.53'8 5 0.0989 0.4000 
1998 0.51 '385 0.0989 0.4000 
1999 0.5-")8 5 0.0989 0.4000 
2000 0.5-385 0.0989 0.4000 
2001 0.5385 0.0989 0.4000 
2002 0.53 385 0.0989 0.4000 
2003 0.5385 0.0989 0.4000 
2004 0.5-3 85 0.0989 0.400 
2005 0.5385 0.0989 
Key: 
D-R: debt-retention margin 
D-E: debt-equity margin 
E-R: equity-retention margin 
Table 5.12 King's tax conditions- Sweden 
To (bracket) rates Year D-R D-E E-R 
1993 0.3333 0.4286 -0.0667 
1994 0.1111 -0.0278 0.1429 
1995 0.3889 0.3889 0 
1996 0.3889 0.3889 0 
1997 0.3889 0.3889 0 
1998 0.3889 0.3889 0 
1999 0.3889 0.3889 0 
2000 0.3889 0.3889 0 
2001 0.3889 0.3889_ 
_0 
2002 0.3889 0.3889 0 
2003 0.3889 0.3889 0 
2004 0.3889 0.3889 0 
2005 0.3889 0.3889 0 
Key: 
D-R: debt-retention margin 
D-E: debt-equity margin 
E-R: equity -retention margin 
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Table 5.13 King's tax conditions- UK 
Year To bracket rates Top rates 
_D-R 
D-E E-R D-R D-E E-R 
1993/94 0.4925 0.1940 0.2500 0.4925 0.1940 0.2500 
1994/95 0.4925 0.1940 0.2500 0.4925 0.1940 0.2500 
1995/96 0.4925 0.1940 0.2500 0.4925 0.1940 0.2500 
1996/97 0.4925 0.1940 0.2500 0.4925 0.1940 0.2500 
1997/98 0.4493 0.1594 0.2500 0.4493 0.1594 0.2500 
1998/99 0.4493 0.1594 0.2500 0.4493 0.1594 0.2500 
1999/00 0.4286 0.1429 0.2500 0.4286 0.1429 0.2500 
2000/01 0.4286 0.1429 0.2500 0.4815 0.1852 0.2500 
2001/02 0.4286 0.1429 0.2500 0.4815 0.1852 0.2500 
2002/03 0.4286 0.1429 0.2500 0.4870 0.1896 0.2500 
2003/04 0.4286 0.1429 0.2500 0.4870 0.1896 0.2500 
2004/05 0.4286 0.1429 0.2500 0.4870 0.1896 0.2500 
2005/06 0.4286 0.1429 0.2500 0.4870 0.1896 0.2500 
Key: 
D-R: debt-retention margin 
D-E: debt-equity margin 
E-R: equity-retention margin 
5.4 Conclusion 
Although it is widely accepted that taxes influence corporate financing decisions, 
supporting empirical evidence is far from conclusive. This may be due to the 
inherent difficulties in quantifying the tax regime and tax policy changes. 
Most empirical studies aiming at testing for tax effects focus on the impact of 
marginal tax rates on firm leverage because it reflects the change in tax associated 
with any particular financial decisions. However, it is argued that the 'true' marginal 
tax rate is not observable because it depends on managersý expectations on the 
-r- - '- 
future status of the company (Shevlin, 1990). Therefore, alternative observable 
variables that are presumably correlated with the marginal tax rate have been used 
as proxies in the standard leverage regressions, such as the effective average tax rate, 
statutory marginal tax rate, simulated marginal tax rate, and non-debt tax shields. 
Each measure has its problems. The statutory tax rates 
do not display sufficient 
cross-sectional and time-series variation 
for testing; the effective average tax rate 
and non-debt tax shields are endogenous since 
they are the outcome of a sequence 
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of business decisions and cannot be regarded as a measure of tax policy; the 
simulated marginal tax rate has been proven to be the most reasonable proxy for 
statutory tax burdens than other most commonly used tax measures but the 
estimation procedure is complex and may not be applicable in all empirical studies 
due to data limitations. Moreover, personal taxes are argued to affect corporate 
financing decisions. However, the construction of personal tax variables also suffers 
from the endogeneity problem. 
The consequence of all these considerations is that we are unlikely ever to find a 
unique mapping from the whole tax code to the tax burden taken by firms. 
Therefore, I finally choose to follow Chowdhury and Miles (1989) and Green and 
Murinde (2008) and use King's tax ratios calculated by top (bracket) tax rates to 
measure the tax regime faced by firms and changes in the regime. To avoid possible 
over-parameterisation., only two tax margins, the debt-equity and debt-retention 
ratios, are used as regressors. Effective average tax rates and non-debt tax shields 
are also included in the estimation model to help understand the effects of the tax 
code. The endogeneity of the two variables are dealt with by instrumental variable 
estimators discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Appendix 5.1 Calculation of King's Tax Conditions (King, 1977) 
King (1977) shows that a firm's choice among debt, equity and retained earnings 
depends on three key ratios: the retention rates for debt, new issues and retained 
earnings. If one of the three methods of financing is given,, firms will choose the one 
which has a higher retention rate between the other two. 
1. Retention Rate for New Issues 
Before calculating the King's ratios for different tax systems, two tax variables are 
defined first. The first is concerned with measuring the degree of discrimination 
between retentions and distributions imposed by different tax systems, termed 'tax 
discrimination variable" denoted by 0.0 is the opportunity cost of retained 
earnings in terms of net dividends forgone. Net dividends are dividends after 
payments of all taxes, both corporate and personal, so 0 is equal to the additional 
potential disposable income which shareholders could receive if one unit of retained 
earnings were distributed. The second is a company tax variable, termed the basic 
rate of corporate income tax, denoted by -r . It 
is defined as the rate of tax which 
would be paid if no profits were distributed, or in other words, the rate of tax on 
undistributed profits. 
Given these definitions, the total tax liability of a company and its shareholders 
equals the basic rate on taxable profits plus any additional tax which arises because 
dividends are taxed at a different rate from that levied on retained earnings. If one 
unit of retained earnings is distributed, the shareholders receive 0 and the 
remaining I-0 goes in tax. Therefore, the additional tax liability per unit of net 
dividends is (I - 0)/ 0. If the total tax liability is 
denoted by T, taxable profits by Y, 
and net dividends by D, then 
=, rY + 
(A 5.1) 
The relationship between gross dividends G and net 
dividends D is given by the 
simple formula 
MD)G 
where ýnD is the personal 
income tax rate on dividend income. 
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Then (A 5.1) can be rewritten as 
MD 
(A 5.2) 
Then we can use the variables 0 and -r to classify the different corporate tax 
sN, stems. 
1.1 The Classical System 
Under classical tax systems, companies pay a flat rate of corporation tax denoted by 
c on all taxable profits and then the shareholders are liable to personal income tax 
on the dividends received. The total liability at both corporate and personal level is 
T= c)'+ m DG (A 5.3) 
Since equation (A 5.2) and (A 5.3) are effectively the same equation, we can 
identify coefficients which imply that -r = c, and 
(1 
-OX'-MD)IO = MD. Therefore, 
the classical system is characterized by 
T= 
O= l-MD 
Hence, if one unit of corporate profits is distributed, the shareholders will get 
(1-7-)0. 
Rearrange the equation and we can get the retention rate for new issues 
(I - cxl - MJ 
1.2 The Imputation System 
The imputation system gives shareholders tax credit for tax paid by the company 
which may be used to offset their personal tax liability on dividends. The company 
pays a rate of corporation tax c on all profits. After this any profits which are 
distributed are regarded as already having bome personal tax at a certain rate s 
called the 'rate of imputation. Then shareholders only need to account for tax on 
dividends at the difference between their personal income tax rates MD and the rate 
of imputation. Therefore, under the imputation system, the total liability is 
T= Cy+ 
(MD 
- s)G (A 5.4) 
Using equations (A 5.2) and (A 5.4), we can identify the coefficients 'r =c and 
(I 
- OXI - 
rnD)1O = 
(MD- 
s). Therefore, the imputation system is characterized by 
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,r= 
- n7D 
I-S 
If one unit of corporate profits is distributed. the sbarebolders will get (I - -r)O . 
Therefore, the retention rate for new issues under the imputation system is 
CXI - ml)) 
I-S 
1.3 The Two-rate System 
The two-rate systern levies different tax rates on distributed and undistributed 
profits, with the former lower. For this system, the total liability is composed of a 
rate of corporation tax on undistributed profits denoted by cu ,a different rate of 
corporation tax on distributed profits denoted by Cd , and the shareholders' rate of 
income tax on dividends. If shareholders are also granted an imputation credit s for 
the distributed profits in terms of dividends, the total tax liability is 
T=c,, (Y-G)+CdG+ 
( 
Md -S)G 
=C 
u)'+ 
(Md 
+ Cd- c., - s)G 
Using equations (A 5.2) and (A 5.5), we can get that r=c, and 
(1 
- 
OXI 
- MD)/ 
0= (MD + Cd- c, - s), which implies that 
T= 
it 
'-MD 
+Cd -Cu -S 
(A 5.5) 
If one unit of corporate profits is distributed, the shareholders will get 
(I - -r)O . 
Therefore, the retention rate for new issues under the two-rate system with 
imputation credits granted to shareholders for dividends distributed is 
(1 - Cu)(1 - MD) 
'+Cd -Cu -S 
2. Retention Rate for Retained Earnings 
Given the corporate income tax rate c and the capital gains tax rate :, the retention 
rate for retained earnings associated with capital gains tax 
is (I - c)(I -,: ) for both 
the classical system and the 
imputation system. For the two-rate system, the 
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retention rate is (I - c,, )(I - -7-) . where c, is the corporate income tax rate on 
undistributed profits. 
Retention Rate for Debt 
Since the interest payment associated with debt is deducted before the corporate 
profits are taxed, the interest payment is only liable to personal income tax. 
Therefore. the retention rate for debt under all tax systems is I-m, - where m, is 
the personal income tax rate on interest income. 
To conclude, the retention rates for debt, new issues and retained earnings are 
summarized in text Table 5.1. 
Using the retention rates obtained for different tax systems, the King's ratios can be 
calculated as follows 
debt-retentions: retention rate of 
debt 
retention rate of retentions 
debt-equity: retention rate of 
debt 
retention rate of equity 
retention rate of equity 
equity-retentions. 
retention rate of retentions 
Formulas used to calculate King's ratios under different tax systems are shown 
in 
text Table 5.2. 
I-, 
Chapter 6 The Impact of Taxes on Capital Structure Choice 
in European Countries: A Model of Aggregate Leverage 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the impact of tax policies and other firm characteristics on 
the capital structure choice of a sample of European companies. 
It is generally recognized that taxation has a potentially important impact on 
corporate financing decisions. However, the empirical evidence is far from 
conclusive. In this chapter, the impact of tax policy on firmslý leverage ratios is 
studied for a balanced panel of 129 medium-sized listed companies from 11 
European countries during the period 1993 to 2005. A general model of company 
leverage is applied within which King's tax ratios are used to capture tax policy 
changes, controlling for non-tax influences suggested by the theory of corporate 
finance. The Hausman-Taylor (1981) instrumental variable estimator and the 
Arellano-Bover (1995) GMM estimator are used to control for different forms of 
endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. 
6.2 The Model and Variables 
6.2.1 The Model 
A common method of testing corporate capital structure is adopted. The model to 
be 
estimated is: 
yi, =x//P + Uf 
(6.1) 
where Y,, is the leverage ratio and x,, is a vector of 
determinants that vary across 
firms and/or over time. u, is a composite residual which 
has the form: 
ull = Pi + 771 + Vil 
(6.2) 
where u, is the unobservable firm effect, q, 
is the time specific component and v,, 
is the remaining disturbance. 
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6.2.2 Dependent Variables 
6.2.2.1 Definition of Leverage Ratios 
Capital structure theory does not provide an unambiguous definition of leverage. 
Accordingly, several different measures of company leverage are employed. For the 
numerator of the leverage ratio, according to Green and Murinde (2008), there are 
three different concepts of 'debt'. The widest definition is total liabilities. On a 
company's balance sheet, total liabilities include all current liabilities, long-term 
debt and any other miscellaneous liabilities the company may have. Total liabilities 
include some items which may be used for transaction purposes rather than 
financing and may overstate the amount of leverage. Therefore, it is usually not 
regarded as being confined exclusively to borrowings to finance a company's assets. 
A narrower measure is debt + creditors, which includes all external long-term and 
short-term debt a company owes to institutions and the market, as well as trade 
credit received. The narrowest measure is simply debt, i. e. excluding trade credit. 
For the denominator of the leverage ratio, the widest measure of debt is always 
related to total assets; while two narrower measures, debt + equity + non-equity 
reserves and debt + trade creditors + equity + non-equity reserves, are more likely 
to be related to the capital structure of the company and are therefore applied in 
relation to the narrower measures of debt. Equity represents ownership interest in a 
corporation in the form of both common stock and preferred stock. Therefore, five 
measures of leverage are used in separate regressions and the results obtained from 
each regression are compared, as a check on the robustness of the underlying model, 
and of the estimates of the impact of tax changes. The definitions of leverage ratios 
are shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Measures of leverage 
Definition 
LRI total liabilities / total assets 
LR2 (debt + trade creditors) / total assets 
LR3 debt / total assets 
LR4 debt / (debt + total shareholders' equity + non-equity reserves) 
LR5 debt+ trade creditors / (debt + trade creditors + total shareholders' equity 
+ non-equity reserves) 
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6.2-2.2 Book Value versus Market Value 
Another issue is whether leverage should be measured by the ratio of book values or 
market values of assets and liabilities. Although the ratio of the market value of debt 
(or total liabilities) to the market value of total assets (or capital structure of a firm) 
enters the calculation of the weighted average cost of a firmýs capital, the choice 
becomes quite problematic when the objective is to find the deten-ninants of optimal 
capital structure. 
Many arguments have been made in the literature in favour of the use of book 
values in measuring leverage. Early surveys (for example, Stonehill et al., 1975) 
reveal that managers think in terms of book values rather than market values. Also, 
Thies and Klock (1992) argue that book ratios better reflect firms' target debt ratios 
since the market value of equity is dependent on many factors that are not under the 
direct control of management. Corporate treasurers therefore often explicitly claim 
to use book values to avoid distortions in financial planning that arise from the 
volatility of market prices. Banerjee et al. (1999) provide support for the use of 
book value from the perspective of the determinants of optimal leverage (the trade- 
off between the costs and benefits of borrowing). They argue that a benefit of 
borrowing is an increase in firm value caused by interest debt shields and this is not 
directly affected by changes in market value once the debt instruments have been 
issued. Moreover, the main cost of borrowing is the expected cost of financial 
distress. The value of a distressed firm is close to its book value so debt-holders' 
liability is measured by book value instead of market value in the event of 
bankruptcy. In addition, Bowman (1980) documents a high correlation between 
market values and book values of leverage. 
On the other hand, proponents of market value measures of leverage argue that it is 
market value that ultimately determines the real value of a fin-n and that book value 
measurements of debt can importantly influence the computation of cost of capital 
and distort the calculation of debt-equity ratios (for example, Sweeney, Warga, and 
Winters, 1997). 
1"6 3 
Taking account of the relative ease and accuracy with which leverage can be 
measured, book values are used to calculate leverage ratios in the present analysis. 
6.2.2.3 Summary of Average Aggregate Leverage Ratios across Countries 
Figure 6.1 presents the average of five aggregate leverage ratios across countries in 
percentage in the sample. The proportion of total assets consisting of total debt 
(LR-3) is between 20% and 30% for most countries except that Germany has a little 
lower level of 18.97%. Furthermore, the use of debt does not tend to be higher in 
countries with higher corporate income tax rates since other factors, including both 
firm-specific characteristics and institutional differences across countries, may also 
play an important role in determining firmsý'Ieverage ratios. 
However, it should be borne in mind that there may exist differences in accounting 
practices in different countries. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) point out 
that German accounting emphasizes more on 'conservatism' and less on 'true and 
fair" considerations. Therefore, asset values of German companies may be 
understated relative to asset value in many other companies. Also, German 
companies include pension assets and pension liabilities in their balance sheets. 
However, the level of pension assets and liabilities are not known and there is no 
easy way to correct for this using the data available. Thus, the comparison of 
leverage ratios among different countries and estimated results on book values need 
to be interpreted with the appropriate caution. 
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6.2.3 Independent Variables 
A variety of independent variables suggested by the theories of corporate finance, 
including both tax variables and control variables, have been applied in the study. 
The definitions of these variables are shown in Table 6.2. 
6.2.3.1 Tax Variables 
Y111-1- 
Aing's Tax Ratios 
During the sample period there were many changes in tax regimes within the 
countries sampled. generally involving cuts in corporate income tax rates but also 
changes in tax systems. King's tax ratios are used in order to capture tax regimes, 
tax policy changes and the cross-sectional variations among different countries over 
time9. As discussed in the previous chapter, to avoid possible over-parameterisation 
of the model, only the debt-equity and debt-retention ratios are used as regressors. 
More details about the derivation of King's ratios are given in Chapter 5. A 
simplification in King's procedure is that the tax costs of equity and retained 
earnings are allocated to dividend tax and capital gains tax resPectivelylo. Retention 
rates are calculated for each country using tax rates at the top income bracket for 
each tax, particularly having regard to the results of Graham (1996b) and Plesko 
(2003) 1 1; and then are used as regressors in the model. However, the top corporate 
tax rate does not invariably correspond to the top income bracket in every country. 
Therefore, the model was re-estimated using top (i. e. the highest) tax rates, and 
although inevitably there were some quantitative changes in the findings, the 
qualitative results remained unchanged. The estimated results using top tax rates are 
shown in the text while the results obtained based on the top bracket rates are shown 
in Appendix 6.2 for comparison. 
9 The time-series variation in King's tax ratios is not as much as in other company- specific control 
variables. However, applying a sample of companies within 
1-3) years period has enabled the 
study to exploit the time-series variation in statutory taxes to a much greater extent 
than other 
studies of the same type. A sample of companies within a much 
longer period with more 
variations in taxes is recommended for future research. 
10 This follows from the simplifying assumption that capital gains are taxed on accruals rather than 
realisations (Auerbach, 2002). 
11 For debt- and equity-holders, if income is added to the tax 
base and taxed at graduated rates, then 
the top bracket marginal personal income tax rates are applied. 
However, if dividend and interest 
payments are subject to a lower 
final withholding tax at a flat rate, then the lower rates are used. 
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Effective Tax Rate 
Notwithstanding its limitations, the effective tax rate (the ratio of corporate tax paid 
to pre-tax corporate income if positive and zero otherwise) is also used as a measure 
of the impact on firms of the tax system as a whole. If this is a forward-looking rate 
used in financial decisions, a positive relationship is expected with leverage, 
provided firms have tax-shelterable income. However, a high effective tax rate 
could reflect high profitability, or past low leverage for reasons unrelated to tax. 
Thus the relationship to leverage could be negative, as indeed Booth et al. (2001) 
found. 
Non-debt Tax Shields 
According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) non-debt tax shields and debt 
interest are tax-shelter substitutes. The tax-saving that results from each fl of 
tax shield is the same irrespective of its source but, unlike debt, the use of non- 
debt tax shields will not increase the probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, non- 
debt tax shields will always be preferred to debt and firms with many non-debt 
tax shields will make less use of debt, ceteris paribus. Hence, non-debt tax 
shields could be negatively related to leverage. However, a positive relation is 
also possible because firms with substantial non-debt tax shields generally have 
more tangible assets to be used as collateral, and therefore can often borrow on 
relatively favourable terms at lower costs (Moore, 1986). It is also possible that 
there will be no significant relation between non-debt tax shields and debt 
because of the argument of MacKie-Mason (1990) that an increase in non-debt 
tax shields has no impact on financing decisions for firms that are far away from 
tax exhaustion. 
Non-debt tax shields include in particular, depreciation, investment tax credit, 
operating loss carry-backs and carry-forwards. Notwithstanding the limitations of 
published company accounts discussed in Chapter 5.2.2.1, the measure of non- 
debt tax shields applied is the standard one of book depreciation scaled by total 
assets. 
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6.2.3.2 Control Variables 
Control variables are applied to model the impact of non-tax factors on leverage. 
They are usually held to be the key determinants of capital structure (Frank and 
Goyal, 2008). It should be noted that there are no interaction terms included in the 
model. The reason is that there is a danger in seeking arbitrary interactions, as in a 
large dataset it is very easy to reject the null of non-significance. Variables may 
appear to be statistically significant but their economic interpretation may be 
difficult to explain. I do however include variables aimed at mitigating possible 
ambiguities in the tax effects, especially the collateral effects. 
Asset Tangibility 
Tangibility is the characteristic that an asset can be used as collateral to secure debt 
and hence helps to control for the collateral effect associated with non-debt tax 
shields. A companyýs capacity to secure its debt in the event of financial distress 
gives creditors an improved guarantee of repayment and should increase with the 
proportion of tangible assets on the balance sheet. Hence, trade-off theory predicts a 
positive relationship between leverage and the proportion of tangible assets, which 
has been confirmed by Downs (1993), Raj an and Zingales (19,95), Shenoy and Koch 
(1996) and many other researchers. 
On the other hand, the agency costs of excessive management perquisites are higher 
for firms with low collateral (Grossman and Hart, 1983). Managers of highly- 
levered firms are less able to consume excessive perquisites because bondholders 
monitor such firms more closely. Thus shareholders would like firms with fewer 
tangibles to be more highly geared, and such firms may voluntarily choose higher 
debt levels. In addition, if non-debt tax shields are measured with error, tangibles 
may pick up the substitution effect between debt and non-debt tax shields 
instead of 
ý 1.. 
the collateral effect and again have a negative sign. 
The ratio of fixed assets to total assets is used as the proxy 
for asset tangibility. 
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Asset Intangibility 
Since tangible assets exclude liquid assets they may not in fact be a good measure 
of a company's ability to repay debt in the event of financial distress (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). Arguably. asset intangibility is less ambiguous as it measures a 
company"s inability to secure its debt, and hence should be negatively related to 
leverage. Many empirical studies have measured firms' intangibility by R&D costs 
as well as advertising costs and provided strong evidence for this negative 
relationship. Examples include Titman and Wessels (1988), Bhaduri (2002), Bathala 
et al. (1994) and Jensen et al. (1992). 
The intangibility variable is calculated as the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. 
Growth Opportunities 
High-levered firms are more likely to pass over profitable investment opportunities 
(Myers, 1977). Hence, firms with substantial growth opportunities should use less 
debt. In contrast, higher growth opportunities imply a higher demand for funds. 
Pecking order theory suggests that when firms require external finance, they prefer 
debt to equity, which implies a positive correlation between growth opportunities 
and leverage. 
The price-to-book value ratio, defined as the market price to book value per share, is 
commonly used as the measure of firms' growth opportunities and thus applied in 
the present analysis. 
Size 
Since large firms are typically mature firms and tend to be more diversified, they 
have a reputation in the debt market and therefore face a lower cost of issuing debt. 
Hence, large firms may be expected to have higher debt ratios. Alternatively, size 
can be seen as a proxy for information asymmetries between 
firm insiders and 
capital markets (Drobetz and Fix, 2005). The adverse selection problems 
for large 
firms are less severe than for small firms. Large 
firms should therefore be more able 
to issue equity, implying a negative relationship 
between leverage and size. 
However, Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest that if this relationship exists, 
it 
should be associated with small 
firms using more short-term debt to finance their 
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investment,, since smaller firms have higher transaction costs to issue long-term debt 
or equity. 
The two most common measures of firm size are the natural log of (real) net assets 
and the natural log of (real) sales. Green and Murinde (2008) suggest that sales are 
less likely to be contaminated by idiosyncratic asset structures or reporting 
procedures than are net assets. This is supported by Frank and Goyal (2003) who 
argue that. empirically, sales are a better measure than net assets. Therefore, the 
natural log of nominal sales scaled by consumer price index is applied. 
Profitability 
Pecking order theory suggests that firms prefer internal funds to finance new 
investment before they resort to external financing. Since the availability of internal 
funding depends on profits, a negative relationship is expected between profitability 
and firm leverage. 
In contrast. a positive correlation between profitability and leverage may find 
support from Ross (1977) who argues managers may use high debt levels to signal 
an optimistic future of a firm to a market. High profitability therefore may be 
associated with a high debt level. The traditional trade-off theory may also predict a 
positive dependence. The argument is that the market is more likely to offer funds to 
profitable firms at lower costs because those firms are less likely to fail. 
The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets 
is used as a 
measure of profitability. 
Firm Risk (Volatility) 
The volatility of income is clearly related to the assessment of a 
firin's default risk. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that investors are 
less able to accurately 
forecast the future earnings of firms with high volatility based on public 
information. 
They therefore demand a higher premium to provide funds, resulting 
in an increase 
in costs of debt. Therefore, firms with 
high volatility would avoid issuing debt when 
seeking funds and so a negative relationship 
between earnings volatility and 
leverage is expected. 
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Risk is often measured by the standard deviation of returns over some past time 
period. but this method throws away potentially valuable time series data. I proceed 
instead by estimating the following time-series regression for each company from 
199-3 to 2005: 
ENT 
=a+, 8T +c where: T=(I, 2,..., 13) (6.3) total assets 
The absolute values of the residuals from these regressions are consistent estimates 
of the conditional standard deviations of EBIT/(total assets), and are used to 
measure firm risk. 
Liquidity 
Pecking order theory suggests that firms require financial slack to avoid resort to 
external finance (Myers, 1977). The liquidity of a firin is a measure of this slack and 
is expected to be negatively related to leverage. On the other hand, the trade-off 
theory may predict a positive relationship because firms with high liquidity ratios 
have greater ability to meet short-term obligations and thus are associated with 
lower default risk. 
Following Ozkan (2001), the liquidity ratio calculated as current assets to current 
liabilities is applied. 
Industry Classification 
Industry class is argued to influence the capital structure of firms because it reflects 
the degree of specialization of capital stock, which in turn affects the liquidation value 
of the firm. Titman (1984) suggests that the more specialized servicing a firm requires, 
the higher its liquidation costs and therefore the lower the firm's leverage ratio. 
I follow Titman and Wessels (1998) and include a dummy variable equal to unity for 
manufacturing firms (SIC codes between 3400 and 4000) and zero otherwise. 
Other Control Variables 
Besides the conventional variables discussed above, I also include two control 
variables which are relatively 
less used in the previous empirical studies. However, 
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the theoretical concerns have provided motivation to include them into the capital 
structure model. 
(1) Dividend Dummy 
A dividend announcement may convey infon-nation about the future prospects of a 
firm. Dividends may give a credible signal of firm quality (Miller and Rock, 1985) 
because they cost bad firms more than good firms in terms of reduced investments. 
It is also argued that non-dividend-paying firms are subject to large informational 
asymmetries, which could cause them to prefer debt to equity financing (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984- Sharpe and Nguyen, 1995). Ross (1977) demonstrates that debt also 
has a positive signalling effect. If debt and dividends are both signals of firm quality, 
they could be substitutes for one other (Frydenberg, 2004). Therefore it can be 
argued that a firm that does not pay dividends is expected to use more debt 
financing. 
Following Graham (2000), a dummy variable NODIV is used to capture the effect of 
no dividend payment on corporate capital structure. NODIV is equal to one for a 
finn that does not pay dividends. 
(2) Term Spread 
Economic intuition suggests that the position of the economy in the business cycle is 
an important determinant of finns' default risk and thus may have an impact on a 
companyýs financing decisions. Previous studies usually include a set of time dummy 
variables to capture such effects and most of them find significant joint effects of the 
dummies. However, these time-specific effects are hard to interpret. Therefore, 
instead of using time dummies, I finally include a country- specific measure of the 
term spread as an indicator of macroeconomic conditions 12 . An increase in the term 
spread is typically associated with expected future inflation (Mishkin, 1990). 
Expected inflation tends to increase the debt ratio through a tax effect: higher future 
inflation increases the real value of current tax deductions. However, the term spread 
is also positively related to the current and future cost of borrowing (Fama, 1990), and 
thus controls for cross-sectional variations in the expected level of interest rates. In 
12 The spread varies across countries but not among 
firms in the same country. 
146 
the cross-section therefore, a higher term spread is likely to be associated with lower 
leverage and particularly with a lower long-term debt ratio. 
A negative correlation between term spread and debt ratios can also find support 
from Baker and Wurgler (2002). They argue that the observed capital structure is a 
cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. A positive term 
spread is usually interpreted as an indicator of economic expansion and high 
expected real growth implies rising stock market valuations. Therefore, according to 
the market timing hypothesis, firms would use more equity financing in order to 
take the opportunities. As a consequence, less debt is issued and a negative 
relationship is found between leverage and the term spread. 
Table 6.3 reports basic summary statistics of the sample for the non-categorical 
variables in the regressions. Statistics by country, which may give a general idea of 
the spread of the data, are presented in Appendix 6.1. 
Table 6.3 Summary statistics 
VARIABLE 
(N=1677) MEAN MIN MAX 
SD SKEWNESS KURTOSIS 
LRI 0.5671 0.1482 0.9983 0.1525 -0.0027 2.6028 
LR2 0.3362 0.0025 0.7930 0.1535 -0.0053 2.4521 
LR3 0.2117 0 0.7482 0.1408 0.3569 2.5877 
LR4 0.3267 0 0.9973 0.2029 0.2211 2.4115 
LR. 5 0.4401 0.0046 0.9977 0.1843 0.0074 2.5028 
TAN 0.3444 0.0021 0.9599 0.2218 0.8663 3.0920 
INTAN 0.0902 0 0.8013 0.1351 2.2144 8.8259 
SIZE 15.7111 11.0220 20.1936 1.1456 0.4644 4.9213 
GROW 2.9421 0.32 102.1 3.8413 13.1467 291.5338 
PROF 0.1132 0.0012 0.5602 0.0638 1.8482 9.4237 
LIQD 1.6761 0.0817 9.9404 0.981- --- 13.0333 
VOLA 0.0216 3.63E-06 0.2056 0.0242 2.8957 15.5657 
NDTS 0.0481 0.0003 0.2602 0.0306 1.9680 10.2841 
TAXR 0.4249 0 11.6346 0.6246 11.4370 169.9079 
TX-DVE' 2509 -0.0320 1.0590 
0.1974 1.3300 4.7240 
TXDVIE 
2 0.2641 -0.0320 1.1-324 0.2046 
1.4245 5.2215 
TXDVR 0.2046 -0.3846 0.5598 0.3067 -0.5841 
1.7406 
TXDVR 
2 0.2174 -0.3846 0.5598 0.3130 -0.5583 
1.6540 
TERM 0.7541 I -3.0933 I 
3.1533 1.2626 -0.7938 3.1634 
Notes: 
1. King's ratios calculated using the top income bracket tax rates 
2. King's ratios calculated using the top tax rates. 
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6.3 Methodology 
6.3.1 Diagnostics 
The model of leverage can be estimated in several ways. The appropriate technique 
depends on the structure of the error term (u,, ) and the possible correlation between 
the components of the error term and the explanatory variables of the model. Here is 
a brief summary of the issues. More detailed discussions about choosing appropriate 
estimators were presented in Chapter 3.2.1. 
In the simplest case, if there are no firm- or time-specific effects, which implies that 
p, =77, =0, then pooled OLS regression is appropriate. However, it might be 
expected that unobservable firm-specific or time-specific factors, or both, will have 
an effect on leverage. 
There are two ways to treat the unobservable effects. The first is to include the 
unobservable effects in the error term by assuming the firm effects and/or time 
effects are all IID random variables 
2 )j, 
171 and v 0. U2 
(0ý 
0- 
11 
-- (I" )) p 71 - 
(0'(T7 
In this case, the random effects model is appropriate. However, the random effects 
estimator is based on the orthogonality assumption that the unobservable firm 
and/or time effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. If this 
condition is violated, the random effects estimator is inconsistent. The alternative 
to the random effects estimator is to treat firm and/or time effects as fixed. The 
fixed effects model assumes that the slope coefficients are constant for all firms 
over time but that the intercept varies across firms and/or over time. The model 
gives consistent estimates regardless of correlation between the error components 
and the regressors but it is less efficient than random effects estimation. 
The fixed 
effects estimator has the further disadvantage that 
it cannot be used to estimate 
time- or company-invariant effects since time- and company-invariant variables 
are swept out by the within transformation applied. 
It can be argued that this 
wastes useful information contained 
in the relations among individual means 
(Owusu-Gyapong, 1986). 
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Before choosing an estimation technique it is therefore necessary to look for 
evidence of specific firm and/or time effects and whether these effects are correlated 
with the explanatory variables and also to test for heteroskedasticity. The results of 
these diagnostics are shown in Table 6.4. 
6.3.1.1 Test for Firm Effects and Time Effects 
Baltagi. Chang and Li (1992) conduct Monte Carlo experiments which suggest that 
F-tests of the firm and time intercepts perform well in finite samples. F-tests are 
therefore first used to check individually for firm and time effects using a one-way 
fixed effects model. The Lagrange multiplier test of Breusch and Pagan (1980) is 
also used. as a check for firm effects. 
It is not surprising that there are significant firm effects for all 5 leverage measures. 
However. tests on the one-way fixed time effects model find no evidence of 
significant time effects. These results suggest a model incorporating firm effects 
only in the error term: 
Yi, =a+ Xil, 8 + Uil 
(6.4) 
where ui, =, ui + vl, and: pi - IID(O, o-ý, 
2 ), vi, - IID(O, a, 
2) 
6.3.1.2 Fixed Effects Model vs. Random Effects Model 
The results of the Hausman specification test 
(Hausman, 1978) show that the 
assumption of no correlation between the error term and 
the regressors is rejected 
for all leverage measures at the 5 percent 
level except for LR5. Therefore, the 
simple random effects estimator is not valid 
for LRI to LR4. The random effects 
model is correctly specified only 
for LR5. 
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6.3.1.3 Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Finally, the results of pooled OLS estimates of the model are used to calculate the 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity, distributed as Y2 
(1) 
under the null of no heteroskedasticity. The test statistic rejects the null hypothesis 
for most of the leverage measures except for LR5. 
6.3.1.4 Endogeneity Problem 
The Hausman tests show that there is strong evidence of endogeneity between the 
regressors and the unobserved individual effects. Given the evidence of endogeneity, 
the. Hausman-Taylor (1981) approach is used first to estimate the model. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the Hausman-Taylor estimator is essentially an instrumental 
variable random effects estimator (Hausman and Taylor, 1981; Baltagi, 2005) and 
can be used to estimate random effects models in which, as in this case, some of the 
explanatory variables are correlated with the unobserved individual random effects. 
A particular advantage of the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator in this context is 
that it becomes possible to identify the coefficients of the time-invariant variables 
that are wiped out by the fixed effects estimator. 
In the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimation, King's tax ratios, term spread, size 
and volatility are treated as time-varying exogenous variables. The industry 
dummy is treated as exogenous since it is the only time-invariant variable in the 
model and at least one such variable is required as instrument in the estimation 
procedure. The dividend dummy is also treated as exogenous 
because whether to 
pay or not to pay is a structural decision which would not typically 
be affected 
by concurrent adjustments in leverage. Other 
independent variables used as 
proxies for specific firm characteristics 
(tangibility, intangibility, growth, 
profitability and liquidity), and other variables scaled 
by the total assets of the 
firm (non-debt tax shields and the effective tax rate) are treated conservatively as 
if they are correlated with the unobserved 
firm effects. To conclude, there is no 
specific rule for defining a variable as exogenous 
or endogenous in an 
instrumental variable estimation. Different definition of endogenous variables 
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and the choice of instruments may affect the estimated results. However. the 
argument here is that the variables as ratios scaled by total assets (or asset 
related items) are necessarily endogenous in models seeking to explain the ratio 
of debt or liabilities to total assets, and this is used as a criterion for the 
definition of endogenous variables in the present analysis. 
The Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator takes account of the correlation between the 
unobserved firm effects and some of the explanatory variables. However, the 
concern is that endogeneity also occurs more directly in the model through the 
idiosyncratic error term: since some of the explanatory variables in (6.4) are scaled 
by total assets, they are necessarily endogenous when the left-hand side variable is a 
ratio of debt to total assets, as in my model. In general, one would expect many of 
the entries in a firm*s balance sheet to be determined simultaneously at a point in 
time, and since balance sheet entries appear on both the left-hand side and the right- 
hand side of the estimated equation, at least some of the regressors are necessarily 
endogenous in any version of the equation. In addition, the effective tax rate is 
evidently not independent of any measure of leverage. Under the circumstances, the 
Hausman-Taylor (198 1) estimator is inappropriate. Green and Murinde (2008) show 
that properly allowing for the endogeneity between explanatory variables and 
idiosyncratic error term in leverage models has an important impact on the size and 
significance of the estimated coefficients. Therefore, the model is re-estimated using 
the Arellano and Bover (1995) GMM estimator and the results are compared with 
those obtained from the Hausman-Taylor (1981) approach. 
In the Arellano-Bover (1995) GMM estimation, (6.4) is rewritten in matrix notation 
as: 
=WO+ u= 
Xß+Z)7+u (6.5) 
where y is an NT xI vector of leverage ordered by year and 
by firm and W is a 
correspondingly ordered matrix of explanatory variables which consists of 
firm- and 
time varying variables X and time-invariant variables 
Z. (6.5) is then interpreted as 
T cross-section regressions, each corresponding to a particular year. 
The system is 
then pre-multiplied by the non-singular transformation suggested 
by Arellano and 
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Bover (1995) which splits the model into T-1 within-group equations and the Tth 
(between) equation. See Chapter 3.2.1.6 for more details. 
As the within-group operator eliminates p from the first T-I equations in the model, 
all exogenous and lagged endogenous variables are valid instruments in these 
equations. The Tth equation must be instrumented by variables which are 
uncorrelated with u, and therefore uncorrelated with the firm effect (u) and with the 
idiosyncratic effect (i). This limits the number of endogenous variables whose 
coefficients can be identified in the model. To solve this problem, a weaker 
assumption is made that the correlation between X, and u is constant over time. 
Therefore, applying the within-group transformation to remove the time mean from 
X, creates valid instruments for the Tth equation, since: E(p I X, - Xj) = 0; 
X, Y X1, IT. 
Consistent with the Hausman-Taylor (198 1) estimation, tangibility, intangibility,, 
growth.. profitability,, liquidity, effective tax rate and non-debt tax shields are treated 
as endogenous. 2 King's tax margins (TXDJI'E and TXDVR), size, volatility, and 
term spread are time-variant exogenous variables. Dividend dummy is treated as 
exogenous. Industry classification is treated as a time-invariant exogenous variable 
and falls under the constant correlation assumption. Therefore in the first T-1 
equations, the instruments consist of I lag of the endogenous variables and current 
values of the exogenous variables. Instruments in the Tth equation are the current 
value and 3 lagged mean deviations of the time-varying exogenous variables and the 
current value of the time-invariant exogenous variables. For estimation purposes, 
King's tax ratios and dividend dummy are treated in the same way as the industry 
dummy. King's tax ratios vary over time, but not sufficiently to use with 1+3 lags; 
and clearly they are exogenous. The dividend dummy also has insufficient time 
variation to use with 1+3 lags. Finally, cluster-robust standard errors are calculated 
to correct for heteroskedasticity (Baltagi, 2005). J tests are reported 
for the validity 
of the overidentifying restrictions implied by the instrument set 
(Sargan, 1958). 
Overall. these estimation procedures can be argued to be substantially more 
conservative than is common 
in the literature. 
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6.4 Discussion of Results 
The estimated results of the Hausman-Taylor (1981) and Arellano-Bover (1995) 
estimators using the King's tax ratios calculated based on the top tax rates are 
shown in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6. The J tests confirm the validity of the 
overidentifying restrictions in the Arellano-Bover (1995) GMM estimation. The 
estimates obtained by using the top bracket tax rates are given in Appendix 6.2 for 
the record. Although there are inevitably some quantitative changes between the two 
sets of results, the qualitative results remain unchanged. Overall, the estimated 
results are generally consistent with a priori expectations. 
The results obtained by applying the two approaches exhibit general consistency in 
the signs of parameters. However, there are significant differences in the efficiency 
of the two estimators. The Hausman-Taylor (1981) instrumental variable estimator 
generally reduces the significance of the coefficients on some of the endogenous 
variables. The insignificant regressors in the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimates, 
including tangibility, intangibility, volatility, effective tax rates and non-debt tax 
shields, turn strongly significant throughout. I would argue that the Arellano-Bover 
(1995) GMM estimator which accounts for more general forms of endogeneity 
provides more efficiency than the Hausman-Taylor (198 1) estimator. Therefore, the 
discussion of results is concentrated on the GMM estimates. 
6.4.1 Tax Variables 
King's Tax Conditions 
The coefficients on King's ratios are all statistically significant and exhibit a consistent 
sign pattern for debt-equity and debt-retentions. The debt-equity margin is signed 
positive throughout as expected and shows that the tax margin did affect 
financing 
decisions in the expected way. The debt-retention margin is signed negative throughout 
(but smaller in value than the debt-equity margin), which 
is less expected, but could be 
explained by the attribution of the capital gains tax as the price of retained earnings. 
High statutory capital gains tax rates may encourage more efficient asset management 
and therefore the cross-sectional variation 
in effective capital gains tax rates may be less 
than or even inverse to the variation 
in the statutory rates. 
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Table 6.5 Hausman-Taylor estimates 
L IRZ I ----F-LR2 -T--LR3 LýR4 Lii5 
Exogenous: tax 
TXDVE 
........................... 
0.1335*** 
........... 
0.0873*** 0.0529** 
........... ..... 
0.1158*** 0.1410*** 
(0.0212) (0.0222) (0.0216) (0.0308) ............. I .......... (0.0262) 
TXDVR -0.0841 -0.0411 -0.0367** -0.0680*** -0.0671*** 
- 
(0.0172) (0 . 0181) (0 . 0177) (0.0250) (0.0 21 1) 
Endogenous: tax 
TAXR 0.0082*** 
............ (0.00-11) 
NDTS -0.1216 
(0.1439) 
Endogenous 
TAN -0.1919*** 
(0.0315) 
INTAN 
- ------ -- --- 
-0.1093*** 
- ---- - (0.0299) 
GROW 
............ ........... . 
0.0057*** 
........... I ............. . (0.0006) 
PROF -0.4469*** 
(0.0496) 
LIQD -0.0389*** 
(0.0036) 
Exogenous 
SIZE 
NOLA 
INODIV 
I IND 
TERM 
0.0560*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0537 
--- ........... I .................. (0.0955) 
0.0605*** 
(0.0120) 
-0.0026 
................ ... -. - ................. (0.0229) 
-0.0026 
.......... ...... (0.0018) 
0.0020 
(0.0032) 
-0.1222 
(0.1492) 
-0.1029*** 
(0.0327) 
0.0129 
(0.0312) 
0.0032*** 
......................................... (0.0007) 
-0.6144*** 
(0.0515) 
-0.0282*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0464*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.1860* 
................................ --- (0.0991) 
0.0497*** 
(0.0124) 
-0.0146 
........... ...................... -. 1 1 ............ (0.0251) 
-0.0038** 
-. - ..................... (0.0019) 
0.0009 
.... ...... --l., I., (0.0031) 
-0.2495* 
(0.1444) 
-0.0185 
(0.0317) 
0.1685*** 
(0.0303) 
0.0028*** 
.......... . ........... .......................... (0.0006) 
-0.5993*** 
(0.0499) 
-0.0117*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0398*** 
(0.0041) 
-O. t392 
I ................... (0.0960) 
0.0514*** 
(0.0120) 
-0.0067 ............. (0.0253) 
-0.0058*** -- ........... (0.0018) 
0.0050 0.0070* 
(0.0045) (0.0038) 
-0.4225** 
' -0.2319 (0.2103) ý (0.180-5)-' 
, 
-0.0460 -0.1554*** 
(0.0461) (0-0395) 
0.1580*** -0.0462 
(0.0437) (0.0373) 
0.0095*** 
......... . ........ ......... ... 
0.0088*** 
.. ..... . ........ . .......... ... . ..... .... (0.0009) ... ........ . ... ... .I.......................... (0.0008) 
-0.9287*** -0.7689*** 
(0.0725) (0.0621) 
-0.0242*** -0.0411 
(0.0053) (0.0046) 
0.0723*** 0.0659*** 
(0.0058) (0.0049) 
-0.2627* ... - .. . 
-0.1796 
... .............. .......... I ............ ....... 11 .. . ... . ... (0.13)96 (0.1197) 
0.0710*** 0.0611 
......... ... (0.0175) (0.0150) 
-0.0074 -0.0128 
(0.0328) (0.0267) 
-0.0071 -0.0045** . ........... I ................. .............. (0.0026) (0.0022) 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in parentheses 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Table 6.6 GMM estimates 
L Rl LR1 LR2 LR3 LR4 LR5- LRý 
Exogenous: tax 
TXDVE 
'TO.. 
073 1 0.0728*** 0.040.1 0.0861*** 0.1149*** 
(0.0108) (0.0092) (0.0114) (0.0140) (0.0094) 
TXDVR 
-0.0583*** -0.0355*** -0.0332*** -0-0693*** -0.0671*** 
(0.0082)_ (0.0106) 
_(0.0118) 
(0.01) 8) (0.0113) 
Endogenous: tax 
TAXR 0.0236*** 0.0152*** 0.0101*** 0.0074** 0.0221 
(0.0021)_ (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0018) 
NDTS 0.0705 -0.5079*** -0.2876*** -0.5766 -0.4491 
(0.0845) (0.0628) (0.0737) (0.1225) (0.0810) 
Endogenous 
TAN 
-0.4189*** -0.2023*** -0.0445** -0.1731*** -0.3485*** 
(0.0254) (0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0340) (0.0217) 
INTAN 
-0.1616*** 0.1204*** ................. 
0.3732*** 
.......... 
0.4259*** 0.0463** 
. ..... (0.0188) (0.0157) (0.0195) (0.0236) (0.0205) 
GROW 0.0026*** 0.0015*** 0.0019*** 
.......... --- ..... 
0.0063*** 
...................... -. 1 -........ 
0.0052*** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
PROF -0.2266*** -0.3288*** -0.2933*** -0.4994*** -0.4396*** 
(0.0217) (0.0229) (0.0280) (0.0386) (0.0218) 
LIQD -0.0388*** -0.0326*** ........... -0.0139*** . ..... -0.0311*** -0.0478*** (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0-0013) 
Exogenous 
SIZE 0.0498*** 15*** 0.03 0.0165*** 0.0298*** 0.0432*** 
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0009) 
VOLA 
........... -0.0941 
** -0.3167*** .......... --- ............ -- ........... .............. -0.2567*** ........................... -0.4203*** 
-0.3608*** 
(0.0390) (0.0397) (0.0274) (0.0438) (0-0515) 
NODIV 0.0747*** 0.0541 
............ - ........... 
0.0448*** 
.................................. 
0.073 1 *** 
.......... ........... --1--. - ............. 
0.0690*** 
(0.0072) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0076) (0.0044) 
IND -0.0016* -0.0007 -0.0001 
0.0008 0.0002 
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0010) 
TERM 0.0012** -0.0020*** -0.0036*** -0.0032*** -0.0022*** 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
J Test 
- -. 1 ... ....... 
111.3627 
. ..... 
120.5956 
............... - 1.11 ..................... 
113 3.2494 114.1755 .................... 
121.5742 
prob: z 
2(l 14) [0.5524] [0.3182] [0.50221 [0.4778] [0.29641 
Notes: The standard ýerrors are shown in parentlieses. i ne Y-vaiucs jui 
J LUý, Lý, aIC; MIUW11 III 
square brackets. 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<O. l 
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Effective Tax Rate 
The estimated coefficients on the effective tax rate are positively signed and 
significant for all leverage ratios, as expected. Certainly, the results suggest that 
effective tax rates have a positive relationship with leverage reflecting the tax 
advantage of debt. 
Non-debt Tax Shields 
The coefficients on non-debt tax shields are all negative in the leverage equations 
and generally significant except for LRL This is consistent with the basic 
DeAngelo-Masulis (1980) argument that firms with many non-debt tax shields will 
reduce their use of debt to minimize the probability of bankruptcy. The results 
provide support for the hypothesis that non-debt tax shields are tax substitutes for 
debt. 
6.4.2 Control Variables 
Asset Tangibility 
The coefficients on asset tangibility are all negative and are significant at the 5 
percent level. This would suggest that firms with more fixed assets tend to borrow 
less. These results contradict the predictions of Downs (1993), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Shenoy and Koch (1996) but are consistent with the arguments of 
Grossman and Hart (1983) that firms with low levels of collateral assets might 
voluntarily choose higher debt levels to mitigate the agency problem of managers 
consuming excessive perquisites. 
Another possible explanation is that the tangibility variable may 
be a proxy for non- 
debt tax shields instead of a measure of asset specificity. Firms with substantial 
fixed assets may also be subject to substantial non-debt tax shields, such as 
depreciation, which would reduce taxable income and therefore moderate the tax 
benefit of debt. Thus, purchases of fixed assets 
by firms may imply more tax 
shelters and fewer incentives to take advantage of 
debt tax shields, giving rise to a 
negative relationship between asset tangibility and 
firm leverage. 
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Asset Intangibilitj, 
Asset intangibility has generally positive signs which are unexpected. A possible 
explanation is that intangibles consist of patents, copyrights, development costs, etc., 
which it can be argued are generally used by firms to generate future investments. 
Therefore, intangibility may also serve as an indicator of growth prospects. 
Consistent with pecking order theory, high growth firms would choose debt relative 
to equity when retained earnings are exhausted. 13 . 
Size 
Finn size is positively related to all leverage ratios at the I percent significance 
level. This is consistent with the view that size is a proxy for a low probability of 
default (larger firms are more diversified and therefore are able to borrow more debt 
than smaller firms without encountering financial distress). 
Profitability 
The estimated coefficients on profitability are negative and are significant at the I 
percent level for all five leverage measures. The results are consistent with the 
predictions of pecking order theory (firms prefer using surplus generated by profits 
to finance their investment before raising external debt and equity capital) and 
conform to the preponderance of previous empirical evidence. 
Growth Opportunities 
The growth opportunities variable is invariably positively signed and significant for 
all leverage ratios at the I percent level. The strong evidence of a positive 
relationship contradicts the trade-off theory (managers of high growth 
firms are 
reluctant to raise debt because the cost of financial 
distress is relatively high). 
However, the positive relationship may be explained by the pecking order theory. 
Due to higher demand for funds, high growth firms would eventually consider 
external financing when retained earnings were exhausted. 
If extemal finance were 
considered, the managers would prefer 
debt to equity, implying a positive 
II -, There is another concern that the significant unexpected signs of 
both tangible and intangible 
assets may be due to the potential collinearity 
between these two variables. In earlier estimations 
using Hausman-Taylor estimator, 
deletion of either variable made no qualitative difference to the 
results. Further research 
is needed to solve this puzzle. 
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correlation between growth and leverage ratios. Another possible explanation 
provided by Titman and Wessels (1988) is that growth opportunities add value to a 
firm. Hence. they increase the debt capacity of a firin and in turn increase the 
leverage ratio measured in book value, since this additional value is not reflected in 
the -firm's book value. Therefore, the strongly positive coefficient estimates should 
not be viewed as necessarily being inconsistent with the agency- and tax-based 
theories. 
Liquiditjý 
As expected, the estimated coefficients on liquidity are negative and significant at 
the I percent level for all leverage measures. This negative relationship also 
supports the pecking order theory. 
Volatility 
The estimated coefficients on volatility are negative signed and significant for all 
leverage ratios. The results are in line with the view that high risk firms have more 
expected bankruptcy risk and therefore less debt financing. The results are 
consistent with those of MacKie-Mason (1990) and Chowdhury and Miles (1989) 
suggesting that the volatility of earnings plays a significant role in the capital 
structure decisions of firms. 
Industry Dummy 
The estimated coefficients on the industry dummy are quite mixed and insignificant, 
which implies that firms' financing decisions are not related to industry 
classification. However, the coarse classification may affect the estimates. Finer 
classifications may be useful. 
DividendDummy 
The coefficients on the dividend dummy are all positive and significant at 
the I 
percent level, which is consistent with the results obtained 
by Graham (1999). This 
positive effect on debt can be taken as evidence that 
firms not paying dividends 
prefer to use more debt because they are more 
likely to be subject to large 
information asymmetries. 
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The results also lend support for Frydenberg (2004) that firms signalling quality 
through dividends do not need to signal quality through a high debt ratio. 
Term Spread 
The term spread is generally negatively signed and significant as expected. The 
results lend support for the argument that if an expansion in the economy is 
expected firms would go to equity market for funds to benefit from the rising stock 
price rather than issuing debt. 
6.4.3 Size of Tax Effects 
To evaluate the size of the tax effects I calculate the impact on different leverage 
ratios of a 10% (1000 basis point) increase in the rate of corporate profits tax in 
each country. assuming no change in other rates, including imputation rates. This is 
done by differentiating the empirical counterpart of (6.1) country-by-country with 
respect to the corporate profits tax rate (c) and multiplying the result by 0.1. 
Because of the non-linearity in the tax ratios, the impact of a tax change varies 
across countries, depending on the tax system and initial conditions. The 
calculations are based on 2004 tax systems and rates of tax. The estimates based on 
the results from the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator and the Arellano-Bover (1995) 
GMM estimator are reported in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 respectively. It is important 
to emphasize that the sample size is very small for some countries (e. g. Greece and 
Portugal). The results shown must therefore be regarded as 'ballpark' estimates. It 
should also be noted that these calculations assume that imputation systems (in 
France, Spain and UK) did not change the imputation rate along with the basic 
corporate profits tax rate, and this accounts for much of the difference in magnitude 
between the three imputation countries and the rest. The reason that the imputation 
rate remains unchanged in calculating the effects of tax rate changes is that the 
imputation rate is determined independently of the basic tax rate, and it is not clear 
how best to change it. An increase in imputation offsets the increased advantage of 
debt provided by a rise in the basic rate, and is effectively a 
different policy measure. 
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The results show that, based on the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimates. a 10% tax 
increase would increase debt ratios by small proportions: for the narrower leverage 
definition (LR4) from a maximum of 5.18% (UK) to a minimum of 0.27% (Ireland), 
and mostly less than 2%. Based on the GMM estimates, the estimated size of tax 
effects is even smaller. The change in LR4 now ranges from 3.4% (UK) to 0.15% 
(Ireland). and mostly less than 1%. Taking account of the correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the idiosyncratic error term reduces the estimated impact 
of corporate tax rate changes on leverage ratios. 
Graham (1996a) finds that a 10% increase in the tax rate would raise US company 
debt ratios for a broadly similar definition 14 to LR4 by 0.69% per annumlý while 
Alworth and Arachi (2001) report an effect of between 0.8% and 0.9% per annum 
using Graham's (I 996a) method for Italian companies. Using a regression approach, 
Gordon and Lee (2001) find that the debt ratios of smaller US companies would 
increase by 3.6%. Graham's (1996a) method involves a regression of the change in 
debt on tax variables and leverage determinants, whereas Gordon and Lee (2001) 
use the leverage ratio as the dependent variable, as is done here. It is therefore not 
easy to compare all these results directly. However, it is reasonable to suppose that 
Graham's companies would grow in size over time and therefore as a first 
approximation, the equilibrium change in the debt ratio would be about equal to the 
calculated rate of 0.69%. If so, the results of Graham (1996a) and Alworth-Arachi 
(2001) fall within the range reported in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 for the medium-size 
European companies in my sample. Moreover, their results are for classical tax 
systems and so are fully comparable with the estimates for European classical tax 
systems. Gordon and Lee's (2001) results are rather larger than for most countries 
analysed here except for France, Spain and UK, which contribute 58% (75) of my 
sample companies, but as discussed above, these are also the imputation systems. 
14 Graham (1996a) uses the book value of debt plus the market value of equity as 
denominator to 
calculate the leverage ratios. 
15 Graham (1996a) calculates that 22% rise in the corporate tax rate would raise 
debt ratios by 
1,52% per annum; 0.69% = 1.52%/2.2. There are substantial non-linearities 
in Graham's 
calculations but the 1.52% estimate 
is based on a linear regression. Therefore, linear rescaling to 
compare with the results 
here is not unreasonable. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have studied the impact of tax policy on the financial decisions of 
listed European companies within the context of an ad hoc model of leverage. 
The literature on firms' capital structure has established a series of stylized facts 
relating corporate financial decisions to a variety of independent variables, in most of 
which the tax factor is ignored or treated as just one element in a general model of 
company financing. In this chapter, I have extended the analysis by taking account of 
the interaction between corporate and personal taxes under different tax systems 
through utilizing a panel of 129 non-financial firms from II European countries for the 
period 1993 to 2005. The selection of the sample is intended to give the best chance of 
identifying tax effects through variations in statutory tax rates by concentrating on 
middle-sized companies from a substantial cross-section of European countries over a 
relatively long time period for this type of study. The price of this approach is that 
several countries are represented by a relatively few firms, and this should be bome in 
mind when interpreting the results. The robustness of the model is checked by 
considering different possible ways of measuring firms' leverage. The model is 
estimated using the Hausman-Taylor (1981) approach and the Arellano-Bover (1995) 
GMM estimator to mitigate different forms of endogeneity between the explanatory 
variables and the composite error term. The results have shown that the GMM 
estimates are more efficient than the Hausman-Taylor (1981) instrumental variable 
estimates. 
Many of the results for the control variables are in line with previous literature and 
provide rather more support for pecking order theories than 
for trade-off theories. For 
the tax effects, the coefficients on King's tax ratios are strongly significant and 
consistently and reasonably signed for all leverage equations. 
After taking account of 
the endogeneity between the explanatory variables and the 
idiosyncratic error term, the 
effective tax rate is significant and positively signed and 
I find strong support for 
DeAnglo and Masulis' (1980) argument about the substitution effects 
between tax 
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shelters, underlining the impact of estimation methods and the importance of using a 
consistent and efficient estimation procedure. Finally and perhaps most interesting, the 
estimated size of the tax effects in most countries is very much in line with Graham's 
(2008) conclusion that tax effects on company financing are significant but 'not large'. 
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Appendix 6.2 Estimates using King's Tax Ratios based on the Top 
Bracket Tax Rates 
Table A 6.2.1 Hausman-Taylor estimates 
LRI LR2 LR3 LR4 LR5 
Exo4l, enous: tax t5 
TXDVE 
. 
0.1161*** 
......... 
0.0809*** 0.0413* 0.1002*** 0.1266*** 
(0.0221) (0.0232) (0.0226) (0.0322) (0.0273) 
TXDVR -0.0951 -0.0467*** -0.0443** -0.0790*** -0.0757*** 
. 0172) (0.0181) (0-0177) (0.0250) (0.0212) 
Endogenous: tax 
TAXR 0.0082*** 0.0020 0.0010 0.0050 0.00 69* 
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0045) 1 (0.0038) 
NDTS 
.......... ................. -0.0854 ........ -0.1020 ......................... ........................... -0.2307 .................... -. - .............. -0.3907* ..... .. -0.1940 (0.1437) (0.1488) (0.1439) . .................. ...... - .................. 
, 
(0.2097) ..... ............ I ................. ........... (0.1802) 
.. Endogenous 
TAN -0.1926*** -0.1033*** -0.0192 -0.0468 -0.1563*** 
(0.0316) (0.0328) (0.0317) (0.0461) (0.0396) 
INTAN -0.1105*** 0.0136 0.1671 *** 0.1570*** -0.0459 
(0.0300) (0.0312) (0.0303) (0.0438) (0.0374) 
GROW 0.0056*** 0.0032*** 0.0027*** 0.0094*** 0.0087*** 
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
PROF -0.4522*** .......... --- ................ -0.6172*** ............. .............. 
-0.6028*** -0.9340*** -0.7738*** 
(0.0497) (0.0515) (0.0499) (0.0725) (0.0622) 
LIQD -0.0387*** -0.0281*** -0.0116*** -0.0240*** -0.0408*** 
(0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0053) (0.0046) 
Exogenous 
_ SIZE 0.0550*** 0.0460*** 0.0393*** 0.0715*** 0.0652*** 
(0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0058) (0.0049) 
VOLA 0.0477 
............................. 
-0.1888* -. 1-1- .............. I .................. 
-0.1433 ........... .... ....................... 
-0.2685* -- ........... 
-0.1844 ............... ........ .... ........... ................. .............. .... (0.0957) (0.0992) (0.0960) (0.1396) (0.1199) 
NODIV 0.0598*** 0.0497*** 0.0506*** 0.0703*** 0.0610*** 
(0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0175) (0.0150) 
IND -0.0034 .... I ............................. 
-0.0151 -0.0072 .......... - ......... 
-0.0083 .--. 1 .............. -II................. 
-0.0136 ........... .................... .......... - ........................... ...... (0.0228) (0.0252) (0.0253) (0.0328) (0.0267) 
TERM -0.0026 -0.0037** -0.0058*** -0.0070*** -0.0045** 
(0.0018) (0.0019) 
_, . __(0.0018) 
(0.0026) (0.0022) 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in parentneses 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Table A 6.2.2 GMM estimates 
----I -LR I LR2 
Exogenous: tax 
TXDVE 0.0599*** 0.0637*** 0.0316*** 0.0773*** 0.1039 
(0.0114) (0.0097) (0.0112) (0.0161) (0-0096) 
TXDVR 
-0.0634*** 0.0349*** -0.0354*** -0.0758*** -0.0658*** (0.0082) (0-0109) (0-0118) (0.0134) (0.01 1 9) 
Endogenous: tax 
TAXR 
-- .......... 
0.0237*** 
.......... 1-1-1 .......... 
0.0155*** 0.0105*** 
........ ................ 
0.0075*** 0.0220*** 
(0.0022) (0-0019) (0.0025) . (0.0028) ............ LO . 00 17) NDTS 0.1180 -0.4415*** -0.2497*** -0.5313*** 
_ 
-0.3791 
(0.0849) (0.0610) (0-0722) (0.1136) (0-0816) 
Endogenous 
TAN 
-0.4195*** -0.2040*** -0.0402** -0.163 1 -0.3460*** 
(0.0267) (0.0189) (0.0194) (0.0361) (0.0218) 
INTAN -0.1719*** 0.1211 *** 0.3704*** 0.4201 *** 0.0505** 
(0.0188) (0.0144) (0.0246) (0.0216) 
GROW 0.0026*** 0.0014*** 0.0019*** 0.0062*** 0.0052*** 
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
PROF 
-0.2282*** -0.3299*** -0.2948*** -0.5012*** .......... .. -0.4387*** (0.0215) (0.0226) (0.0275) (0.0441) (0.0241) 
LIQD -0.0385*** -0.0318*** -0.0130*** -0.0305*** ..... ...... -0.0470*** ............... (0.0013) (0-0011) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0014) 
Exogenous 
SIZE 0.0500*** 
. 
0.0315*** 
............ 1., -1- - ........... 
0.0164*** 
-. 1"...... . ................... I-. 
0.0297*** 
..... 11 ............ 
0.0430*** 
............................... (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0010) 
VOLA -0.0971 -0.3252*** -0.2613*** -0.4201 -0.3762*** 
(0.0390) (0.0384) (0.0278) (0.0439) (0.0538) 
NODIV 
........................... ............ .......... ............................. 
0.0732*** 
. -. l.. --- ................... 
0.0544*** 
........... .................. ............. .................... 
0.0440*** 
..................... .............. I ...................... 
0.0730*** 
...................... --- .......... ....... 
0.0696*** 
........................... ........................................ 
(0.0076) (0.0 (0.0044) (0.0071) (0.0045) 
IND -0.00 16 -0.0008 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0000 
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0010) 
TERM 0.0014** 
.................. . -0.00 
19*** -0.0034*** -0.0030*** -0.0020*** 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0-0007) 
J Test 111.7716 
................... 
120.5422 
............... --- --- ............ 
113.3956 114.4941 122.1548 
prob: Z [0.5415] . 3195] 
[0.4984] [0.4694] [0.2 83 8] 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in parentheses. ]'he F-vaiues tor i tests are snown in 
square brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<O. 
l 
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Chapter 7A Decomposition Analysis of Capital Structure 
Determinants: Short-term and Long-term Debt16 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how tax regimes and fin-n characteristics affect the different 
components of debt. 
In the previous chapter, five different measures of leverage at the aggregate level 
were employed to investigate the determinants of company financing decisions. 
However, it is argued that there is no 'universal truth' of capital structure and its 
determinants. The analysis may be highly sensitive to the form of debt being 
considered. Barclay and Smith (2005) argue that debt differs in several important 
aspects, including maturity, priority, convertibility, call provisions, covenant 
restrictions, and whether the debt is held privately or publicly. Each of the features 
is potentially important in determining the extent to which debt financing can cause 
or exacerbate a potential underinvestment problem. Therefore leverage related costs 
of different components of debt may differ so that firms may have separate policies 
with regard to long-term and short-terin borrowings. 
Recently, more studies have been based on not only long-term or total debt ratios, 
but on short-term debt as well. This may be of particular importance for countries 
where short-term debt constitutes a major part of total debt, such as Sweden (Song, 
2005). Song (2005), Hall et al. (2004) and Michaelas et al. (1999) all find that 
there exist significant differences in some of the determinants of short-term and 
long-term debt ratios such as tangibility, non-debt tax shields and firm size. Due to 
data limitations, these studies are not able to further decompose short-term and 
long-term debt into their elements. Bevan and Danbold (2002) further 
disaggregate long-term and short-term debt into bank borrowing and securitized 
debt and find results consistent with previous studies. 
This procedure also helps to 
16 A paper extracted from this chapter titled 
'Taxes and Capital Structure: A Study of European 
Companies' (co-authored with Professor Christopher 
J. Green) is going to be published in The 
Manchester School Supplement 2008. 
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explain some mixed results regarding firm size and indicates the constraints for 
small firms in bank borrowing and in their debt choice. 
In order to gain a more thorough understanding of the determinants of corporate 
borrowing, in this chapter total debt is decomposed into short-terin and long-term 
debt. An additional 4 leverage variables are defined. The same model is adopted 
using the same sample as in Chapter 6. Estimation coefficients for total debt ratios 
(LR3 and LR4) are presented for comparison. 
Another concern about estimation is the endogeneity problem. As in the previous 
chapter., the Hausman-Taylor (1981) and Arellano-Bover (1995) panel data 
estimators are adopted to control for different forms of endogeneity between the 
regressors and the composite error term. Comparisons are made between the 
results. 
Consistent with the previous chapter, estimated results using the King's tax ratios 
calculated based on the top tax rates are shown in the text. The estimates obtained 
by using the top bracket tax rates are given in Appendix 7.1 for comparison. 
7.2 The Model and Variables 
7.2.1 The Model 
The model to be estimated is the same as in Chapter 6: 
yi, = 
Xll P+ U'l 
(7.1) 
where y,, is the leverage ratio, x,, is a vector of determinants that vary across 
firms 
and/or over time, and u,, is a composite residual which 
has the form: 
Pi + 77, + vit 
(7.2) 
where p, is the unobservable firm effect, q, 
is the time specific component, and v it 
is the remaining disturbance. 
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7.2.2 Dependent Variables 
7.2.2.1 Definition of Dependent Variables 
Due to data limitations, the disaggregation analysis is focused on firm debt only. 
Total debt is decomposed into short-term and long-term debt. Short-term debt is 
defined as the portion of debt payable within one year including the current portion 
of long term debt and sinking fund requirements of preferred stock or debentures. 
Long-term debt represents all interest bearing financial obligations, excluding 
amounts due within one year. Different measures of firms' debt ratios are calculated 
based on book values (Table 7.1). Two denominators, total assets and debt + total 
shareholder's equity + non-equity reserves, are used to scale total debt, short-term 
debt and long-term debt. Therefore, the following relationship exists between 
different debt ratios: 
LR-3 =L TD I+ STD I 
LR4 = LTD2 + STD2 
By examining various debt ratios, this study aims to examine influences on the 
maturity structure of debt, and determine whether the factors that influence long- 
term debt would have the same impact on short-term debt decisions. 
Table 7.1 Measures of leverage 
Definition 
LR3 debt total assets 
LR4 debt (debt + total shareholders' equity + non-equity reserves) 
LTDI long-tenn debt total assets 
LTD2 long-tenn debt (debt + total shareholder's equity + non-equity reserves) 
STDI short-term debt total assets 
STD2 short-tenn debt (debt + total shareholder's equity + non-equity reserves) 
7.2.2.2 Summary of Average Debt Ratios across Countries 
Figure 7.1 has shown the average ratios of total debt (LR3), long-term debt (LTDI) 
and short-term debt (STD I) across countries in percentage in the sample. Long-term 
debt ranges from 10.55% (Gen-nany) to 20.65% (Belgium) of the total assets. 
Greater variability is displayed with respect to short-term debt, with Greece the 
most heavily reliant (12.2 1 %) and the UK the least (4.74%). 
In addition, firms in all 
sample countries rely more on long-term 
debt than on short-term debt. 
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These statistics differ markedly from those reported by Hall et al. (, -)004). They 
study a sample of companies from 8 European countries 17 and find that all sample 
countries invariably have significantly higher average short-term debt ratios than 
long-term ones. The differences may arise from the selection of sample firms. Hall 
et al. (2004) focus on a sample of unlisted small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) 18 which are believed to have no access to international capital markets and 
not be sub ect to international scrutiny and norms. The statistics do tend to confirm 
the Bevan and Danbolt (2002) argument that small firms borrow more short-term 
debt than long-terrn debt because they are supply constrained, in that they do not 
have sufficient credit rating to allow them access to long-term borrowing (see also 
Bank of England, 1998). 
In the time series of debt ratios of the sample countries over the 13 year period 
(Figure 7.2 to Figure 7.4), there is a small decrease in borrowing in 1993 and 1994 for 
most countries but after that time there is mainly a trend of increases in all 3 debt 
ratios (although there are some exceptions) followed largely by a decreasing trend 
since 2003. For Greece and Portugal, leverage ratios show a greater variation but this 
is probably due to the small sample size of these two countries. 
7.2.3 Independent Variables 
To allow comparison with the results of leverage determinants at the aggregate level 
in Chapter 6, the same explanatory variables are used in the model. The independent 
variables include King's tax ratios, effective tax rates, non-debt tax shields, 
tangibility, intangibility, size, growth opportunities, profitability, liquidity, volatility, 
industry dummy, dividend dummy and term spread. More details can be found in 
Table 6.2. 
Table 7.2 reports basic summary statistics for the additional four leverage variables 
in the regressions. 
The 8 sample countries are included in my sample: Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. 
18 An SME was defined as having fewer than 200 employees 
in Hall et al. (2004). 
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Table 7.2 Summary statistics of long-term and short-term debt ratios 
VARIABLE 
(N=1677) MEAN 
- 
MIN MAX SD SKEWNESS KURTOSIS 
LTDI 6.1426 0 0.7300 0.1227 0. 3.3294 
LTD2 
_ _0.2167 
0 0.8659 0.1746 0. 2.7679 
STDI 
- 
0.0691 
- 
0 0.4544 
- 
0.0701 1.5987 5.8679 
STD2 F 0.1100 1 : 77761 0.6733 0.1102 1.6499 6.2192- 
7.3 Methodology 
As in the previous chapter, diagnostics are performed first to clarify the structure of 
the error components and other estimation issues. F tests are used to check 
individually for firm effects and time effects in the one-way fixed effects model. A 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test is also applied as a check for 
firm effects. Pooled OLS estimates of the estimation equation are used to calculate 
the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity. Finally, the 
correlation between the individual effects and the explanatory variables is tested. 
Test statistics are reported in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3 shows that there are significant firm effects for all leverage measures; but 
there is less evidence of time effects,, and this suggests concentrating on a model 
which incorporates only firm effects: 
yu =a+ XiI, 8 + Uil (7.3) 
where u,, - pi + v,, and p, - IID(O, 
o7p 
2 ), vj, - IID(O, o-v 
2 
Also, there is considerable evidence of heteroskedasticity for all the debt ratios. 
The Hausman (1978) tests show that there is strong evidence of endogeneity 
between the regressors and the unobserved individual effects. The Hausman-Taylor 
(1981) approach is used to deal with this problem. 
Consistent with the previous 
chapter, I also apply the Arellano-Bover (1995) estimator 
to allow for a more 
general form of endogeneity between the explanatory variables and 
the idiosyncratic 
error term. The same instruments are applied as 
in the previous chapter. The results 
-C* - from the two estimators are compared. 
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7.4 Discussion of Results 
The estimated results for long-term and short-term debt ratios using the Hausman- 
Taylor (1981) and the Arellano-Bover (1995) estimators based on top corporate tax 
rates are presented in Table 7.4 and Table 7.5 respectively. The estimates for total 
debt ratios (LR3 and LR4) are also presented for comparison. The J tests confin-n 
the validity of the overidentifying restrictions in the Arellano-Bover (1995) GMM 
estimation. The estimated results obtained by applying King's tax ratios based on 
the top bracket tax rates are consistent with those using the top tax rates although 
there are some quantitative changes, and are given in Appendix 7.1 for the record. 
As expected, different results are obtained in some of the determinants of the long- 
term and short-term leverage ratios, and also between the two different estimators. 
Consistent with the previous chapter, the following discussion is focused on the 
results obtained by using the Arellano-Bover (1995) GMM estimator. The 
differences between the estimated results from the two estimators are discussed in 
Chapter 7.4.3. 
7.4.1 Tax Variables 
The coefficients on King's ratios exhibit a consistent sign pattern for debt-equity 
and debt-retentions, and among different types of debt. The debt-equity margin is 
signed positive throughout, as expected. The debt-retentions margin is signed 
negative throughout (but smaller in value than the debt-equity margin except for 
long-term debt ratios). It is very interesting to find that the estimated coefficients on 
King"s conditions for short-term debt ratios are strongly significant while those for 
long-term debt ratios are generally insignificant. The greater responsiveness of 
short-term debt to taxes is not surprising because it is much easier for 
firms to adjust 
their short-term debt levels in response to year-to-year 
fluctuations in tax rates, 
which is consistent with the findings of Gordon and 
Lee (2001). These results 
strongly support the contention that short-term and 
long-term debts are determined 
differently from one another in firms' balance sheets. They also suggest that the 
main impact of tax is on short-term 
borrowing. 
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Table 7.4 Hausman-Taylor estimates 
LR3 LR4 LTDI LTD2 STDI STD2 
Exogenous: tax 
TXDVE 0.0529** 
TXDVR -0.0367** 
(0.0177) 
Endogenous: tax 
0.1158*** 
(0 
-0.0680*** 
ý(0.0250) 
'''0.0174 (0.0 196) 
-0.0382** 
(0.0160) 
9-93ý_9 
_ 
0. 
_0347* 
** 
_ 
0.0793_*** 
(0.0286) (0.0123) (0.0187) 
-0.0569** -0.0007 -0.0144 
(0.0097) (0.0147) 
IANK 0.0009 0.0050 0.0005 0.0036 0.0003 0ý-0013 
(0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0028) (0.0042) (0.0019) (0.0029) 
NDTS -0.2495* -0.4225** -0.3512*** -0.4739** 0.1141 0.0682 
1 (0.1444) (0.22 103) (0.1324) (0.1968) ý i 
(0.0884) (0.1351) 
Endogenous 
TAN -0.0185 . .... .... ........ .... (0.03 
INTAN 0.1685*** 
(0.0303) 
GROW 0.0028*** 
06) 
PROF -0.5993*** 
(0.0499) 
LIQD -0.0117*** .......... (0.0037) 
Exogenous 
SIZE I 
VOLA 
NODIV 
I IND 
TERM 
............ 
-0,93,98 (0.0041) 
-0.13ý; ................... . (0.0960) 
0.0514**. *, 
(0.0120) 
-0.0067 
(0.0253) 
-0.0058*** -. 111.11 ................ (0.0 
-0.0026 ... . ....... . (0.0017) 
-0.0460 
(0 
0.1580*** 
(0.0 43) 7) 
0.0095*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.9287*** 
(0.0725) 
-0.0242*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0723*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.2627* .......... (0 
0.0710*** 
(0.0175) 
-0.0074 
(0.0328) 
-0.0071 *** - .......... (0.0026) 
0.1083*** 
(0.0290) 
0.2547*** 
(0.0276) 
0.0030*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.3945*** 
(0.0457) 
0.0276*** 
........... --. - (0.0034) 
0.0361*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0550 11, .......... 1. ................. (0.08 
91.. 
-O. 
ýýý. *.. *ý*. 
(0.0110) 
-0.0320 
(0.0218) 
-0.0036** I. - .............. --- ---- (0.0016) 
1 
-0-. Ill512111-**-*- -0.12501*1** (0.0431) (0.0193) (0.0295) 
0.3141*** -0.0791*** -0.1491*** 
(0.0407) (0.0179) (0.0274) 
0.0099*** -0.0002 -0.0004 
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
-0.6469*** -0.2006*** -0.2787*** 
(0.0678) (0.0303) (0.0463) 
0.0353*** 
--- ............ -0.0391 ... -0.0592*** ......... (0.0050) (0.0022) (0.0034) 
0.0630*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.1309 I. --l- .................... ....... I -. - (0.1306) 
0.0545*** 
(0.0163) 
-0.0445 
(0.0293) 
-0.0042* ........... (0.0024) 
0.0024 
(0.0023) 
-0.0826 ...... .............. (0.0585) 
0.0154** 
0.0250** 
(0.0107) 
-0.0021 
(0.0011) 
(0.0035) 
-0.1298 
(0.0893) 
0.01Q 
(0.0112) 
40366** 
(0.0162) 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in paremnescs. 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p<0.1 
180 
Table 7.5 GMM estimates 
LR3 LR4 LTDI LTD2 STDI STD2 
Exogenous: tax 
TXDVE 0.0401 0.0861 0.0091 0.0180 0.0378*** 0.0710*** 
(0.0114) (0.0140) (0.0088) (0 (0.0047) (0.0074) 
TXDVR 
-0.0-')-'1'2*** -0.0693*** -0.0032 -0.0191* -0.0261*** -0.0507*** 
(0.0118) (0.0138) (0.0074) (0.0105) (0.0042) (0.0056) 
Endogenous: tax 
TAXR 0.0101*** 0.0074** 0.0123*** 0.0114*** -0.0030*** -0.001 '"'3** 
(0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0-0009) (0.0013) 
NDTS 
-0.2876*** -0.5766*** -0.2494*** -0.4386*** -0.0962* -0.1454* 
1 
(0.0737 (. 225) (0.059-3) 
, (0.1091) (0.0535) . 
(0.0764) 
Endogenous 
TAN 
-0.0445** -0.1731*** -0.0676*** -0.1441*** -0.0045 -0.0629*** 
(0.0189) (0.0340) (0.0136) (0. (0.0089) (0.0136) 
INTAN 0.3732*** 0.4259*** 0.3605*** 0.4584*** 0.0173** -0.0337** 
(0.0195) (0.0236) (0.0124) (0.0227) (0.0082) (0.0139) 
GROW 0.0019*** 0.0063*** 0.0024*** 0.0086*** -0.0006*** -0.0023*** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
PROF -0.293: )3*** -0.4994*** -- - ------- -0.2428*** -0.4803*** - ----- -0.0372*** -0.0483** (0.0280) (0.0386) (0.0190) (0.0304) (0.0131) (0.0225) 
LIQD 
........... - -------- ....... ... -0.0139*** -- . ............ ... - ............ -0.0311*** 
0.0021 ** -0.0061*** ........... -0.0144*** -0.0257*** (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0017) 
. __(0.0018) Exogenous 
SIZE 0.0165*** 0.0298*** 0.0100*** 0.0180*** 0.0065*** 0.0123*** 
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
VOLA 
........... .. --l-I. -I. I. - ..... -0.2567*** ....... .... 
-0.420')*** ................................. -, .................. -0.0702** ........ -0.1396*** ......... . -. 1-1-1- ............... 
-0.1548*** .............. -0.2348*** 
(0.0274) (0.0438) (0.0274) (0.0443) (0-0132) (0.0213) 
NODIV 0.0448*** 
1".., ............... 
0.0731 *** 
. ............. -I.............. 
0.0316*** 0.0521 *** 0.0210*** 0.0262*** 
........ ... ...... (0.0046) (0.0076) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0021) (0.0039) 
IND -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0020*** -0.0024 
0 . 0017*** 
0.0025** 
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0010) 
TERM -0.0036*** -0.0032*** -0.0026*** ........... - ................. - --- ....... -0.0019*** ........ ---- - ............ I-- .......... 
-0-0019*** -0.0023*** 
.............. - (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
J Test 113.2494 
. ............. ........... 
114.1755 124.8618 119.0701 
............. 
113-9871 119.0136 
72(l prob: 14) [0.5022] [0.47ý78] [0.22921 [0.3539] 
[0.4827] [0-355ZLJ 
Thi- P-vqliie,, for J tests are shown in 
. 
Notes: ine stanuaru cirur, ý, avu wiuvij 
square brackets. 
***p<o. ol; **p<0.05; *p<O. l 
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The estimated coefficients on the effective tax rate are positively signed for total 
and long-term debt ratios, as might be expected, but negative in the short-term debt 
equation, suggesting that there are differences between the determinants of long- 
and short-term debt. The coefficients on non-debt tax shields are all negative. 
consistent with the DeAngelo-Masulis (1980) story that firms with many non-debt 
tax shields will reduce their use of debt to minimize the probability of bankruptcy. 
However, the coefficient is much smaller and less significant in the short-term debt 
equations, a result not inconsistent with (though weaker than) that obtained by Song 
(2005) who found that non-debt tax shields are complements or unrelated to short- 
term finance. 
7.4.2 Control Variables 
Asset tangibility is uniformly signed negative and significant. As noted earlier, this 
is consistent with Grossman and Hart's (1983) argument that firms with fewer 
tangible assets may voluntarily choose high leverage to prevent managers from 
consuming excessive perquisites. This could also be related to the effect of 
collateral on non-debt tax shields: the tangibility variable could be picking up some 
effects of non-debt tax shields on leverage and therefore be signed negative. Asset 
intangibility has generally unexpected positive signs, except in one of the short- 
term debt equations. As discussed in the previous chapter, a possible explanation is 
that intangibility may serve as an indicator of growth prospects. Consistent with the 
pecking order theory, high growth firms would choose long-term borrowing relative 
to equity when retained earnings are exhausted. 
The growth opportunities variable is positively signed and significant for all but the 
short-term debt ratios. As noted earlier this is consistent with a version of pecking 
order theory. High growth firms with more investment opportunities 
(holding 
profitability fixed) are more likely to exhaust their retained earnings and eventually 
consider external financing. If external 
finance is considered, managers prefer debt 
to equity, which implies a positive correlation 
between growth and leverage. The 
significant positive estimate of the growth attribute 
in the long-term debt equation 
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may also imply that, since growth opportunities add value to a firm, they increase 
the firm's debt capacity and thus the leverage ratio. However,, this increase in firm 
value cannot be reflected in the firm's book ratios (Titman and Wessels, 1988). The 
negative signs in the short-term debt equations are more consistent with the tax- 
based trade-off theories. The estimated coefficients on profitabilitJ7 are negative and 
significant for all debt ratios. This too is consistent with pecking order theory: finns 
prefer to use internal funds generated by profits to finance their investment over 
external funds. Thus, with investment and dividends fixed, more profitable firms 
should be less levered. 
The coefficients on liquidity have significant negative signs for total debt and short- 
term debt, which lend support to the pecking order view that firms use liquid assets 
to finance their investment to avoid increasing leverage. However, one of the long- 
term debt equations has a positive sign, providing a little evidence that shareholders 
may prefer to see higher long-term debt ratios in more liquid firms so as to reduce 
free cash flows and tie managers to specific projects. Management could evade 
shareholder control by financing less profitable projects using internal funds, which 
are subject to a minimum of external monitoring (Jensen, 1986). 
Firm size is positively related to leverage for all debt ratios. This is consistent with 
the trade-off view that larger firms are usually more mature and diversified and 
therefore face lower agency costs of debt. They are able to borrow more debt than 
smaller firms without encountering financial distress. Conversely, the coefficients 
on volatility are uniformly negative, in line with the view that high-volatility firms 
have greater bankruptcy risk and therefore less debt. The coefficients on the 
dividend dumm are all positive and significant, which is consistent with the y 
signalling model and with the empirical results of Graham (1999). The industry 
dummy varies in sign and significance. Negative signs 
in the long-term debt 
equations are consistent with Titman and Wessels' 
(1988) argument that 
manufacturing firms use less debt than non-manufacturing 
firms; but the signs in the 
short-term debt equations are positive, suggesting 
that there may be more use of 
short-term finance in manufacturing. 
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Finally, the term spread is signed negative, as expected, but there are only 
differences of magnitude and not of sign between short- and long-term debt. The 
results provide strong evidence for the market timing hypothesis that firms use 
more equity financing to take advantage of the rising stock price during economic 
expansions. 
7.4.3 Comparison between the Hausman-Taylor and the Arellano-Bover Estimates 
The Hausman-Taylor (198 1) and the Arellano-Bover (1995) esimates show 
consistent signs in most of the estimated variables. Some of the insignificant 
variables in the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimation turn significant when applying 
the Arellano-Bover (1995) GMM estimator, such as volatility in both long-term and 
short-ten-n debt equations, and growth opportunities, size, dividend dummy and term 
spread in short-term equations. However, regarding some of the regressors such as 
effective tax rates, non-debt tax shields and tangibility, there are substantial 
quantitative and qualitative differences between the two estimates for long-term and 
short-term debt ratios. 
It is interesting to find that the estimated coefficients on non-debt tax shields and 
tangibility from the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator are consistent with those 
obtained by others who have explicitly studied models of long- and short-term 
leverage. The non-debt tax shields variable has a significant negative effect on long- 
term debt ratios and a positive but less robust impact on short-term debt ratios. The 
results are consistent with the findings of Song (2005). Tangibility is positively 
related to long-term debt and negatively related to short-term 
debt, which is in line 
with the results of Van Der Wijst and Thurik (1993), 
Chittenden et al. (1996), 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002), and Hall et al. (2004). On the other 
hand, the Arellano- 
Bover (1995) GMM estimates emphasize more the similarities for the two variables 
rather than the difference between long-term and short-term 
financing. 
One possible explanation for this is that all the previous 
studies mentioned above 
apply pooled OLS or fixed effects regressions, 
as does the Hausman-Taylor (1981) 
approach, which do not take account of 
the possible correlation between the 
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idiosyncratic error term and some of the explanatory variables in the model. Using 
the GMM estimator with valid instruments applied to control for all forms of 
endogeneity which may be relevant may give rise to the change in some of the 
estimated results. It is argued, therefore, choosin2 aDDroDriate (-, -, timqflnn 
approaches is of great importance when analysing the determinants of different 
forms of financing. 
7.4.4 Size of Tax Effects 
Again I calculate the impact on different components of debt of a 10% (1000 basis 
point) increase in the rate of corporate profits tax in each country based on 2004 tax 
systems and tax rates, assuming no change in other rates (including imputation 
rates). However, since the estimated coefficients on long-term debt ratios are 
generally insignificant, I focus only on the short-term debt ratios. 
Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 show the estimated tax effects on short-term debt ratios 
based on the Hausman-Taylor (198 1) and Arellano-Bover (1995) estimates 
respectively. The estimated tax effects on firms' short-term leverage ratios vary 
significantly among different countries but are larger than those estimated for the 
leverage ratios at the aggregate level. The results provide strong support for Gordon 
and Lee (2001), who find that short-term debt exhibits greater responsiveness to 
taxes. Comparing the results based on two estimators, this suggests that takin i g into 
account the more general form of endogeneity significantly reduces the estimated 
size of corporate tax changes. Focusing on the results based on the GMM estimates, 
the narrower short-term leverage definition (STD2) ranges from a maximum of 
12.46% (UK) to a minimum of 0.44% (Ireland). However, the apparently larger tax 
effects appear just in those countries with imputation tax systems (France, Spain and 
UK). As noted earlier, this may be due to the assumption of an unchanged 
imputation rate when I calculate the impact of corporate tax rate changes. The 
exceptionally high estimated change in the UK may also 
be attributable to the low 
average short-term leverage level. Excluding the three countries with 
imputation 
systems, the highest estimated changes appear 
in Belgium (2.62%) and Netherlands 
(2.19%), leaving the rest of the sample countries with a change of less than 2%. 
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Table 7.6 Effect of a 10% increase in the corporate profits tax rate on short- 
term debt ratios based on the Hausman-Taylor estimates 
STDI STD2 
Country 
mean 
Estimated 
Change 
Country 
mean 
Estimated 
Change 
Belgium 9.22 3.64 12.78 5.29 
France 8.23 6.70 13.01 9.22 
Germany 8.42 2.81 14.88 3.18 
Greece 12.21 2.08 17.25 2.80 
Ireland 7.81 0.71 12.76 0.88 
Italy 9.45 2.84 16.33 3.14 
Netherlands 7.72 3.56 13.05 4.26 
Portugal 7.62 2.34 13.55 2.62 
Spain 7.89 7.36 11.17 10.94 
Sweden 8.20 2.24 11.66 3.01 
UK 4.74 12.84 7.13 18.21 
Notes: 
The table shows the effects of a 10% (1000 basis points) increase in the rate of corporate 
profits tax with no change in other rates including imputation rates. These calculations are 
based on 2004 rates of tax and tax systems in place at that time. 
Table 7.7 Effect of a 10% increase in the corporate profits tax rate on short- 
term debt ratios based on the GMM estimates 
STD1 STD2 
Country 
mean 
Estimated 
Change 
Country 
mean 
Estimated 
Change 
Belgium 9.22 2.00 12.78 2.62 
France 8.23 5.82 13.01 6.86 
Germany 8.42 1.47 14.88 1.51 
Greece 12.21 0.71 17.25 0.88 
Ireland 7.81 0.39 12.76 0.44 
Italy 9.45 0.98 16.33 0.98 
_ Netherlands 
al tu P 
7.72 
62 7 
2.03 
1.16 
13.05 
13.55 
2.19 
1.18 
g or . 
Spain 
Sweden 
7.89 
8.20 
5.36 
0.77 
11.17 
11.66 
6.99 
0.94 
46 12 
UK 4.74 10.11 
7.13 . 
Notes: 
The table shows the effects of a 10% (1000 
basis points) increase in the rate of corporate 
profits tax with no change 
in other rates including imputation rates. 
These calculations are 
based on 2004 rates of tax and tax systems 
in place at that time. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
In the previous chapter, I have studied the impact of tax policy on the financial 
decisions of non-financial companies from 11 European countries within an ad 
hoc model of leverage. By applying five different measures of leverage at the 
aggregate level in separate regressions, significant and consistent impacts of tax 
changes have been uncovered, which confirms the robustness of the underlying 
model. 
In this chapter, I extend the analysis by dividing the total debt into short-term and 
long-term debt. Different debt ratios based on individual components of debt 
structure have been applied to test the relation of each of the elements to the 
explanatory variables. Consistent with the previous chapter, both the Hausman- 
Taylor (1981) and the Arellano-Bover (1995) GMM estimators are applied. The 
two estimators generate significantly different results for some of the control 
variables, which re-confirms the importance of using appropriate estimation 
techniques. 
The results for the control variables again provide rather more support for pecking 
order theories than for trade-off theories and I find evidence of substantial 
differences between the determinants of long-ten-n and short-term financing 
decisions. For tax variables, estimates suggest that the main impact of taxes is on 
short-term debt, with long-term borrowings less influenced by taxation. After taking 
account of the possible correlation between the explanatory variables and the 
idiosyncratic error term in the estimated model, the effective tax rate is significant 
and positively signed in all but the short-term 
debt equation, a finding in which I 
can have confidence given that this variable 
is instrumented in the estimation 
procedure. The sign pattern and significance of non-debt 
tax shields in all the 
equations provide important new evidence 
in support of the DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) argument that tax shelters are substitutes 
for one another and that firms will 
generally prefer non-debt tax shelters over 
debt ceteris paribus. A relatively larger 
effect of taxes is found on short-term 
debt than on total debt, which is in line with 
Gordon and Lee's (2001) conclusion that short-term 
debt is easier to adjust in 
response to year-to-year tax rate 
fluctuations. The results also suggest that the 
187 
analysis of aggregate leverage ratios provides only part of the story. A 
disaggregation analysis of all forms of corporate debt is required for a better 
understanding, of capital structure and its determinants. 
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Appendix 7.1 Estimates using King's Tax Ratios based on the Top Bracket Tax Rates 
Table A 7.1.1 Hausman-Taylor estimates 
LR3 LR4 LTDI LTD2 STDI STD2 
Exogenous: tax 
TXDVE 0.0413* 
(0.0226) 
TXDVR 
............. -0.044 (0.0177) 
Endogenous: tax 
0*0010 
(0-003 F 
NDTS 
-0.2307 ------------------- - (0.1439' 
Endogenous 
-0.0192 - ........... - (0.0317) 
0.1671 *** 
(0.0303) 
0.0027*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.6028*** - I.. --- ................... . -1- (0.0499) 
-0.0116*** ........... - ............................ (0.0037) 
0.0393*** 
(0.00 
-0.1433 
(0.0960) 
0.0506*** 
(0.0120). 
-0.0072 
(0.0253) 
-0.0058*** ---- ............. -- ............. (0.0018). 
0.1002*** -0.0009 
(0.0322) (0.0204) 
-0.0790*** -0.0433*** 
(0.0250) (0.0160) 
(0.0045) 
-0.3907* 
(0.2097) 
0.0006 
(0.0028) 
-0.3312** ............... ............ (0.1318) 
-0.0468 - .............................. (0.0461) 
0.1570*** 
(0.0438) 
0.0094*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.9340*** 
(0.0725) 
-0.0240*** ................. (0.0053) 
0.0715*** 
-- ............... (0.0058) 
-0.2685* 
(0.1396) 
0.0703*** 
(0.0175) 
-0.0083 . I. -I-I... 1--l ................ -- I (0.0328) 
-0.0070*** 
(0.0026) 
0.1069*** 
............................. - ........... I (0.0290) 
0.2503*** 
(0.0276) 
0.0029*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.3979*** 
(0.0456) 
0.0276*** 
.......................... (0.0033) 
0.0353*** 
- ................... ............. (0.0037) 
-0.0594 
(0.0878) 
0.0342*** 
(0.0110) 
-0.0321 -- .......... (0.0218) 
-0.0035** -- ---------- (0.0016) 
0.0070 
(0.0298) 
-0.0634*** 
(0.0231) 
0.0037 
(0.0042) 
-0.4420** 
(0.1961) 
0.1499*** 
................... '.. - .-.......... (0.0431) 
0.3077*** 
(0.0 
0.0098*** 
(0-0009) 
-0.6518*** ...... . .... . ....... --- --- (0.0677) 
0.0354*** 
(0.0050) 
0.0621 *** 
I. -I ý11.1111-11 I .................. ... (0.0054) 
-0.1365 
(0.1 
0.0528*** 
(0.0164) 
-0.0447 
(0.029,21) 
-0.0041 
(0.0024) 
0.0413*** 413*** 0.0905*** 
(0.0127) (0.0193) 
-0.0022 -0.0174 
(0.0097) (0.0146) 
(0.0019 
(0.0882 
0.0012_ 
0.0022L 
0.0662 
0.1346) 
-0.1239*** 
(0.0193) 
-0.0759*** 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.2001 
(0.0303) 
-0.0390*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0025 
............ -.. ýII.. '', (0.0023) 
-0.0824 
(0.0585) 
0.0159** 
(0.0073) 
0.0247** 
................................ (0.0107) 
-0.002 1* 
(0.0011) 
-0.1951 *** 
(0.0295) 
-0.1436*** 
(0.0274) 
-0.0004 
(0.0006) 
-0.2782*** 
(0.0462) 
-0.0591 
(0.0034) 
0.0080** 
(0.0035) 
-0.1297 
(0.0892) 
0-0ý71 
(0.0112) 
0.0362** 
(0.0160) 
(0.0017) 
Notes: The standard errors are snown in 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<O. l 
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Table A 7.1.2 GMM estimates 
L: : R3: LR3 LR4 LTDI L 7T D72 ............... ... ... STDI STD2 
EXOgenous: tax 
TXDVE 0.0316*** 0.0773*** -0-0107 -0- . 00ý451 - 
0.0447* 0.0827*** 
(0-0112) (0.0161) (0-0079) 0.013o) (0.0046) (0.00 TXDVR 
-0.0354*** -0.0758*** -0-0062 -0.0248** -0.0246*** -0.0492*** (0.0118) (0.0134) (0-0083) (0.0110) (0-0040) (0-005 151 Endogenous: tax 
TAXR 0.0105*** 0.0075*** 0.0124*** 0.0116*** -0.0029*** -0.00" 1 (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0-0009) (0-0013) 
NDTS 
-0.2497*** -0.5313*** -0.1762*** -0.3438*** -0.1127** -0.1654** (0.0722) (0.1136) (0.0527) (0.1040) (0.0525) (0.0778) 
Endogenous 
TAN 
-0.0402** -0.16-")1*** -0.0586*** -0.1355*** -0.0071 -0.0660*** 
(0.0194) (0.0361) (0.0145) (0.0205) (0.0088) (0.0132) 
INTAN 1) 0. _3704*** 0.4201 0.3591 0.4530*** 0.0190** -0-0296** 
(0.0188) (0.0246) (0.0125) (0.0229) (0.0082) (0.0134) 
GROW 0.0019*** 0.0062*** 0.0024*** 0.0085*** -0.0006*** -0.0023*** 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
PROF -0.2948*** -0.5012*** -0.2471*** -0.4859*** -0.0344*** -0.0426** 
(0.0275) (0.0441) (0.0206) (0.0304) (0.0115) (0.0213) 
LIQD -0.0130*** .......... -1-1-- --- ý .......... -0.0305*** 
0.0033*** 
........... -0.0049*** -0.0147*** -0.0261 (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
Exogenous 
SIZE 0.0164*** 
---------- 
0.0297*** 0.0098*** 0.0179*** 0.0065*** 0.0122*** 
(0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
VOLA 
.......... -0.2613*** ........... -0.4201*** -0.0759*** .......... I ........... __ . --_ ............... -0.1484*** .. -0-1559*** -0.2380*** ................. (0.0278) (0.0439) (0.0279) (0.0439) (0.0128) (0.0207) 
NODIV 0.0440*** 
. - - 
0.0730*** 0.0303*** 
................. 
0.0507*** 
.......... .......... - 
0.0216*** 0.0272*** 
0 0 044) (0.0071) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0021) (0.0037) 
IND -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0017** -0.0021 0.0017*** 0.0025** 
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0-0010) 
TERM -0.0034*** .......... . ... -0.0030*** ...... -0.0024*** ............ 
-0.0016** -0.0018*** -0.0023*** 
.......... - (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
J Test 
- .. . -1 - 
113.3956 
....... ... ................. -...... .... . 
114.4941 
............ 
125.0779 
....................... 
118.5886 
........................... . 
114.7207 
........... .. 
1 1_9-. 1- 15 
b Z2 4 Ipr 0 ( 1j [0.4984] 1 [0.4694] [0.2251] [0.36551 [0.4634] [0.3529] 
II 
ýF'I_ - A_-A ý ol, -Il ;, Thf- P-vqliie,; for J tests are shown in I'NoleS: I IIC NLaIlUalu 
square brackets. 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<O. 
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Chapter 8 The Dynamics of Corporate Capital Structure 
8.1 Introduction 
Recent surveys conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001), and Brounen, De Jong 
and Koedijk (2004) argue that firms do seek a target debt-equity ratio. In the static 
framework, the observed leverage ratios are used as proxies for firmsý target levels. 
Most existing empirical research suffers from criticism for making this assumption 
because firms may temporarily deviate from their target capital structure due to 
shocks or random changes. In the presence of adjustment costs, firms may gradually 
adjust towards the target. Hence, the observed capital structure of a firm is actually 
the result of trading off the costs and benefits of moving towards the underlying 
target capital structure which however may be determined by firm-specific and also 
macroeconomic factors. 
Capital structure theories do not propose to explain the observed differences in 
leverage ratios, but rather the differences in the optimal debt ratios across firms 
(Heshmati. 2002). Several researchers have recognized the importance of employing 
a dynamic approach to study firms' financial decisions. In some early papers, the 
optimal debt level is exogenously determined either in terms of historical data or by 
an adjustment process with lags of more than one year. Fischer et al. (1989) use the 
observed range within which the firm allows its debt ratio to vary as an empirical 
measure of target capital structure and identify the characteristics of firms which 
display larger swings in debt ratios. An earlier paper by Jalilvand and Harris (1984) 
characterizes firms" financial behaviour as partial adjustments to a long-term 
financial target which is measured as the average of the actual ratios over the entire 
estimation period. This proxy for target leverage is also adopted by some more 
recent researchers including Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and Fama and 
French (2002). 
In the recent literature on the dynamics of capital structure 
decisions, a new 
approach endogenizing the target debt ratio 
is widely adopted. The target level is not 
determined externally as in the previous studies, but is included 
in the model as a 
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linear function of the determinants of capital structure such as firm characteristics. 
The GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (199 1) is applied to obtain the 
coefficients on both the lagged debt ratio and the determinants of target leverage. 
Key contributions include De Miguel and Pindado (2001) using Spanish finn data 
and Ozkan (2001) for UK companies. Gaud et al. (2005) and Drobetz and Fix (2005) 
also apply this approach for Swiss data. It is crucial to note that all the studies 
mentioned above estimate a constant speed of adjustment coefficient and do not 
shed any light on the factors that determine the adjustment process to the target 
leverage ratio. 
Banerj ee et al. (1999) are the first to simultaneously endogenize both the adjustment 
factors and firms' target debt ratios. They not only identify the determinants of 
target leverage ratios, but also estimate the speed of moving towards the target 
capital structure and identify the determinants of adjustment speed. In their model, 
they allow the adjustment coefficients to vary across firms as well as over time for 
the same firm and hypothesize that their values are dependent on three factors: the 
absolute difference between the observed and target debt ratios, the firm size, and 
growth opportunities. A non-linear least squares approach is applied to estimate the 
parameters. They find that firms with higher growth opportunities are more ready to 
adjust leverage towards target. This is as expected, because a growing firm can 
change its capital structure more easily by altering the composition of the new 
capital raised. Also, the estimation results show that the deviation from target 
leverage ratios and increase in the size of firms decreases the speed of adjustment. 
Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) further develop the model suggested by Banerjee et 
al. (1999) by combining the partial adjustment model and the linear specification of 
the speed of adjustment into one estimation equation and then applying the 
difference GMM estimator. This approach allows them to obtain the coefficients on 
lagged ratios, the determinants of target leverage and the determinants of adjustment 
speed simultaneously. Moreover, Banerjee et al. (1999) 
have argued that economy- 
wide factors should have an impact on the speed of adjustment, and 
they use time 
dummies to capture these factors in a simplistic way. Drobetz and Wanzenried 
(2006) include several macro economic factors instead, to capture the stage of the 
business cycle of firms. The positive relationship between growth opportunities and 
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adjustment speed is re-confirmed. A statistically weak positive correlation is 
revealed between the speed of adjustment and the difference between the target and 
observed leverage. However, the results for the impact of firm size on firms' 
adjustment decisions are quite mixed. 
In this chapter, I adopt the dynamic adjustment model widely used in previous 
studies (such as Ozkan, 2001-1 De Miguel and Pindado, 2001) to allow for the 
existence of adjustment costs and examine the determinants, both tax variables and 
control variables, of a time-varying optimal capital structure. 
Consistent with previous empirical chapters, I report the estimates using the King's 
tax ratios calculated based on the top tax rates in the text, with those obtained by 
using the top bracket tax rates presented in Appendix 8.1 for the record. 
8.2 Dynamic Model with Constant Adjustment Coefficients 
8.2.1 Empirical variables in the Model 
As discussed in previous chapters, the target leverage ratio for a firm may depend 
on various explanatory variables, including firm specific variables (tangibility, 
intangibility, size, growth opportunities, profitability, liquidity, volatility, and 
dividend dummy), tax variables (non-debt tax shields, effective tax rates, and King's 
tax ratios), and also the economy-wide factor (term spread) used to capture macro- 
economic conditions across countries. 
8.2.2 Model and Estimation Procedures 
The target debt level for a finn can be expressed as 
x,,, 8 + u, 
where u,, p, + v,, and IID(O, o7,, 
2), vi, - IID(O, 
With adjustment costs, firms do not reach the target 
leverage ratio immediately but 
take appropriate steps following a target adjustment model: 
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ý)jj = a(Y, *, - Yl't-I 
ý< 
(8.2) 
where y,, and y,,, _, are 
the actual leverage ratios in the current and previous period 
respectively, and y, is the firm's target ratio. 
Adjustment costs are measured by the coefficient a. If there is no adjustment cost, 
i. e. a then y, = y, , which implies that the actual debt level adjusts to the 
target level instantaneously. On the other hand, if a=0, then y,, = y,., -, , which 
means the adjustment costs are sufficiently large that in comparison the costs of 
being in disequilibrium are negligible and the firm chooses to remain at the debt 
level of the previous period. In practice, we expect the value of a to be between 0 
and 1. Finns adjust their leverage in a way that is inversely proportional to the level 
of adjustment costs. The larger are the adjustment costs, the slower will be the 
adjustment towards the target even if a firm recognises that its existing debt level is 
not optimal. 
Re-arranging (8.2) we get 
y, l = ay,, + 
(8.3) 
Substituting (8.1) into (8.3) we get the dynamic leverage equation to be estimated: 
, a, 8 + pi + vi, (8.4) Yit 0- a)yi"-, + x/I 
where u, is the'firm-specific effect and v,, is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Note that this formulation assumes that the adjustment process is deterministic and 
only the equilibrium relationship in (8.1) is stochastic. 
The model with lagged adjustment in the debt ratios is used to estimate 
both the 
aggregate and the long- and short-term leverage ratios. 
The estimation is carried out using the 
GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). First, all the variables are fully transformed 
by the orthogonal 
deviations filter proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) using: 
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i7 
)][T-t 
T-, +l 
(x" +Xi, t+l +--. +x T-i+2_ t =: 2,3,.... T (8.5) 
This transfon-nation implies that if the idiosyncratic error term v,, is serially 
uncorrelated, the transformed error term v, will have the same property and be 
uncorrelated with all the right-hand side variables of the period t-s, for s>2. 
Therefore, all the second and longer lags of the right-hand side (endogenous) 
variables of the model are valid instruments. 
The feature of the Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator of central interest is the 
set of internal instruments built from past observations of the instrumented variables. 
The instrument count can easily grow large relative to the sample size as T rises. 
Therefore, the estimator can generate moment conditions prolifically, especially 
when T is large. Roodman (2007) concludes that too many instruments can overfit 
endogenous variables and fail to remove their endogenous components, biasing the 
estimated coefficients towards those from uninstrumented estimators. Also, a high 
count of instruments can weaken the Sargan/Hansen test and generate implausibly 
good p values of 1.0000 (Bowsher, 2002). 
However, the literature provides little guidance on how many instruments is too 
many in real world samples (Ruud, 2000). A minimally arbitrary rule of thumb is 
that instruments should not outnumber individuals in the panel. In choosing the 
instruments, I follow the standard method of including every regressor in the 
instrument matrix. However, due to the relatively long sample period of 13 years, I 
limit the number of instruments by using only one lag for each variable during each 
period rather than using all valid longer lags. The second lags of the dependent 
variable and the other endogenous variables as well as the contemporaneous values 
of all exogenous variables are included in the instrument set. Consistent with the 
estimation of static models in previous chapters, I treat tangibility, intangibility, 
growth, profitability, liquidity, non-debt tax shields and effective tax rate as 
endogenous, because of the appearance of a balance sheet aggregate 
in the 
denominator of these variables. 
195 
The instrument matrix is 
[Yjl, 
M 
[Vi2 
DMf1 zi = 
Mi P, 71-1 ý 'Wý, i 
f, 
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where the rows correspond to the transformed equations for t of firm i. 
m,, are endogenous regressors and i4ýj, are strictly exogenous regressors with 
E(w, 1,,, =0 for all t, s=1,2,..., T. The moment equations are given by 
E(ZI77, )0 where ý', is the transformed idiosyncratic error ten-n. 
To check for potential misspecification of the model, four test statistics are reported. 
First, I report two Arellano-Bond tests for serial autocorrelation. The first F statistic 
(m, ) tests for first order autocorrelation of first-differenced residuals under the null 
of no serial correlation. Negative first-order serial correlation is expected since Av, 
is mathematically related to Av,,, -, via 
the shared term v,,, -, . 
The second F statistic 
(M2) tests for lack of second order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals 
under the null of no second-order serial correlation. The third test statistic is a Wald 
test of joint significance of all the estimated coefficients on the determinants of the 
target debt ratio. Finally, the Hansen test of over- identifying restrictions is applied. 
The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between the instruments and the 
transformed error term, which means the selected instruments are valid. I also report 
the number of instruments applied in each equation. Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 show 
the misspecification test statistics. 
All the test statistics for first-order serial correlation are negative and significant, as 
expected. The tests for second order auto -correlation are negative and insignificant 
for the aggregate leverage ratios and the long-term debt ratios. However, the test 
statistics are positive and significant at 5 percent level 
for short-term leverage 
measures. The Wald test statistics for the joint significance of explanatory variables 
of target debt function are significant at I percent 
level in all specifications. The 
Hansen tests for all estimated equations are insignificant, which 
implies that the 
variables used as instruments 
in the GMM estimation are appropriate. 
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Table 8.1 Specification test - aggregate leveralle ratios 
Statistics LRI LR2 LR3 -LR4 LR5 
No. of instruments 94 94 94 94 94 
V-order correlation -5.34 -5.94 -5.71 -6-04 -5.62 
order eorrellaýt-i-on -z 
[0.000] 
-0.88 
[0-000] 
-0.20 
[0.000] 
-0.42 
[0.000] 
-0.57 
[0.000] 
-1.03 
[0.378] [0.840] [0.676] [0.625] [0.305] 
Wald test Ooint) 
............. . ........... ...... 
Z(I 3) 
..... ........... .......... 
65.96 
............ ... ...... - 
57.85 62.77 110.44 118.51 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Hansen test Z(80) 76.25 90.88 87.80 96.25 89.48 
[0.598] [0.190] [0.2581 [0.104] [0.220] 
rNotes: Y-vajues are snown in square brackets. 
Table 8.2 Specification test - long-term and short-term debt ratios 
Statistics LTDI LTD2 STDI STD2 
No. of instruments 94 94 94 94 
I't-order correlation -5.08 
..... ...................................................... [0.000] 
-5.50 
. ................................... I ............. ..... [0.000] 
-5.89 
............ .......... [0.000] 
-6.17 
[0.000] 
2 nd order correlation -0.36 -0.64 2.11 2.32 
[0.7171 [0.5091 [0.034] [0.021] 
Wald test Ooint) 
................ 
Zý(I 3) 
............ 
33.68 
I ............ [0.001] 
107.84 
........... -- -- --- ............. [0.000] 
38.55 
...... [0.000] 
46.18 
[0.000] 
Hansen test 
............. - ............... ................................... 
Z(80) 
.................. ..................... ............. 
79.28 
................... I ................... [0.502] 
78.50 
- .......... [0.526] 
91.91 
................... I ....................... [0.1711 
91.57 
...................................... I ........... [0.1771 
_ Notes: P-values are shown in square brackets. 
One possible way to deal with second order serial correlation for short-term debt 
ratios is suggested by Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006). They include the second 
lag of the dependent variable as an additional explanatory variable, which 
successfully removes the second order correlation. However, 
I still use the first- 
order adjustment model for short-term debt ratios 
for several reasons. First, the 
inclusion of the additional variable is to accomplish a statistical requirement 
which guarantees consistent parameter estimates. 
However, this is arbitrary and it 
is not clear how it would be interpreted. 
Second, the purpose of this test is to 
confirm the validity of YQ-2 as 
instruments because Y, 
_, -2 
will be uncorrelated 
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with A,,,, as long as v,,, themselves are not serially correlated. 
However, the Hansen test has proved that the instruments applied to short-term 
debt equations are uncorrelated with the transformed error term and thus are valid 
instruments. Third, the standard dynamic capital structure model is the first-order 
model. Adding an extra lag of short-term debt ratios results in more parameters to 
be estimated and fewer valid instruments and this may affect the estimates, 
especially in a relatively small sample. To conclude, I would argue that applying 
the same model and estimation strategy as used for total and long-term debt ratios 
on short-term debt will also generate consistent estimates and is the best choice for 
the present analysis. 
8.2.3 Empirical Results 
The estimated results using King's tax ratios based on the top tax rates are shown 
in Table 8.3 for aggregate leverage ratios and Table 8.4 for long-term and short- 
term debt ratios. The model is re-estimated using instead the rates applicable at the 
top income bracket, and the qualitative results obtained are essentially the same. 
These results are reported in Appendix 8.1 for the record. Most of the estimates 
have signs consistent with the results from the static model. However, the 
magnitudes and significance are different. The inclusion of dynamics into the 
model removes quite a lot of the impact of explanatory variables and fewer 
variables are significant. 
The coefficients on the adjustment factor (I - cr) are positive and significant across 
all equations which imply that firms do bear transaction costs when they decide to 
adjust the leverage of the previous period to the target level in the current period. 
For long-term and short-term debts, the coefficients 
(I 
- a) on lagged long-term debt 
ratios are smaller than those on the corresponding lagged short-term 
leverage ratios. 
The speed of adjustment (a ) is higher for long-term debt, which suggests that 
it is 
relatively easier for firms to adjust their long-term 
borrowing than short-term 
borrowing. This could be due to different attributes of long-term and short-term debt. 
Diamond (1991) argues that "Short-terin debt matures before the cash 
flows arrive 
from a firm's investments and must be refinanced at terms 
that depend on its future 
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credit rating" (p. 709). It is also argued that short-term debt is not used to finance 
assets, but to finance management. Firms are more likely to issue short-tenn debt 
when market or firm-specific conditions change and firms are in urgent needs of 
funds to cover operating costs. However, short-term debt may create liquidity risk 
since if the borrower is unable to refinance, the lender liquidates. Therefore, short- 
term debt is associated with higher adjustment costs. On the other hand, the value of 
the short-term debt account is very important when determining a company's 
financial health and managers would be very careful about their short-term 
borrowing decisions and may be reluctant to incur short-term debt even when they 
can do so. Therefore,, the adjustment of short-term debt level is relatively inert and 
slow. 
With regard to the determinants of aggregate leverage ratios, the estimated 
coefficients on King's tax ratios are consistent with the results in static models and 
are generally significant. The results do provide some support for the argument that 
tax policies have an impact on firms' debt decisions, even after accounting for the 
adjustment cost. The estimates on non-debt tax shields are all negative but 
insignificant, suggesting no significant substitution effect between tax shelters. 
However, it is quite possible some effects of non-debt tax shields on leverage are 
picked up by the tangibility variable. Finally, the estimated coefficients on effective 
tax rate are insignificant. 
Fewer control variables are significant. The significant firm-specific variables are 
tangibility, intangibility, size, profitability, liquidity and volatility. Their signs are 
consistent with those obtained in Chapter 6 except the intangibility variable. 
The 
negative coefficients on intangibility contradict the results in static models, 
but 
provide support for the generally accepted view that asset 
intangibility measures a 
company's inability to secure its debt and thus should 
have a negative impact on 
firm leverage. The macroeconomic variable term spread is negatively correlated 
with leverage as expected and strongly significant 
for LR3 and LR4, which suggests 
that the impact of macroeconomic factors is mainly on 
firms' total debt. Growth 
opportunities and dividend dummy show no significant 
effects on leverage ratios. 
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Table 8.3 Arellano-Bond GMM estimates - aggregate leverage ratios 
LRI LR2 LR3 LR4 LR5 
LR 
Lt. 
. 
5777*** 
............. .............. .......... 
0.6684*** 
. ....... -11 1 ............ I ........... 
0.6288*** 
I .......... .. -. 1.1--l -. 1-1--l" 
0.5893*** 
.1............ I .................. ........ .. 
0.5573*** 
(0.0735) (0.0731) (0.0758) (0.0588) (0.0632) 
TAN -0.4958*** -0.2996*** -0.2720** . ......... -0.4290** -0.5057*** (0.1424) (0.1089) (0.1159) (0.1681) (0.1695) 
INTAN -0.3025*** -0.2119** -0.1214 -0.2462* -0.3717*** 
(0.1020) (0.0830) (0.0766) (0.1318) (0.1216) 
SIZE 0.0384** 0.0326*** 0.0291 0.0512*** 0.0542*** 
(0.0166) (0.0120) (0.0093) (0.0189) (0.0189) 
GROW 0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0046** 0.0033** 
(0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0017) 
PROF 
. ......... -0.3530*** -0.2534** -0.2596** -0.6770*** -0.5710*** (0.1167) (0.1219) (0.1274) (0.1557) (0.1428) 
LIQD -0.0327*** -0.0207*** ------------ ---------- -0.0174** .... ....... .. - l. '-.... ---. - -. -0.0237** ... ..... -0.0324*** (0.0095) (0.0073) (0.0078) (0.0114) (0.0102) 
VOLA 
..... .. . -0.0930 ................... .................. -0.3716** .............. ........... - ................................ 
-0.2952** ... - .............................. -0... 
5.381** 
.... ........... 
0..... 4_3.7 1 
. . (0.1345) (0.1485) (0.1491) (0.2402) (0.1888) 
NDTS 0.0038 -0.2838 ............. ............ 
-0.2491 -0.0692 ........ .. -0.0761 (0.3462) (0.2727) (0.2660) (0.4474) (0.4075) 
TAXR 0.0165 0.0043 -0.0051 -0.0148 0.0060, 
(0.0105) (0.. 0107) (0.0083) (0.0154) (0.0127) 
TXDVR -0.0611 -0.0498* ................. -0.0464** ............. ............ - 
-0.0711 1-1-1111-1-11----- ............ 
-0.0626** 
................ ...... . .... ... .-- ( .. 0.. . 
.. 0.. 261 (0.0259) ý(0.0227) (0.0331) (0.0319) 
TXDVE 0.0736** 0.0465 0.0280 0.0579 0.018ý46*, *- 
11 0.0 33 1 7) (0.0294) (0.0282) (0.0486) (0.0425) 
NODIV 0.0089 -0.0044 -0.0069 -0.0106 
0.0019 
00- 166) (0.0165) (0.0157) (0.0250) (0.0218) 
TERM -0.0013 -0.0037** -0.0054*** -0.0072*** -0'.. 
0043*,. 
- ............ ................. ........................... .... (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0023) 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***p<o. ol; **p<0.05; *p<O. l 
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Table 8.4 Arellano-Bond GMM estimates-long-term and short-term debt ratios 
LTDI LTD2 STDI STD2 
LTD STD 
0.5239*** 0.4819*** Ll. 0.5975*** 0.5440*** 
0 1020) (0.0820) (0.0700) (0.0632) 
TAN -0.3049** -0.4565** TAN -0.0047 -0.0505 
(0 1333 0) (0.1835) (0.0411) 
- 
(0.0676) 
INTAN -0.1363 -0.3262** ..................... 
INTAN 0.0146 0.0290 
(0.0837) (0.1482) (0.0466) (0.0785) 
SIZE 0.0340*** 0.0635*** SIZE 0.0007 0.0001 
(0.0097) (0.0192) (0.0037) (0.0073) 
GROW 0.0008 0.0071*** 
.......... . 
GROW 
............. -0.0008 -0.0022*** ............... -1.1 -. (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0006) 1.1-11 (0.0008) 
PROF 
............... -0.3782*** ................. - ........... -0.9400*** .............. ..................................................... 
PROF 
.......................... 
0.0685 
.............. II.................. ......... 
0.1400 
.-....................... - ............................. . (0.1245) (0.1694) (0.0792) (0.1388) 
LIQD -0.0070 ................ -0.0105 ................... I ............ ......... . 
LIQD 
........... I ............ .. -0.0103* ............. .......... ......... ---l- -0.0175* ll-- ............ (0.0071) (0.0111) (0.0058) (0.0090) 
VOLA -0.0596 -0.1484 VOLA -0.2182*** -0.3260*** 
(0.1410) (0.2383) (0.0736) (0.1218) 
NDTS -0.0438 ....................... - .......... ........... 
0.1823 
....................................... 
NDTS 
................. I ............ - ................. -0.1272 .... ........... ....................... I .................... 
_ 
-0.2229 I., ............................ -. 1 . ..... ..... (0.3359) (0.5457) (0.1986) (0.3184) 
TAYCR -0.0032 ....... ....... -0.0157 I ..................................... 
TAXR 
............. . ...... -0.0010 (0.0080) (0.0146) (0.0047) (0.0079) 
TXDVR -0.0424 -0.0610 TXDVR -0., 0097" -0.022_7_ 
(0.0277) (0.0403) (0.0115) (0.0196) 
TX11)VE -0.0031 . ........ -0.0080 
TXDVE 0.0312** 0.0715*** 
.......... (0.0304) (0.0504) (0.0159) (0.0264) 
NODIV 0.0019 
. ............. 
0.0069 
.......... ...................... .......... ............ 
NODIV 
............................. -0.0037 ....................... - ................................. 
-0.0083 ............... -. 1 1 ............... ...................... ............. .............. (0.0171) (0.0245) (0.0085) (0.0180) 
TERM -0.0013 -0.0011 ....... ... .. .. - . . 
TERM -0.0036*** ........... ............ -0.0053*** ....... ... - ........... .0-0.0.2., 0 0 0 0 2 9 (0.0012) (0.0019) 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<O. l 
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The estimated coefficients on explanatory variables in long-term and short-term 
debt functions show considerable differences. With regard to long-term debt ratios, 
no significant impact is obtained for King's tax ratios, suggesting that tax policy 
does not influence firms' long-term financing decisions, as obtained in static models. 
The significant control variables include tangibility, intangibility, size, growth 
opportunities and profitability. They have almost the same signs as the GMM 
estimates in the static model except for intangibility. All other explanatory variables 
in target long-tenn debt equations are insignificant. 
As for short-term debt ratios, the results imply that the decision of short-terrn 
borrowing is determined by the growth opportunities, liquidity and volatility of the 
firm as well as the tax policy (King's tax ratios) and the macroeconomic factor 
(term spread). Signs are generally the same as the GMM estimates in the static 
models. The estimated coefficients on all other explanatory variables of target short- 
term leverage are insignificant. 
To conclude, adding the lagged leverage ratio into capital structure model to allow 
for the existence of adjustment costs has reduced the significance of some of the 
explanatory variables. However, it is interesting to find that those variables which 
are commonly used in existing literature, such as size, volatility, profitability and 
liquidity, are all reasonably signed and strongly significant, and are consistent with 
the results from previous studies of dynamic capital structure (e. g. Ozkan, 2001; De 
Miguel and Pindado, 2001). Hence, I would argue that the lack of significance for 
some explanatory variables may be due to the relatively small size of my sample, 
especially when I include a wide range of tax and non-tax factors into the estimated 
model as potential determinants of firm leverage. A larger sample which provides 
more degrees of freedom in the estimation may increase the estimation efficiency 
and thus provide more insight into the understanding of the 
determinants of 
dynamic capital structure decisions. 
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8.3 The Adjustment Speed under Different Corporate Governance 
Systems 
8.3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous section, in the target adjustment model 
0a< 
the coefficient a is the speed of adjustment, which measures the adjustment costs. 
The adjustment process is a trade-off between the transaction costs of moving 
towards the target leverage ratio and the costs of deviating from equilibrium. 
Therefore, if the adjustment costs are greater than the costs of being in 
disequilibrium, the adjustment process would be very slow. For the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable, (I - a) , the greater the value, the higher the 
transaction costs, and therefore the more slowly the adjustment is made. 
Gaud et at. (2005) conclude that two main factors appear to explain the slow 
adjustment process of the debt level towards the target. The first is a purely 
mechanical reason due to a boom in the stock market. An increase in stock prices 
unaccompanied by an increase in the size of a firm's assets or in the value of the 
growth options'9 leads to a decrease in leverage. However, this argument assumes 
that leverage is measured at market value and thus not applicable to my research. 
Second, fir-ins with easy credit face a low risk premium on bank loan interest rates 
and hence may borrow more, which results in a high level of debt. Such firms often 
have above-target leverage. 
I might therefore expect that the adjustment speed of firm leverage should be quite 
different among countries due to different institutional and market characteristics. In 
the previous section, it was assumed that the speed of adjustment was constant for 
all firms in my pooled sample from II European countries. 
However, due to the 
relatively small sample size, it is not possible to estimate simultaneously 
different 
adjustment coefficients for each sample country 
in the model. Therefore, in order to 
19 The growth Options are the positive net present value opportunities 
in which the firm has not yet 
In 
invested. The value of growth options reflects the time value of 
the finn's current investment in 
real assets as well as the option value of the 
firm's potential future investments. 
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capture the dynamics of corporate financing decisions more precisely, the II 
countries were split into two sub-groups according to their corporate governance 
systems. 
Patterns of corporate governance and control differ significantly across countries. 
However. two broad categories are distinguished by Franks and Mayer (1992): the 
arm's length' market-based Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system as applied in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, and the more relational and bank-based system 
which predominates in Continental Europe. The division of sample countries also 
coincides with a parallel classification of legal systems since the UK and Ireland are 
common law countries while all Continental European countries are based on the 
civil law. As Watson (1974) argues, the common law provides individual investors 
better protection than the civil law. Therefore, firms in the UK and Ireland are under 
more pressure for their performance and they may less afford being away from their 
optimal capital structure. 
It is widely held that the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system differs 
significantly from the relation-based system (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1998; Ooghe and De Langhe, 2002; Li, 1994). First, in the Anglo- 
Saxon pattern, firms tend to have more diffused ownership. Quoted equity is held by 
a large number of institutions and individuals but there are relatively few large 
block shareholders. The reason is that a large number of companies in Anglo-Saxon 
countries are publicly traded. Also, companies in Anglo-Saxon countries tend to be 
larger than those in Continental European countries, so that block shareholdings in a 
typical Anglo-Saxon company may require more capital. However, in the 
Continental European pattern, firms have more concentrated ownership with greater 
prevalence of large block shareholders. Finns usually have close 
long-term 
relationship with banks and financial institutions, and raise most of their external 
finance from them. For example, in France and Germany, large bank and inter- 
corporate shareholdings are widespread. It can 
be argued that, as a result, firms in 
the Continental European system are more likely to 
invest with a long-term horizon. 
Second, in Anglo-Saxon countries, more companies are 
listed and their shares are 
publicly traded. This may 
be contrasted with Continental European companies 
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where fewer companies are publicly traded. Therefore, the Anglo-Saxon system is 
argued to be more liquid and this market liquidity enhances the organizational 
efficiency of firms. Shareholders have a stronger incentive to monitor management 
since any managerial failure would be punished by a fall in investor confidence and 
a declining share price. 
The Anglo-Saxon countries in my sample, especially the UK, are characterized by a 
more active market for corporate control. There are more mergers and takeovers 
compared to most Continental European countries. Due to the larger size and higher 
liquidity of stock markets, I would therefore expect firms in the UK and Ireland 
have a higher speed of adjustment towards their target capital structure. These firms 
may be much closer to their optimal capital structure at any one time than 
Continental European firms. This hypothesis can be tested by estimating separate 
adjustment speeds for the UK and Ireland. 
8.3.2 Model 
The estimation equation for debt ratios is 
y, l --: 
(I 
- al)CD, yi,, -, 
+ 
(1 
- a2)CD2 YO-l + Xit a18 + PI + vit (8.6) 
where 
I if firm i is from UK or Ireland 
CD, =0 
otherwise 
I if firm i is from any of the Continentd European countries 
CD, =0 
otherwise 
In this equation, different adjustment speeds are allowed 
for the two sub-samples by 
introducing country dummies that interact with the variables which measure 
the 
s eed of ad ustment. pi 
Consistent with the previous section, the estimation equations 
are transformed by 
orthogonal deviations proposed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995). The GMM estimator 
suggested by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) is implemented. The current values of 
strictly exogenous variables as well as 
the second laggs of the dependent variable and 
endogenous variables are used as 
instruments. 
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Tests are performed first to check for potential mi s specification of the model: the 
two Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation, the Wald test for joint significance of 
the estimated coefficients on the determinants of target debt equation, and the 
Hansen test of over-identification restrictions. The test statistics are shown in Table 
8.5 and Table 8.6. 
Table 8.5 Specification test for dynamic capital structure model with country 
dummies - aggregate leverage ratios 
Statistics LRI LR2 LR3 LR4 LR5 
No. of instruments 105 105 105 105 105 
V-order correlation z -5.15 
. 00 
-5.33 
[0.000] 
-5.52 
[0.000] 
-5.07 
[0.000] 
-4.84 
[0.000] 
2 nd order correlation z -1.05 -0.37 -0.58 -1.18 -1.34 
[0.295] [0.715] [0.559] [0.238] [0.180] 
Wald test Uoint) 
.... .... ........ ...... . ........ 
3) 33.79 
.... ........... [0.001] 
56.13 
........... -1-1- [0.000] 
76.54 
--- ... ....... [0.000] 
114.53 
[0.000] 
74.47 
[0.000] 
Hansen test 
.......... 
Xý(90) 
........... .......... 
90.24 
.............. [0.473] 
94.91 
.......... [0.341] 
101.52 
[0.1911 
102.88 
. ... . [0.167] 
ý 
96.90 
.................. [0.291] 
Notes: P-values are shown in square brackets. 
Table 8.6 Specification test for dynamic capital structure model with country 
dummies - long-term and short-term debt ratios 
No. of instruments 
Statistics LTDI 
105 
LTD2 
105 
STDI 
105 
STD2 
105 
Ist-order correlation z -5.46 -5.60 -5.89 ................. 
-6.22 
........... .......... ... . .............. . ............... .................. . --- ....... ....... ----------- ............ ..., ........... [0.000] ... ............ [0.000] [0.0001 [0.000] 
2 ind order correlation z -0.25 -0.64 2.06 
2.34 
................. . ........... ......... [0.8011 [0.524] [0.039] [0.019] 
Wald test (joint) 3) 40.30 
............. ............ ................... 
116.59 
....... .................................... ........... 
3,8... 0,5_ 50.. 02 
.......... .................. ................ [0.000] [0.0001 [0.000] [0.000] 
Hansen test x 
2(90) 87.28 
.......... I ............ - 
87.02 
............ 
100.40 95.77 
...... ... ..... [0.5621 [0.5691 [0.2131 [0.319] 
Notes: P-values are shown in square I)raCKCLS. 
I find evidence of significant negative first-order autocorrelation 
for all debt ratios, 
as expected, but still encounter the problem of second-order 
autocorrelation for 
short-term debt ratios. Also, the 
Wald tests corroborate the joint significance of all 
explanatory variables of 
debt equations and the Hansen tests confirm the validity of 
the instruments selected for all the 
leverage measures. 
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8.3.3 Results 
The estimation results using King's tax ratios based on the top corporate tax rates 
are presented in Table 8.7 for aggregate leverage ratios and Table 8.8 for long-terrn 
and short-term debt. The results obtained by using the top bracket corporate tax 
rates are essentially the same and are presented in Appendix 8.1 for the record. 
The signs and significance of estimated coefficients on the determinants of target 
debt functions are generally consistent with those obtained in Chapter 8.2. Therefore, 
the discussion will only focus on the coefficients on the lagged debt ratios. 
For all leverage ratios, the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables are 
positive and generally significant for both sub-samples, which is evidence for the 
existence of adjustment costs. The Continental European firms have an invariably 
higher coefficient (I -a) than the Anglo-Saxon companies for all forms of debt 
financing, suggesting that firms in the UK and Ireland have a higher speed of 
adjustment (measured by a) towards their optimal capital structure than those in 
Continental European countries. The results corroborate the hypothesis in Chapter 
8.3.1 that the companies in the Anglo-Saxon countries with larger and more liquid 
stock markets are more able to adjust to their optimal capital structure. In contrast, 
capital markets in Continental European countries are less developed, so firms have 
less flexibility in changing their debt structure. 
In the decomposition analysis, the coefficients on long-term debt ratios are again 
smaller than the corresponding short-term coefficients for both Anglo-Saxon and 
Continental European companies, suggesting a lower speed of adjustment (a) for 
short-term debt for firms under both systems. Compared with 
long-term debt, the 
adjustment of short-tenn debt levels of a firm is deterred 
by the liquidity risk created 
by short-term borrowing. Finns are reluctant to 
incur short-term borrowing because 
sometimes they may not be able to obtain refinancing. 
The results suggest that 
liquidity considerations play an important role in 
firms' financing decisions regardless 
of their corporate governance systems. 
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Table 8.7 Arellano-Bond GMM estimates with country dummies - aggregate leverage ratios 
LRI 
CDI*LR 
LR2 I LR3 
__ 
I LR4 I LR5 
0.4635*** 
........... I .......... 
0.4000*** 
....... ..... . 
0.4447*** 
........... I ....... ..... ..................... .. 
0.2507 0.3443 
(0.1698) (0.156 27) (0.1718) . ..... - (0.1795) 
CD2*LR 
Ll. 0.6744*** 0.7803*** ---- - ------------- 
(0.0983) (0.0911) 
TAN -0.5466*** -0.4196*** 
(0.1772) (0.1490) 
INTAN 
.............. - .............. .......... .. -0.2046* ......... .......... -0.1475 .......................................... (0.1073) (0.0958) 
SIZE 0.0296* 
............ ... . ......... 
0.0297** 
(0.0156) (0.0119) 
GROW 0.0019 -0.0005 
(0-0015) (0.0009) 
PROF -0.2454** ............. -. 1- - ........ -0.1823 ........................ ................ "... .................. (0.1139) (0.1278) 
LIQD -0.0316*** -0.0228*** 
(0.0113) (0.0071) 
VOLA -0.1184 -0.3646** 
(0.1359) (0.1534) 
NDTS 0.2540 
........... - -0.1419 -l-1-1.1-1--l- .............. ---. - (0.3710) (0.2937) 
TAXR 
.......... - 
0.0178* 
........... 11-1-1- .................. 
0.0053 
............................. I ................................ (0.0096) (0.0095) 
TXDVR -0.0521 -0.0552* 
(0.0282) (0.0296) 
TXDVE 
.............. ... 
0.0671** 
............ -I-I.......... 
0.0535* 
.... ...... - --1-- (0.0323) (0.0304) 
NODIV 
.......................... .. . . 
0.0039 
. ............... I ......................... ....... 
-0.0063 .... .................. I... . . ................. . (0.0157) (0.0145) 
TERM -0.0020 ........... 
-0.0041 
(0.0020) (0.0020) 
-............. 
0.7164*** 0.7136*** 0.6559*** 
(0.0948) (0.0853) (0.0838) 
-0.3286** -0.6278*** -0.6267*** 
(0.1307) (0.2275) (0-1946) 
-0.0622 ............ -0.1229 ..... -0.2817** .... .......... (0.0836) (0.1504) (0.1275) 
0.0270*** 0.0454** 0.0474*** 
(0.0091) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
-5.44E-06 0.0056*** 0.0040*** 
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0013) 
-0.2487* ................................... III- .......................... ..... -0.6758*** ..... ...................... .- -- ............... -0.4743*** -.. - .............. 1. - -1.11 ............... (0.1312) (0.1951) (0.1455) 
-0.0177** . .......... ... -0.0290*** ............ -0.0344*** .......... I. - ...... ..... ........... (0.0071) (0.0104) (0.0094) 
-0.2786* -0.4927* -0.4480** 
(0.1515) (0.2561) (0.1923) 
-0.0747 ............. 
0.3642 0.1746 
(0.2726) (0.4646) (0.4038) 
-0.0054 ................ -. 1'.. -I .............. ........................... -0.0124 - ......................... -. 1 -. 1 ........... 
0.0091 
....... (0.0083) (0.0136) (0.0108) 
-0.0566** ............. . ....... .. -0.0887** ................. I.. 1.1-1.11I. I. I. - 
-0.0600* -. - ............... ...... . (0.0251) (0.0416) (0.0353) 
0.0360 
.......... .. 
0.0771 
--- ................ 
0.0871 
.. ...... (0.0277) (0.0499) (0.0424) 
-0.0086 .................................. ... -0.0150 ................ - ............... 
-0.0021 ............ -1-1- -- ..... .. (0.0147) (0.0237) (0.0188) 
-0.0058*** . -0.0086*** 
-0.0050** 
.......... ............. (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.002 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in parenineses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<O. l 
208 
Table 8.8 Arellano-Bond GMM estimates with country dummies - long-term and short-term debt ratios 
LTD1 LTD2 STDI STD2 
CDI*LTD 
Ll. 0.4244*** 
(0.1147) 
CDý*LTD 
Lt. 0.5963*** 0.5149*** 
0.1272) (0.0989) 
__ TAN -0.3416** .......... .... I --- -. 1- -0.5025*** 1 ........... I I....., ......................... I...... -...... - 
- 
0.143 (0.1846) 
INTAN -0.1202 -0.2985* 
(0.0836) (0.1539) 
SIZE 0.0325*** 
.......... 
0.0620*** 
(0.0099) (0.0190) 
GROW 0.0010 
......................... .............. 
0.0075*** 
........... .............. ..................................... (0.0014) (0.0016) 
PROF -0.4084*** -0.9648*** .................... -. - I-- (0.1337) (0.1813) 
LIQD -0.0097 -0-0117 
(0.0068) (0.0104)_ 
VOLA -0.0386 -0.1403 
(0.1437) (0.2411) 
NDTS 0.0508 0.3110 
................ (0.3749) (0.5 3t 2) 
TAXR -0.0035 -0.0141 
0.0078) (0.0139) 
TY, DVR -0.0476* ................ --l-I ......... ........ -0.0655 ... 1--l- .......... (0.0279)_ (0.0416) 
TXDVE 
. ......... 
0.0029 
................ II...................... ..... ..... 
-0.0037 .......... .................... I -- ............ ...... . ........................ (0.0298) (0.0508) 
NODIV 
... 
0.0016 
........ 
0.0065 
... .......... .. -........... ............ . .... .... (0.0165) 240) 
TERM -0.0019 -0.0017 
(0.0020) (0.0030) 
0.4006*** 
(0-1362) 
0.5037*** 0'. 4339*"*'* - ------ 
(0.08-9-8) (0.0843) 
CD2*STD 
Lt. 0.6153*** 0.5707*** 
(0.0 (0.0842) 
TAN 
... -0.0193 . ........ -0.0737 (0.0411) (0.0666) 
INTAN 0.0,116 0.0201 
(0.0430) (0.0754) 
SIZE 
................ 
0.0008 0.0004 
(0.0036) (0.0073) 
GROW 
....................... -0.0006 ... ............... -0.0019*** ............................................ ... (0.0005) (0.0006) 
PROF 0.0547 
............... 
0.1180 
(0.0820) (0.1434) 
LIQD -0.0 114* -0.0186** 
(0.0061) (0.0091) 
VOLA -0.2084*** " 115*** -03 ............ (0.0739) (0.1206) 
__ NDTS 
........... -0.1407 -0.2382 (0.2065) (0.3248) 
TAXR -0.0014 -4.89E-05 
(0.0044) (0.0072) 
TXDVR -0.0104 ........... . -0.0226 ..... (0.0119) (0.0203) 
TXDVE 
.......... ............ ....... 
0.0327** 
...................... 
0.0726*** 
.......... ........ .. (0.0 1 ý63) 
NODIV 
............... 
-0.0042 .............. .. - -0.0097 (0.0 (0.0178) 
TERM -0.0034*** -0.0051*** 
(0.0012) (0.0019) 
Notes: The standard errors are snown in parcinjicNuý,. 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<O. l 
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8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter extends the empirical research of corporate financial decisions by 
focusing on the dynamics of capital structure. Firms are assumed to have an optimal 
target debt ratio which is specified as a function of firm-specific characteristics and 
also institutional features which may vary over time and/or across countries. 
However,, firms may temporarily deviate from their target capital structure in the 
presence of adjustment costs. A partial adjustment mechanism is then employed to 
take account of transaction costs incurred in adjusting towards the optimum. 
The model is estimated using the Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM approach after 
transforming the estimated equation using 'forward orthogonal deviation' suggested 
by Arellano and Bover (1995) with longer lags of dependent variables and 
endogenous explanatory variables as instruments. 
The main findings are summarized as follows. First, the results corroborate the 
existence of adjustment costs for all forms of debt and suggest a higher adjustment 
speed and thus lower costs in adjusting long-term debt to its target, compared to 
short-term debt. Second,, significant impact of King's ratios on total and short-terin 
debt ratios is observed, which re-confirms the argument that taxes have a significant 
impact on firms' borrowing decisions, even when accounting for adjustment costs. 
However, no significant results are obtained for non-debt tax shields and effective 
tax rates. Third, the term spread used to capture country-specific macroeconomic 
conditions is significantly negative as expected for total debt and short-tenn debt 
ratios. Fourth,, with regard to firm-specific control variables, leverage ratios at the 
aggregate level are positively related to size and negatively correlated with 
tangibility, intangibility, profitability, liquidity and volatility. Long-term debt ratios 
are positively influenced by size and growth opportunities 
but negatively affected 
by tangibility, intangibility and profitability. Moreover, the results suggest that 
short-term debt is only negatively related to growth opportunities, 
liquidity and 
volatility of firms. 
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The study has also focused on how different market and institutional factors would 
affect firms' adjustment speed in leverage ratios. The differences are reflected in the 
underlying corporate governance systems in different countries. The original sample 
is divided in to two sub-samples: the companies under the relation-based system 
from the Continental European countries, and the companies under the Anglo-Saxon 
system from Ireland and the UK. I consider these issues within a dynamic 
framework with country dummies included to estimate different coefficients on the 
lagged leverage ratios which measures the adjustment speed. It is observed that the 
Anglo-Saxon companies have shown a higher adjustment speed, and thus lower 
adjustment costs in all forms of debt, than the Continental European firms, which 
could be attributed to the larger size and higher activity and liquidity of capital 
markets in these countries, especially in the UK. Furthermore, firms show a lower 
adjustment speed and thus higher costs in adjusting short-term debt to its target, 
compared to long-term debt, regardless of their corporate governance systems. This 
confin-ns that liquidity considerations have an important impact on company 
financing decisions. 
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Appendix 8.1 Estimates using King's Tax Ratios based on the Top 
Bracket Tax Rates 
Table A 8.1.1 Arellano-Bond GMM estimates - aggregate leverage ratios 
LRI LR2 LR3 LR4 LR5 
LR 
Ll. 
.......... ............. 
0.5769*** 
.......... .......... ................. ............. 
............ -. 1-1- . ..... 0.6678*** 
.... ........................ I1-. 1 ........... 
0.6273*** 
.-................. - .......... 
0.5891 
... .......... ...... ... I.. ... 
0.5589*** 
(0.0739) (0.0732) (0.0761) . (0.0590) (0.0634) 
TAN -0.4996*** -0.3009*** -0.2722** -0.4277** -0-5099*** 
(0.1421) (0-1086) (0.1154) (0.1675) (0.1692) 
INTAN -0.3195*** -0.2223*** -0.1333* -0.2591 -0.3837*** 
(0.1046) (0-0852) (0.0791) (0.1379) (0.1268) 
SIZE___ 
....... 
0.039t** "29*** 0.03 0.0296*** 0.0515*** 
.... ... ...... . ........... 
0.0544*** 
(0.0168) (0.0121) (0-0095) (0.0191) (0.0190) 
GROW 0.0013 -0-0007 -0.0003 0.0046** .......... 
0.0032* 
(0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0-0017) 
PROF -0.3669*** -0.2596** -0.2672** - --- - ------ -0.6846*** -0.5813*** (0.1176) (0.1213) (0-1272) (0.1573) (0.1431) 
LIQD -0.0-")29*** . ......... .. -0.0210*** ............... -0.0178** .......... .......... -0.0239** -0.0327*** (0.0095) (0.0073) (0.0079) (0.0114) (0.0102) 
VOLA 
.. -0.0981 .................................................. . -0.3729** ............................................ ........... ........... -0.2956** ............ ................. . -0.5411 
** 
......................... ............................ -- ............ -0.4413** (0.1355) (0.1487) (0.1493) (0.2408) (0.1900) 
NDTS 
.......... 
0.0212 
............. -0.2826 . ........ -0.2547 ..... ..... 
-0.0653 ............. -0.0548 (0.3403) (0.2704) (0.2641) (0.4445) (0.4017) 
TAXR 0.0168 0.0044 -0.0049 -0.0146 0.0062 
(0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0082) (0.0154) (0.0126) 
TXIDVR -0.0673** ............... ............. ...... -0.0497* .................. I ..................... 
-0.0451** ...................................... -0.0715** ............... 
-0.0667** 
(0.0270) (0.026 (0.0230) (0.0339) (0.0327) 
TXDVE 0.0624* 0.0432 0.0250 0.0525 0.0755* 
....... ... (0.0336) (0.0305) (0.0295) (0.0504) (0.0431) 
NODIV 0.0081 -0.0045 -0.0070 -0.0110 
0.0014 
(0.016 (0.0166) (0.015 (0.0250) (0.0218) 
TERM -0.0012 -0.0036** -0.0054*** .......... -0.0072*** 
-0.0041 
........... ......... .... (0.0019) (0-001 (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0023) 
Notes: The standard errors are stiown in parentriescN. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<O. l 
212 
Table A 8.1.2 Arellano-Bond GMM estimates - long-term and short-term debt 
ratios 
LTDI LTD2 STDI STD2 
LTD 
................ . ...... .............................. .......... ... 
STI) 
. U., 
--. 1.1 - ................ .. 
5 1l.. 9.. o. *-*.. * 
.... . ... ...... . ..... ... .. 
479 1'.. * 
**, 
*, 
"' 
...... ........... .. Ll. ................ . .... ... .. 0.5974*** ........... 0.5438*** 
(0.1021) (0.0821) (0.. 069-9) (0.0630--) ........... . ... 
TAN -0.3044** -0.4499** TAN -0-0080 -0.0565 
(0.1323) (0.1824) (0.0409) (0.0676) 
INTAN -0.1581* -0.3566** INTAN 0.0198 0.0410 
(0.0862) (0.1530) (0.0472) (0.0809) 
SIZE "'51*** 0.0) 0.0651 
.............. ....................................... ........... 
SIZE 
..... . ..... 
0.0004 -0-0007 
(0.0099) (0.0195) (0.0037) (0.0074) 
GROW 0.0008 0.0070*** GROW -0.0008 -0.0022*** 
(0.0014) (0-0017) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
PROF -0.3933*** -0.9587*** PROF 0.0710 0.1455 
(0.1250) (0.1719) (0.0790) (0.1397) 
LIQD -0.0072 ... -0.0102 ..... . ------ -- ------ 
LIQD -0.0105* .......... -0.0178** (0.0071) (0.0111) (0.0058) (0.0090) 
VOLA -0.0607 ...... .... .............. - ................. -0.1530 ........ -, - -- ................................ 11 
VOLA 
1 ............................... .... ............... -0.2171 
*** 
............... -. - .......... - .... -0.3246*** ......... .......... -. 1- -1.1 1 -. 11.1 (0.1419) (0.2397) (0.0734) (0.1216) 
NDTS 
.... -0.0575 .............. 
0.1674 
.......... --- -11-- 
NDTS 
......... ..... .. -0.1215 ............ -0.2051 (0.3309) (0.5413) (0.1958) (0.3159) 
TAXR -0.0026 -0.0146 TAXR -0.0013 
0.0 080 00144 00 047 (0.0079) 
TXI[)VR 
............... -0.0406 ..................... -0.0595 .................. ..................................... 
TXDVR 
....... ............... ............................... .... -0.0111 ............. .... . 1.1 1..., 1.11-1 . ....... -0.0263 - .............. ........ -, .... ....... .. .......... .... (0.0284) (0.0417) (0.0116) (0.0197) 
TXDVE -0.0122 -0.0234 TXDVE .......... 
0.0353** 0.0786*** 
(0.0311) (0.05 (0.0166) (0.0278) 
NODIV 0.0010 0.0053 NODIV -0.0032 -0.0072 
(0.0170) (0.0242) (0.0085 (0.0180) 
TERM -0.0014 . -0.0012 ............. - ............ .... ............ 
TERM 
................. 
-0.0035*** ........... -0.0052*** . ................. ................. (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0012) (0.0019) 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<O. l 
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Table A 8.1.3 Arellano-Bond GMM estimates with country dummies 
aggregate leverage ratios 
LR1 LR2 LR3 LR4 LR5 
CD1*LR _ 
Ll. 0.4682*** 
....... .... 
0.3947** . ......... ...... . ........ 0.4228*** 0.2322 0.3481 
(0.1684) (0.1577) (0.1273) (0.1782) . ........ ..... (0.1803) 
...... . ... Ll. 
........... 
0.6773*** 0.7842*** 0.7218*** 0.7187*** 0.6607*** 
(0.0979) (0.0911) (0.0955) (0.0854) (0.0838) 
TAN 
-. 1--l .......... -0.5424*** -0.4203*** .......... -0.3368** .............. .................... ...................... .. -0.6377*** -0.6251 (0.1764) (0.1494) (0.13 3 2) (0.2301) (0.1946) 
INTAN -0.2101 -0.1570 -0.0755 -0.1445 -0.2861 
(0.1072) (0.0969) (0.0853) (0.1518) (0.1287) 
SIZE 0.0293* 0.0298** 
......... .... 
0.0277*** 
........... 
0.0463** 
............ 
0.0468*** 
(0.0156) (0.0119) (0.0093) (0.0184) (0.0181) 
GROW 
................. ....... 
0.0019 
.... ................................ .............. -0.0005 ........................................... ........... -0.0001 .......................... .................. ....................... 
0.0055*** 
.I.................. - ........ 
0.0039*** 
.. -1.1-1- ............... --., 11 ............ (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0013) 
PROF -0.2533** ............. -0.1901 -0.2634** . ...... -. 1- - .................. - ............ -0.7028*** -0.4820*** (0.1138) (0.1277) (0.1305) (0.1987) (0.1466) 
LIQD -0.03 10*** -0.0227*** -0.0179** -0.0292*** -0.0340*** 
(0.0114) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0103) (0.0094) 
VOLA -0.1255 -0.3686** -0.2785* .............. -0.4963* 
-0.4553** 
(0.1363) (0.1536) (0.1522) (0.2579) (0.1933) 
NDTS 0.2836 
.............. -0.1297 
-0.0636 . 
0.3923 
.......... -1.1.1-11-1-. 1 ............. 
0.2095 
. (0.3658) (0.2892) (0.2710) (0.4578) (0.3964) 
TAXR 0.0180* 
- --- -------- 
0.0056 -0.0050 -0.01116 0.0993 
(0.0096) (0.0095) (0.0083) (0.0135) (0.0108) 
TXDVR -0.0577** -0.0586* I. I. -I-11--l... ................................. I-- ............ 
-0.0609** - ............ -.................. ... .. 
-0.0999** ........... -0.0663* .... ................... .................. .......................... (0.0283) (0.0303) (0.026_6) (0.0442) (0.0360) 
TXDVE 0.0549* 0.0452 
................. .............. I .......... 
0.0289 
............... I ............ .............. -. 
0.. 061 4 
..................... .... ..... ..... ........ 
0.0.743 
.................................... I .............................. ... ........... ........... (0.0316) (0.03 (0.0286) _(0.0509) 
(0.0425) 
NODIV 0.0029 -0.0070 -0.0093 ....... .... I ....................... 
-0.0168 -0.0032 
.......... ............ I-- ..... ..... I-- ................. (0.0157) (0-01 (0.0147) (0.0239) (0.0187) 
TERM -0.0019 
(0.0020) 
-0.0041**ý 
(0.0020) 
-0.0058*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.00,86**-* 
9) 
-0.0049** 
(0.0024) 
Notes: The st 
*** p<0.01; * 
andard errors are 
* p<0.05; * p<0 
shown in paren 
.1 
theses. 
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Table A 8.1.4 Arellano-Bond GMM estimates with country dummies - long- term and short-term debt ratios 
LTDI LTD2 STD1 
C,. Dl*LTD CDI*STD 
STD2 
0.3920*** 0.3719** Lt. 0.5029*** 0.4-"')'5 4 .......... ....................... (0.1159) (0.1389) (0.0894) 
CD2*LTD CD2*STD 
Ll. 0.6027*** 0.5214*** Ll. 0.6156*** 0.5698*** 
(0.1288) (0.0995) (0.0946) (0.0842) 
TAN 
.................... -0.3538** .... ............. ........... -. - ................................. -0.5110*** ...... ........... -, ............... ... I .................... 
TAN 
...... I...., ... ....... -0.0221 . ..... .. 1 1-1 -.... ............ -0.0793 .. . (0.1469) (0.1891) (0.0410) .. . (0.0664) 
INTAN -0.1385 -0.3237** INTAN 0.0167 0.0317 
(0.0876) (0.1579) (0.0433) (0.0775) 
SIZE 0.0 3-36 0.0632*** SIZE 0.0005 -0.0003 
(0.0101) (0.0192) (0.0035) (0.0073) 
GROW 0.0009 
........... --. - .............. ............. 
0.0075*** 
.................... ................................................. 
GROW 
.............. .... ...... ............ ... -0.0006 ............ -0.0019*** (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
PROF -0.4249*** ....... ..... - -0.9851*** ............ ............ .. 
PROF 0.0570 0.1228 
(0.1327) (0.1864) (0.0820) (0.1447) 
LIQD -0.0099 -0.0117 ' 
LIQD 
_-O,. 
O 11,6* _ -0.0190** 
0.0069) (0.0104) (0.0061) (0.0091) 
VOLA -0.0390 -0.1440 VOLA -0.2074*** -0.3102*** 
(0.1453) (0.2430) (0.0738) (0.1203) 
NDTS 0.0668 
............. 
0.3364 
. .......... 
NDTS -0.1350 -0.2203 
(0.3738) (0.5231) (0.2039) (0.3229) 
TAXR -0.0029 -0.0131 TAXR -970017 79.0,997 
(0.0078) (0.01.37) (0.0044) (0.0071) 
TXDVR -0.0504* - ............. ........... .......... -0.0680 .......... 
TXDVR -0.0119 ......... ...... .. -0.0262 ............... ....................... .................... (0.0290) (0.0439) (0.0121) (0.0205) 
TXDVE -0.0082 ...... -0.0207 ....................................... 
TXDVE 
............. 
0.0367** 
.......... - ........ ... ..................... 
0.0794*** 
- ............................. ........... ............. 1-1 ..... (0.0305) (0.0515) (0.0169) (0.0280) 
NODIV 0.0007 0.0048 
....................... 
NODIV 
............ 
-0.0037 -0.9086 
........... ................... (0.0163) (0.0 (0.0088) (0.0179) 
TERM -0.0021 -0.0020 
TERM -0.0033_*** -0.0049*** 
(0.0020). (0.0030) (0.0012) __. 
(0.0019) 
Notes: The standard errors are stiown in parenineses. 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<O. l 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
The main purposes of this study are: to systematically examine the characteristics of 
the corporate tax regimes in a sample of European countries; to propose an 
appropriate way to model these existing tax systems; and then to study the impact of 
taxation on corporate financial policies. In this chapter, I summarize the main 
findings, discuss the shortcomings of the present work and suggest further research 
in this area. 
9.2 Taxation in the EU and the Modelling of Tax Systems 
There were many changes in tax regimes within the sample European countries 
during the period 1993 to 2005, including both cuts in corporate income tax rates 
and more structural changes in tax systems. All the three main corporate tax systems, 
the classical system, the imputation system and the two-rate system can be found in 
the sample, and the main trend of changes in the sample period is to move away 
from the imputation system. At present, most of the sample countries are applying 
classical tax systems with different forms and levels of shareholder relief to 
alleviate the double taxation problem. Personal taxation shows more variation 
among countries. Personal tax rates differ for different sources of income. Dividend 
and interest payments are usually added to the tax base and taxed at progressive 
personal tax rates or are subject to a lower final withholding tax at flat rates. In 
some countries, only part of the dividend income is included in taxable 
income for 
individual investors or, as in Greece, dividend income is not subject to personal 
taxation. Capital gains income is generally taxed at a flat rate or even exempted 
from tax in some countries. 
The study of the impact of taxes on corporate 
financing decisions has been 
hampered by two major problems: the difficulty of 
finding tax measures that 
precisely capture the essence of the whole 
tax code due to the complication of 
national tax systems, and the 
infrequency of tax changes (which makes it difficult to 
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analyse the impact of such changes). Regarding the first problem, I finally adopted 
King's tax ratios which were calculated using the top (bracket) statutory corporate 
tax rates. These are believed to Provide a relatively unambiguous and essentially 
exogenous measure of tax policy and therefore represent the best rule of thumb 
applicable to company financing decisions for the purpose of the present analysis. 
Since the impact of the tax system occurs through tax shelters, as well as tax rates, I 
model the effects of non-debt tax shields and the effective tax rate by including their 
proxies in the model. The endogeneity that this introduces is controlled for by using 
appropriate instrumental variable estimation techniques for panel data models. I deal 
with the second problem by studying a balanced panel of 129 non-financial 
companies from II European countries with different tax systems over the period 
1993 to 2005. Cross-country data enable the exploitation of both time-series and 
cross-sectional variations in tax rates, and thus generate sufficient variation in 
King's tax ratios derived from statutory tax rates to identify the effect of taxes on 
financial policy. 
9.3 Selection of Sample and Methodology 
The selection of the sample is intended to provide the best chance of identifying tax 
effects through variations in statutory tax rates over a relatively long time period for 
this type of study. Mid-sized firms are chosen in order to avoid the problem that 
large firms with foreign subsidiaries use tax shelters (such as transfer pricing) to 
avoid or evade tax liabilities, which makes it practically difficult to exactly match 
firms' tax status in any specific jurisdiction to their debt usage. 
Various leverage measures are applied in order to check for the robustness of the 
results. Total debt is decomposed into short-term and long-term to investigate 
whether there are differences among the determinants of 
debt with different 
maturity structures, as suggested by previous literature. 
I start the analysis within a fundamental static 
framework. The model is initiallý, ý 
estimated using the Hausman-Taylor 
(1981) estimator, which is essentially an 
instrumental variable random effects estimator. This estimator not only 
identifies the 
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coefficients on the time-invariant variables which are removed by the fixed effects 
estimator, but also controls for the endogeneity between the explanatory variables 
and the unobserved firm effects. However, endogeneity may occur more directly 
between the explanatory variables and the idiosyncratic error term since 
simultaneously-determined balance sheet entries appear on both side of the 
estimated models. Therefore, the models are re-estimated utilising the GMM 
approach suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995). The results show that applying 
the GMM estimator to take account of endogeneity at a more general level provides 
significant efficiency gains in the estimation, emphasizing the importance of a 
proper estimation procedure. 
I also extend the analysis by including dynamics in the model. A general dynamic 
adjustment model endogenizing the target debt ratio is adopted. In addition, a 
country dummy which interacts with the speed of adjustment is introduced into the 
model to capture the difference in adjustment costs between Continental European 
and Anglo-Saxon companies. The standard approach for dynamic capital structure 
models, the Arellano-Bond (199 1) GMM estimator is applied. 
9.4 The Impact of Taxes on Corporate Financial Policy 
The key conclusions are summarized as follows. 
The Static Framework 
Within the static framework, many results are in line with the existing 
literature and 
provide more support for the pecking order theory than 
for the trade-off theory. 
There is some evidence of differences between the 
determinants of long-term and 
short-term financing decisions. However, the 
differences are not as substantial as 
suggested by previous empirical studies. 
Overall, the results suggest that the major determinants of capital structure of 
sample European companies are 
taxation, non-debt tax shields, tangibility, 
intangibility, growth, profitability, liquidity, size, volatility, 
dividend payment and 
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macroeconomic factors. With regard to tax variables, the estimates show three 
results. 
(1) Tax policy measured by King's tax ratios has a significant impact on fin'ns' 
financing decisions and its main effect is on short-term rather than long-ten-n 
borrowing. More particularly, tax measures increase firms' incentive to finance 
with debt. 
(2) Non-debt tax shields are tax shelters for debt interest payments and are generally 
preferred by finns over debt. 
(3)) The effective tax rates are positively signed for both total debt and long-term 
debt ratios, which confirms the tax advantage of debt. 
For control variables,, the estimates support the following hypotheses. 
(1) Firms with more collateral assets use less debt, which could be related to the 
effect of collateral on non-debt tax shields as debt tax shelter substitutes. 
(2) Finns with more intangible assets use more debt financing, which corroborates 
the pecking order theory. 
(3) High growth firms prefer to use long-term debt to finance investment but avoid 
short-term borrowings. 
(4) Firms prefer to use the surplus generated by profits or liquid assets to finance 
investment to avoid increasing leverage. 
(5) Larger firms have lower bankruptcy costs and therefore can afford more debt 
than smaller firms. 
(6) Firms with volatile income have greater bankruptcy risk and therefore 
less debt. 
(7) Dividend payment has a substitute signalling effect for 
debt. Finns who do not 
pay dividends use more debt financing. 
(8) Firm leverage and term structure of interest rates are negatively correlated, 
which suggests that firms prefer equity 
financing to debt if an expansion in the 
economy is expected. 
Based on the estimated coefficients, 
I also evaluate the size of tax effects by 
calculating the impact of a 
10 percent increase in corporate tax rate in each country 
assuming no changes 
in other rates. The estimated tax effects 
in most countries are 
not large, as concluded 
by Graham (2008). Furthermore, short-term debt shows 
greater responsiveness to 
tax changes than long-term debt. 
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The Dynamic Framework 
Both empirical studies and surveys demonstrate that finns seek a target leverage 
ratio. However. firms may temporarily deviate from their target ratio after random 
shocks and return gradually to their optimum. This adjustment process is ignored by 
the conventional static capital structure model. In this research, a dynamic target 
adjustment model is applied. Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM approach is applied to 
obtain consistent estimates. 
The estimates reveal that fin-ns do bear significant costs when they adjust to their 
optimal capital structure. Regarding the determinants of target leverage ratios, the 
signs of the estimated coefficients are generally consistent with the GMM estimates 
obtained in the static model except for the intangibility variable. However, the 
consideration of adjustment costs has reduced the significance of some variables. In 
line with those obtained from static models, the estimates suggest that tax policy 
measured by King's tax ratios has a significant impact on firms'total debt and short- 
term debt ratios. However, no evidence is obtained for the effect of non-debt tax 
shields and effective tax rates. 
I also consider the impact of different institutional factors on firms' adjustment 
speed. By dividing sample firms into two groups according to their main corporate 
governance systems, it is found that Anglo-Saxon companies have exhibited a 
uniformly higher adjustment speed in all forms of debt than Continental European 
companies. This could be attributed to the larger and more liquid capital markets in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, which facilitate their adjustment process. In addition, the 
evidence suggests that both types of firm have a higher adjustment speed and thus 
lower costs in adjusting their long-term debt towards the optimal level (compared to 
short-term). 
9.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
First, it should be re-emphasized that the sample selection was 
intended to provide 
the best chance of identifying tax effects from variations 
in statutory tax rates. The 
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price of this approach is that several countries are represented by a relatively few 
firms. A larger sample both of firms and countries would produce greater cross- 
sectional variation in tax, firm leverage and control variables 
Second, when examining the impact of taxation and other factors on debt of 
different maturity structures, I decomposed total debt into short-term and long-term 
debt. However, previous literature (e. g. Bevan and Danbold, 2002) has suggested 
that a more detailed analysis of all forms of corporate debt is necessary and this 
would provide a complementary insight to this thesis. 
Third, regarding methodologies applied in the dynamic framework, the standard 
GMM estimator for dynamic models (Arellano and Bond, 1991) was applied. This 
approach involves a loss of information in that time-invariant effects cannot be 
identified. This is a serious problem in corporate finance studies because some time- 
invariant company-specific effects, such as industry classification, are known to be 
very important in financing decisions. A possible extension to the present analysis is 
to use the Blundell-Bond (1998) GMM estimator, which enables one to identify 
both time-variant and time-invariant variables. 
Finally,, an important puzzle raised by the results obtained concerns their 
implications for theory. The theoretical and empirical tax literature is mostly framed 
within the tax benefit/bankruptcy cost trade-off model. However, my empirical 
findings suggest that non-tax variables affect corporate financing decisions 
in a way 
somewhat more consistent with the pecking-order theory. 
More research is needed 
to reconcile these differences. 
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